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This study seeks to understand the factors that contributed to the successful development 
and implementation of the Air Force Furnishings Commodity Council (AFFCC).  
Specifically, we explore the challenges associated with supporting small business goals 
without sacrificing strategic outcomes, the difficulties of standing up a commodity 
council whose spend has no functional ownership or centralized funding, and the 
complexities of establishing accurate cost savings performance and validation metrics.  




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................6 
C. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................11 
D. IMPLICATIONS ...........................................................................................11 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................12 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................13 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................13 
B. THEORIES .....................................................................................................13 
1. Transaction Cost Economics .............................................................13 
2. Agency Theory ...................................................................................16 
3. Institutional Theory ...........................................................................17 
4. Social Exchange Theory ....................................................................20 
5. Theory of Production Competence ...................................................21 
C. STRATEGIC SOURCING ...........................................................................23 
1. Purchasing’s Strategic Evolution .....................................................23 
2. Brief History of Strategic Sourcing ..................................................26 
3. Kraljic’s Purchasing Portfolio Approach ........................................28 
4. Available Sourcing Strategies ...........................................................30 
D. DOD ACQUISITION POLICIES AND DIRECTIVES .............................31 
E. ORGANIZING FOR STRATEGIC SOURCING ......................................32 
1. Centralized, Decentralized, and Hybrid Organizational 
Structures............................................................................................32 
2. Brief History of Commodity Councils..............................................37 
3. Commodity Council Processes ..........................................................39 
a. Spend Analysis ........................................................................39 
b. Standardization of Requirements ...........................................41 
c. Market Research .....................................................................42 
d. Procurement Strategy Development .......................................44 
F. BARRIERS TO STRATEGIC SOURCING ...............................................46 
1. DoD Socioeconomic Goals .................................................................46 
2. Organizational Culture .....................................................................48 
3. Conflicting Government Objectives .................................................50 
a. Budget Maximization Theory .................................................50 
b. Bureau-Shaping Model...........................................................51 
G. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING AND CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................52 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................54 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................55 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................55 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES .........................................................................55 
 viii 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................56 
D. DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS .............................................................57 
E. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ................................................................59 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................60 
IV. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................61 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................61 
B. THE CASE .....................................................................................................61 
C. INTERVIEWS................................................................................................64 
1. Resource Allocation ...........................................................................64 
a. Personnel .................................................................................64 
b. Expertise ..................................................................................65 
2. Training ..............................................................................................66 
3. Development Process .........................................................................69 
a. Spend Analysis ........................................................................69 
b. Customer Involvement ............................................................70 
c. Supplier Integration ................................................................72 
d. Small Business Concerns .......................................................73 
e. Sourcing Strategy ....................................................................75 
4. Implementation ..................................................................................76 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................77 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................79 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................79 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...............................................79 
C. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS ........................................................97 
1. Resource Allocation Analysis ............................................................97 
2. Training Analysis ...............................................................................99 
3. Development Process Analysis ........................................................101 
4. Implementation Analysis .................................................................104 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................105 
1. Strategic Sourcing Distance Learning Degree Program ..............105 
2. Obtain Program Management, Spend Analysis, Market 
Analysis, and Cost Analysis Expertise ...........................................107 
3. Hire a Chief Procurement Officer from Industry ........................108 
4. Establish Customer Driven Commodity Councils ........................109 
5. Implement Negative Incentives to Mitigate Maverick Spend ......109 
6. Maximize GSA BPA Utilization .....................................................110 
E. STUDY LIMITATIONS .............................................................................111 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH...........................112 
G. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................113 
APPENDIX A. AFFCC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ......................................................115 
APPENDIX B. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE TRAINING MODULE 
SCHEDULE..............................................................................................................119 
APPENDIX C. DORM FURNISHINGS MANDATORY USE LETTER ......................121 
 ix 
APPENDIX D. SEATING MANDATORY USE LETTER .............................................123 
APPENDIX E. DOD 2010 SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT SCORECARD .....125 
APPENDIX F. SAVINGS REPORTING METHODOLOGY ........................................127 
APPENDIX G. MERCK’S PROCUREMENT SCORECARD .......................................129 
APPENDIX H. AFFCC COST SAVINGS SPREADSHEETS ........................................131 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................133 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................145 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Contract Obligations by Agency FY2010..........................................................2 
Figure 2. Component Process of Institutionalization ......................................................18 
Figure 3. Purchasing Portfolio Approach ........................................................................29 
Figure 4. Strategic Sourcing Framework ........................................................................32 
Figure 5. Characteristics of the Three Most Common Organizational Approaches .......34 
Figure 6. Center-Led Air Force Procurement Organizational Structure .........................37 
Figure 7. NCR Cost Reduction Levers and Tracking and Validation Process................90 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Federal Government Small Business Procurement Goals .................................6 
Table 2. AFFCC Informant Demographics....................................................................58 
Table 3. AFFCC Core Team Responsibilities ...............................................................64 
Table 4. NCR Procurement Savings Calculations .........................................................90 
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AF   Air Force 
AFAA   Air Force Audit Agency 
AFCEE/TDB  Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment/  
   Technical Directorate Built Infrastructure 
AFFARS  Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulations 
AFFCC  Air Force Furnishings Commodity Council 
AFITCC  Air Force Information Technology Commodity Council 
AFLMA  Air Force Logistics Management Agency 
AFSBSC  Air Force Small Business Solution Center 
AMC   Air Mobility Command 
ASCC   Aircraft Structures Commodity Council 
BPA   Blanket Purchase Agreement 
BPR   Business Process Reengineering 
CAMP   Commodity Acquisition Management Plan 
CAPS   Center for Advanced Procurement and Supply 
CBT   Computer-Based Training 
CC   Commodity Council 
CICA   Competition in Contracting Act 
CONS   Contracting Squadron  
DoD   Department of Defense 
DPAP   Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
ESG   Enterprise Sourcing Group 
FAR   Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FCC   Furnishings Commodity Council 
FDCC   Federal Desktop Core Configuration Compliance 
FSC   Federal Supply Code 
FSS   Federal Supply Schedule 
FSSI   Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative 
GSA   General Services Administration 
IAG   Installation Acquisition Group 
 xvi 
IAT   Installation Acquisition Transformation 
IDIQ   Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
IG   Informational Guidance 
IGE   Independent Government Estimate 
IOMA   Institute of Management and Administration 
KCX   Airborne Fuel Tanker/Cargo 
LGCC   Landing Gear Commodity Council 
LPTA   Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable 
MAJCOM  Air Force Major Command 
MRO   Maintenance, Repair, and Operations 
NAICS  North American Industry Classification System 
NCVA   National Committee on Value Analysis 
NEOCON  National Exposition of Contract Furnishings 
NETCENTS  Network Centric Solutions Contracts 
NPM   Not-for-Profit Managers 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
O&M   Operations and Maintenance 
OFFP   Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
OMB   Office of Management and Budget 
PSC   Product Service Code 
R&D   Research and Development 
RFI   Request for Information 
RQ   Research Question 
SAF   Secretary of the Air Force 
SAF/AQC  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Contracting) 
SECDEF  Secretary of Defense 
SET   Social Exchange Theory 
SKU   Stock Keeping Unit 
TCE   Transaction Cost Economics 
TCO   Total Cost of Ownership  
TPC   Theory of Production Competence 
U.S.   United States 
 xvii 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USAF   United States Air Force 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
UT   University of Tennessee 
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK   
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, our sincerest appreciation goes to our advisors, Lt Col Timothy Hawkins, 
PhD, and Dr. Rene Rendon. This research would not have been possible had it not been 
for their vision, guidance and support.    
We would also like to recognize all of the members of the Air Force Furnishings 
Commodity Council.  Their cooperation and assistance throughout our research proved 
instrumental in identifying the successes and challenges during development and 
implementation of the Air Force Furnishings Commodity Council. 
In addition, special thanks go to the NPS Acquisition Research Program for 
securing funding and providing administrative resources for this research.  Your 
assistance and support was invaluable. 
Finally, Mike would like to especially thank his wife, Kim, and daughter, 
Miranda, for their love, support, and sacrifices.  Kim and Miranda sacrificed more than 
anyone during this research and Mike is truly blessed to have Kim and Miranda in his 
life.   
Neal would like to thank his wife, Sandy, and daughter, Avery, for their love and 
support.  He could not have accomplished this research without their support.   
  
 xx 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory spending outlays have shrunk the federal budget allocation for 
discretionary spending (USD[AT&L], 2010).  This puts the Department of Defense 
(DoD) under pressure to find cost savings.  The pressure is apparent in the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) memorandum that requires agencies to develop a plan 
to reduce contract spending by 7% by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2011 and to reduce 
high-risk contracts (i.e., noncompetitive contracts, time and materials contracts, etc.) by 
10% (Orszag, 2009).  To reduce the overall DoD budget, the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) directed the DoD to pursue wide-ranging efficiency initiatives that would 
reduce $100 billion from the $400 billion spent annually on goods and services 
(USD[AT&L], 2010).   
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. government continues to outsource at an exponential rate.  “In FY2010, 
the U.S. government obligated $535 billion for contracts for the acquisition of goods, 
services, and research and development.  The $535 billion obligated on contracts is equal 
to 15% of the entire FY2010 U.S. budget of nearly $3.6 trillion” (Schwartz, Ginsberg, & 
Alexander, 2011).  According to USAspending.gov (2011), the DoD obligated $367.5 
billion in FY10; this comprises approximately 70% of total government contractual 
obligations.  Figure 1 illustrates government contract obligations by agency.  As a result 
of the significant amount of government contract obligations and the increasing budget 




Figure 1.   Contract Obligations by Agency FY2010 
(From: Schwartz, Ginsberg, & Alexander, 2011, p. 2) 
 
Strategic sourcing is in the early adoption stage within the DoD and has yet to 
become a core competency (Rendon, 2005).  The first known strategic sourcing activities 
in the DoD were initiated by the Air Force in 2001 as an offspring of the “Spares 
Campaign.”  In 2001, the Air Force created a purchasing and supply chain management 
track within its Education with Industry intern program, and sent six officers—one 
contracting and one supply—to three Fortune 500 firms (FedEx, IBM, and NCR) to 
observe industry best practices.  At this time, the Air Force began to consolidate sole 
source spare parts onto existing requirements contracts in order to save acquisition lead 
time and to reduce inventory costs.  In 2003, the Air Force stood up the first commodity 
council focused on strategically sourcing information technology items and services.  In 
2004, additional commodity councils began to operate that the three Air Logistics 
Centers.  By 2008, the USAF realized over $78M in cost savings through strategic 
sourcing, created the Acquisition Management Integration Center (AMIC), which was a 
center of excellence dedicated to the strategic sourcing of services, and began to 
restructure to support strategic sourcing under the Installation Acquisition 
Transformation (IAT) (USAF, 2009). 
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“In May 2003, the Department of Defense officially initiated strategic sourcing 
activities by establishing the DoD-Wide Strategic Sourcing Program (DWSS)” (U.S. 
DoD, 2006, p. 1).  The DWSS was the first strategic sourcing program developed by the 
DoD to improve acquisition efficiency and effectiveness (Censeo, 2004).  In 2005, the 
DWSS produced a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (U.S. DoD, 2006).  The CONOPS 
was the first strategic sourcing operational model that defined the DWSS’ governance 
structure, roles and responsibilities, and the strategic sourcing process (Censeo, 2004).  
The CONOPS led the Air Force to formalize its strategic sourcing policy in 2006 with the 
creation of Instructional Guidance (IG) IG5307.104-93 in the Air Force Federal 
Acquisition Regulations Supplement (AFFARS) (U.S. DoD, 2007).  The IG policy was 
updated in 2010 (USAF, 2010).  
The DoD and its various agencies continue to explore ways to improve 
acquisition.  This exploration into strategic sourcing is clearly defined in the Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy’s (DPAP) vision to “institutionalize strategic 
sourcing across the DoD supply chain to better meet warfighter needs and maximize 
taxpayer value” (DPAP, 2011).  The DPAP’s four broad objectives for strategic sourcing 
include (1) coordinating with DoD components and other defense agencies, (2) fostering 
a culture of strategic decision-making with respect to the acquisition of commodities and 
services, (3) leveraging information technology systems to increase enterprise-wide 
awareness of contract spend data, and (4) developing, training, and organizing the DoD 
acquisition enterprise to effectively execute strategic sourcing initiatives (DPAP, 2011).  
In particular, the U.S. Air Force (USAF, 2009a) listed seven initiatives in its Air Force 
Contracting Strategic Plan 2009–2013 to enable strategic sourcing across the enterprise 
(p. 19).  These initiatives include: 
• Develop a robust Air Force-wide strategic sourcing process with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities 
• Continue to grow the number of Commodity Councils 
• Strengthen support of partnerships and strategic sourcing activities across 
the Federal Government 




• Continue to support strategic sourcing enablers, including implementation 
of the Installation Acquisition Transformation (IAT) 
• Develop and deploy strategic sourcing training materials 
• Institute a strategic sourcing and commodity council outreach and 
awareness program 
The strategic sourcing initiatives identified above illustrate a change from the  
tactical purchasing strategy, employed by the U.S. military since its establishment in 
1789, to a strategic purchasing strategy.  As a result, the DoD’s culture and 
organizational structure supports tactical procurement, not strategic procurement.  
Tactical purchasing typically uses a decentralized organizational structure that supports 
only a local mission or unit and does not coordinate with other buying activities.  Tactical 
purchasing makes it difficult to manage enterprise-wide purchasing activities and tactical 
purchasing limits the ability of the purchasing organization to interact with and advise the 
CEO in regards to purchasing strategies (Moody, 2001). Strategic procurement, on the 
other hand, is typically centralized or center-led.  Strategic procurement views purchasing 
activities across the entire enterprise to seek out efficiencies to meet the same mission 
needs, but at reduced costs and better performance.   
Strategic procurement affects the entire enterprise.  Therefore, strategically 
procured requirements require complete organization buy-in.  Congress allocates funds to 
each Service who, in turn, delegates fund execution to lower levels.  This creates high 
procurement fragmentation of similar requirements.  In addition, strategic sourcing 
initiatives require accurate, consistent, objective, and verifiable cost savings performance 
and validation methodology.  Strategic sourcing initiatives such as commodity councils 
form voluntarily.  Once a strategic sourcing initiative starts, voluntary participation 
makes the development and implementation processes proceed slowly.  Since contracting 
cannot “own” the requirement, finding a functional “owner” of the spend can prove 
difficult for commodity councils.  Finally, after the sourcing initiative is implemented, a 
process must be established to steer all decentralized funds toward the strategically 
sourced contracts.  Without a high-level procurement official—such as a chief 
procurement officer (CPO) —in the organizational structure, strategic sourcing initiatives 
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become difficult to manage.  The lack of a high-level manager to oversee strategic 
sourcing initiatives also makes implementation of socio-economic goals difficult.    
The federal government must consider balancing between cost efficiency goals 
and socioeconomic goals when implementing strategic sourcing initiatives.  Since the 
passage of the Small Business Act of 1953, the federal government sought to 
significantly increase small business participation in government procurement.  As part of 
the Small Business Act of 1953,  
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, 
counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-
business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to 
insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or 
subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but 
not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and 
construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a 
fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such 
enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the 
Nation. (1953, § 661) 
Additionally, Congress created the Small Business Administration (SBA) to assist 
small business participation in federal government procurement and to ensure small 
businesses receive a fair proportion of federal government contracts (SBA, 1953).  
Congress continues to refine the goals established by the Small Business Act of 1953, 
specifically establishing separate small business set-aside goals for government agencies.  
Table 1 states the statutory goals mandated by the Small Business Act, the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act, the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 
1988, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the Small Business 
Reauthorization Act of 1997 (OFFP, 1999).  Each federal government agency negotiates 
their respective small business goals with the SBA.  The SBA provides a scorecard to 
each federal agency to identify how well they meet their small business objectives.  As 
shown in Appendix E, in 2010, the DoD met the small disadvantaged business and 
HUBZone goals while not meeting the small business, women-owned small business, and 
service-disabled veteran-owned small business goals (SBA, 2011).  Overall, the DoD 
received a “B” rating, averaging a 93.5% overall grade (SBA, 2011). 
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Table 1.   Federal Government Small Business Procurement Goals 
(From: OFFP, 1999) 
 
 
Since the DoD has not met three of their primary small business goals, external 
pressure from Congress, SBA, and small businesses subsequently increased. However, 
the efficiency savings from consolidation or bundling can make meeting small business 
goals difficult.  Consolidation or bundling of requirements increases the scope of work 
performed by the contractor.  Since a firm’s revenue or number of employees determines 
the small business designation within its industry, the increased scope can make it 
difficult to obtain competitive offers from two or more small businesses.  Subsequently, 
consolidated or bundled requirements could be issued as unrestricted requiring small 
businesses to compete directly with large businesses.  Therefore, the DoD faces the 
difficulty of balancing cost efficiency goals with socio-economic goals.     
The knowledge gained through an examination of the pitfalls, barriers, best 
practices, and lessons learned during the development and implementation of current 
commodity councils can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of commodity councils 
across the federal government.  This analysis focuses specifically on the Air Force’s 
Furniture Commodity Council (AFFCC). 
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
The Air Force spends approximately 50% of its budget on the purchase of goods 
and services (Gillen, 2006).  Maintenance and operating costs caused the Air Force to 
embark on a significant shift in its acquisition strategy to sustain and support the 
warfighter (Gillen, 2006).  To develop and implement enterprise-wide procurement, the 
Air Force is utilizing commodity councils.  According to the Secretary of the Air Force 
(SAF), “the term commodity council … describes a cross-functional group charged with 
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formulating a centralized purchasing strategy and establishing centralized contracts for 
enterprise wide requirements” (Gillen, 2006, p. 34).   
Among the most prominent means by which commodity councils reap substantial 
savings are leveraging purchase volume and rationalizing suppliers.  IBM saved millions 
by reducing its suppliers by 8%. Deere & Co. reduced the cost of maintenance, repair, 
and operations (RO) supplies by 13%; Lucent Technologies reduced the cost of some 
commodities by 50%; Cessna Aircraft improved production inventory returns by 113%; 
Hewlett-Packard saved $1 billion in material costs (Rendon, 2005, pp. 12–13).  The Air 
Force also achieved savings with the Air Force Information Technology Commodity 
Council (AFITCC).  By standardizing and aggregating its purchase of desktop and laptop 
computers, the Air Force saved more than $167 million (Federal Desktop Core 
Configuration Compliance [FDCC], 2011).   
It is important that commodities continue to be analyzed by the DoD for these 
potential savings.  In FY08 alone, the Air Force realized $78 million in cost savings 
through strategic sourcing.  The Aircraft Structures Commodity Council (ASCC) realized 
$4.4 million in cost savings.  The ASCC also reduced its acquisition lead-time from 
months to 40 days as a result of sourcing strategies.  The Landing Gear Commodity 
Council (LGCC) realized a savings of $4.3 million.  Additionally, the LGCC rationalized 
its supplier base by reducing its number of suppliers from 378 in FY07 to 149 in FY08 
(DoD, 2009). 
Commodity councils offer unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness.  The Air 
Force fully supports its goal to posture itself as a demanding customer to suppliers 
through the mandatory use of commodity councils (USAF, 2009a).  However, with the 
increasing use of commodity councils within the Air Force, there are a number of issues 
that need to be addressed.  
The first issue that we identified was the lack of understanding of the factors that 
contributed to the successful development and implementation of the AFFCC and its 
sourcing strategies.  Specifically, the Air Force doesn’t have adequate dissemination of 
lessons learned from prior commodity council rollouts.  Hence, the knowledge 
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management within the Air Force is not very robust.  The Air Force does have a 
repository of files that can be found in the Contracting website.  In addition, there are a 
few NPS theses that examined commodity councils and USAF strategic sourcing efforts 
(e.g., Osborn and Schoonmaker, 2007), but they are not well known by practitioners.  As 
a result, there is no follow-up research with respect to the NPS theses.  Therefore, we do 
not know whether the weaknesses cited in the 2007 NPS thesis have been resolved?  We 
also don’t understand why strategic sourcing strategies take so long to develop and 
implement.  Clearly, more research is needed to explore these issues.     
The second issue that must be explored is the conflicting guidance with respect to 
the use of the small business program, mandated by the Small Business Act of 1953, and 
strategic sourcing (Bail, 2009).  One could argue that strategic sourcing goals are 
impeded by small business goals.  Yet, the U.S. government continues to steer contracts 
to small businesses and to increase the use of strategic sourcing.  It is the U.S. 
government’s policy to support small business participation in contracts to the maximum 
extent possible (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2011).  However, there is a lack 
of research that determines whether supporting small business goals sacrifices strategic 
sourcing outcomes.  Bowman, Reed, Hudgens, and Searle (2006) asked the question, 
“How can a procurement organization simultaneously concentrate the supply base while 
increasing subcontracting goals and improving small business access to business 
opportunities” (p. 40)? 
However, not everyone agrees that meeting small business goals and strategic 
sourcing are mutually exclusive.  In a memorandum for chief acquisition officers, senior 
procurement officials, and agency small business directors, OMB states, 
A number of agencies already have identified impressive examples of 
saving taxpayers money by contracting with small businesses and, at the 
same time, taking greater advantage of fiscally responsible contracting 
practices, such as use of competition and lower-risk fixed-price contracts; 
small business contracting tools, such as competitive set-asides; and better 
use of technology. (Gordon, Mills, & Hinson, p. 8)   
Examples of this success include the Air Force Medical Services Commodity Council 
awarding 100% of the $40.7 million 2006 fiscal year funding to small business; 
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Information Technology Commodity Council achieving a 12% small business spend on 
$181.3 million; and the Air Force Force Protection Commodity Council awarding three 
small business contracts in the amount of $400 million (Stonerock, 2008).   In addition, 
small business goals were supported by the OMB memorandum dated February 11, 2011, 
which called for the increase of small business participation in federal contracting 
(Gordon et al., 2011).   
The third issue with respect to the use of commodity councils within the Air Force 
is whether the commodity councils can achieve cost savings objectives in cases in which 
the council has no functional ownership of spend or centralized funds (i.e., the 
furnishings commodity council does not generate requirements for furnishings or control 
the funds allocated to procure furnishings).   The lack of spend ownership makes it 
difficult for the commodity council to ensure compliance with procurement policy.  The 
lack of compliance results in commodity council efficiency loss.   
A fourth issue involving strategic sourcing via commodity council concerns the 
measurement of savings.  The commodity councils have reported significant savings, but 
these cost savings are proving difficult to verify (Air Force Audit Agency [AFAA], 
2010).  A question that remains unanswered is whether commodity councils can establish 
accurate and consistent cost savings metrics. Cost savings provide the measure of 
commodity council effectiveness. The AFAA recently found that the commodity councils 
inconsistently computed savings and reported savings that could not be validated (AFAA, 
2010).  According to the AFAA, “this condition occurred because SAF/AQC [Air Force 
Contracting] did not issue sufficient and timely guidance, provide adequate resources, or 
establish a stable management structure for commodity councils to perform effectively” 
(AFAA, 2010, p. 5).  The issue remains as to how to validly, accurately, and consistently 
measure cost savings and whether the identified cost savings metrics support the cost 
savings objectives.   
The final unanswered question about commodity councils is whether they can 
maximize utilization of their respective contracts and control “maverick” spending by 
organizations.  Maverick spend is defined as spend that is purchased outside of a 
mandatory purchasing process (i.e., outside of an in-place contract).  It is essential for the 
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Air Force to use its mandatory purchasing processes to procure goods and services.  
Without the mandatory use of strategic sourcing purchasing processes, significant savings 
will not be realized.  Maverick spending is caused by customers who fear a change in the 
supply process because they do not want to disturb the current supplier relationship due 
to some specific reason, a lack of planning, a desire for control, and/or a need for 
responsiveness.  Therefore, commodity councils must put in place processes that deter 
maverick spending by giving customers flexibility, thus deterring the need to buy “off-
contract” (Reese & Pohlman, 2005). 
The problems previously discussed within the AFFCC led to the need for this 
study.  Specifically, this study will seek to understand the factors that contributed to the 
successful development and implementation of the AFFCC and its sourcing strategies.  
The primary goals are to identify the key factors that led to the development and 
implementation of sourcing strategies, document and analyze challenges and successes of 
the AFFCC development and implementation, and provide a case study of the AFFCC to 
improve the future implementations of effective commodity councils.  The study will 
accomplish its goals via the discussion of the following five project objectives: 
1.  Understand the factors that contributed to the successful development and 
implementation of the AFFCC acquisition strategies.    
2.  Document and analyze the challenges and successes during the AFFCC 
strategy development and implementation process.  Specifically, this research will 
explore the challenges associated with supporting small business goals while not 
sacrificing strategic outcomes (e.g., increased savings, reduced transaction costs, 
and improved supplier performance)  
3.  Explore the difficulties of standing up a commodity council whose spend has 
no functional ownership or centralized fund allocation – issues not uncommon to 
indirect spend.  Here, the organizational processes and the organizational structure 
will be examined for lessons learned, best practices, and barriers to efficiency. 
4.  Document and analyze how the AFFCC computes cost savings in order to 
determine efficiency.  Specifically, this research will explore the challenges 
associated with establishing accurate, consistent, objective, and verifiable cost 
 11 
savings performance and validation methodology and accountability for the 
associated savings. 
5.  Explore the difficulties of controlling utilization of the AFFCC.  Here, the 
accountability process will be examined for lessons learned and best practices to 
maximize AFFCC effectiveness and mitigate “maverick” furnishings spending by 
organizations. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In this study, an explanatory case study methodology (Yin, 2003) is used to 
investigate the research questions.  A case study methodology answers the “how” or 
“why” questions purposed by researchers (Yin, 2003).  As stated earlier, in this study we 
seek to answer specific questions about the design and implementation of the AFFCC.  
We explored qualitative analyses of peer-reviewed literature, theories, government 
policies, directives, and guides, and we conducted interviews with past and present 
members of the AFFCC.  We analyzed the interviews to identify common themes and to 
reduce informant bias.  Additionally, we collected data from multiple sources to eliminate 
subjectivity. 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
A study that identifies the successes and challenges of commodity council 
development and implementation can offer tremendous insight and utility to practitioners.  
Each commodity council has its own unique issues.  However, documenting and 
analyzing the successes and challenges experienced by each commodity council 
individually provides a greater understanding of the overall development and 
implementation process.  Furthermore, identifying how commodity councils compute 
cost savings provides a benchmark for future commodity councils.  Without a greater 
understanding of government commodity council development and implementation 
process, the DoD will continue its slow progression toward full management of spend.  
Therefore, an explanatory study of the AFFCC garners insights needed to understand, 
apply and replicate the commodity council development and implementation process.   
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E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided the background, problem identification, research 
objectives, and research implications associated with the development and 
implementation of the AFFCC commodity council.  In Chapter II, we discuss topics 
relevant to strategic sourcing including theories underpinning strategic sourcing, 
purchasing’s strategic evolution, DoD acquisition policies and directives¸ organizing for 
strategic sourcing, and barriers to strategic sourcing.  Finally, we conclude the chapter by 
discussing business process reengineering and change management.  Chapter II provides 
the framework for understanding the development and implementation of strategic 
sourcing initiatives within the DoD.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we provide a brief review of topics relevant to strategic sourcing.  
The chapter begins with the discussion of various theories and outlines the evolution of 
strategic sourcing, which includes Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio Approach and 
current sourcing strategies.  Next, we discuss DoD acquisition policies and directives, 
organization for strategic sourcing, and barriers to strategic sourcing.  Finally, we 
conclude the chapter by defining business process reengineering and change management 
and discussing how organizations can utilize these concepts to transform mechanized 
purchasing to strategic sourcing.  
B. THEORIES 
Scholars conceptualize and create theories to help explain and predict phenomena.  
Facts, assumptions, and hypotheses converge in theory.  Facts are the foundation of 
theories because the absence of facts results in fiction.  Therefore, theories, which can 
only be disapproved, allow a plausible explanation of phenomena supported through 
continuous experimentation and exploration.  According to Garrison (2000), “theoretical 
inquiry is central to the vitality and development of a field of practice—not to mention its 
recognition and credibility from those not yet initiated in the field” (p. 3).  In addition, 
Garrison (2000) stated that theory is “invaluable in guiding the complex practice of a 
rational process” (p. 3).  Many theories provide insight into the procurement processes 
and relationships.  We summarized transaction cost economics, agency theory, 
institutional theory, social exchange theory, and theory of production competence since 
they provide a framework for understanding the development of strategic sourcing.   
1. Transaction Cost Economics 
In 1934, John R. Commons advanced transaction theory when he recognized 
governance structures that mediated the exchange of goods and services between separate 
entities (Williamson, 1981, p. 550).  Coase (1937) further advanced the theory of 
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transaction cost economics (TCE), also called transaction cost analysis or transaction cost 
theory, in his 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm.”  Coase (1937) stated the following: 
Why is not all production carried on by one big firm? … First, as a firm 
gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, 
that is, the cost of organizing additional transactions within the firm may 
rise. … Secondly, it may be that as the transactions which are organized 
increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the 
uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the 
factors of production. … Finally, the supply price of one or more of the 
factors of production may rise, because the “other advantages” of a small 
firm are greater than those of a larger firm. … a firm will tend to expand 
until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within a firm become 
equal to the costs of organizing in another firm. (pp. 394–395)    
When a transaction occurs, there is a cost associated with that transaction.  As Hobbs 
(1996) wrote, “transaction costs are simply the costs of carrying out any exchange, 
whether between firms in a marketplace or a transfer of resources between stages in a 
vertically integrated firm” (p. 17). 
Shook, Adams, Ketchen, and Craighead (2009) identified TCE as one of eight 
theories important to strategic sourcing.  TCE is a theory of firm governance (i.e., who 
does the work—the firm itself (in-source) or suppliers via contracts (outsource).  TCE 
analysis accounts for every transaction in the sourcing process.  “Transaction costs are 
the costs of running the system and include such ex-ante costs as drafting and negotiating 
contracts and such ex-post costs monitoring, and enforcing agreements” (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997, p. 31).  Transaction costs include both direct costs (e.g., negotiations, 
supplier management, and contract administration) and indirect costs (e.g., poor 
management decisions and costs born out of supplier opportunism).  In addition, TCE 
assumes that decision-makers select alternatives in a state of bounded rationality and act 
opportunistically (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  The first assumption, bounded rationality, 
builds on the premise that decision-makers’ cognitive capability is constrained, which 
limits their ability to act completely rationally (Simon, 1957).  Bounded rationality is 
caused by risk, uncertainty, incomplete information, and complexity of the decision-
making process (Simon, 1972).   In bounded rationality, decision-makers intend to make 
the rational decision, but they are limited by their cognitive abilities.  The second 
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assumption, opportunism, provides that the decision-maker intends to make self-serving 
decisions regardless of the rationale.  Opportunism involves dubious actions such as 
misleading or false statements, empty promises, and threats to take advantage of a 
situation (Conner & Prahalad, 1996).  Williamson stated, “Opportunism makes provision 
for self-interest seeking with guile” (1981, p. 554).  This statement refers to the harm 
caused to the other party.  Each party does not trust the other due to the threat of 
opportunism.  Therefore, the transaction becomes costly to craft and monitor (i.e., 
transaction costs) in efforts to seek protection.  Once the transaction is too costly, firms 
will perform the work in house (make vs. buy).   
TCE is especially important to DoD purchasing because the DoD outsources the 
majority of products and services.  In the absence of strategic sourcing, the DoD has 
hundreds of contractors responsible for providing similar products and services.  For 
example, in FY06, the USAF awarded 1,632 furniture contracts to 468 furniture suppliers 
with a value of $119.1M (HQ AMC, 2009).  As a result, the Air Force suffers from 
fragmented spend.  These excess contracts represent unnecessary transaction costs 
because the requirements could be consolidated into fewer contracts.  In addition, 
contracting with many suppliers increases the likelihood of behavioral uncertainty for 
performing in accordance with government’s expectations and requirements.  Behavioral 
uncertainty causes the government to write detailed contracts and perform extensive 
monitoring of suppliers to deter supplier opportunism.  The FAR prescribes detailed 
terms and conditions.  As a result, buyers are not empowered to craft appropriate 
contracts and suppliers are not trusted.  The detailed terms and conditions require detailed 
contract administration, particularly adequate manpower to negotiate and administer 
contracts, thereby increasing transaction costs.  Therefore, the addition of another 
supplier provides a compounding effect on transaction costs.  Accordingly, the Air 
Force’s execution of approximately 147,000 contract actions in fiscal year 2010 resulted 
in huge transaction costs.   
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2. Agency Theory 
One of the oldest and most commonly codified modes of social interaction, the 
agency relationship, involves two or more parties - the principal and the agent (Ross, 
1973).  The agent takes action on behalf of, or as a representative of another, known as 
the principal (Ross, 1973).  Arrow (1968) further explained that “the agent has been 
selected for his specialized knowledge and therefore the principal can never hope 
completely to check the agent’s performance” (p. 538).  Consequently, when the 
principal and agent have conflicting goals or attitudes toward risks and the agent’s 
actions are unverifiable, principal–agent problems arise (Eisenhardt, 1989a).   
Agency theory is defined by three assumptions: (1) self-interests are maximized, 
(2) life is a series of contracts governed by competitive self-interests, and (3) monitoring 
contracts proves costly and ineffective (Perrow, 1986).  Perrow (1986) stated, “contracts 
will be violated because of self-interest, and can be violated because of the costs and 
ineffectiveness of surveillance” (p. 12).  Agency theory seeks to explain how principals 
can minimize contract violations through effective contract choice (Perrow, 1986). 
The agency problem centers on selecting the optimal contract with the proper 
measurement and rewards for the agent’s service (Eisenhardt, 1985).  The principal has 
two contractual options to ensure optimal performance: behavior-based contract or 
outcome-based contract (Eisenhardt, 1985).  Behavior-based contracts are used when the 
principal has complete information about the agent’s behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1985).  The 
transparency of the transaction allows both parties to observe the agent’s performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1985).  In contrast, an outcome-based contract is more appropriate if the 
principal is not aware of the agent’s behaviors.  If the principal wanted to use a behavior-
based contract, a surveillance mechanism must be in place (Eisenhardt, 1985).  Without a 
surveillance mechanism to observe behavior, outcome-based contracts can penalize or 
reward outcomes that are out of the principal’s observable control (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
Eisenhardt (1989) stated, “Agency theory is most relevant in situations in which 
contracting problems are difficult” (p. 89).  Suppliers act as agents to the government  
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under contracts.  When the suppliers’ self-interest seeking behaviors deviate from the 
government’s intent, there is a principal-agent problem.  This leads to a clash of cultures 
as described by Cohen and Eimicke (2008).   
A government agency contracting for goods or services is sold these items 
by vendors who may attempt to demonstrate their belief in the agency’s 
mission.  While that belief may be sincere, the underlying factor that 
motivates the firm’s behavior is not adherence to the agency’s mission but 
increased market share, profit, and return on equity. (p. 18) 
Strategic sourcing mitigates the principal-agent problem and the clash of cultures 
through the deliberate alignment of the government’s goals with the supplier’s goals.  
This mitigates the chances that suppliers will engage in self-seeking behaviors that 
deviate from the government’s requirements.  In traditional sourcing, the government 
usually seeks at least three sources.  In strategic sourcing, the government seeks, not just 
any three sources, but the best-in-class suppliers whose goals best align with those of the 
government.  Therefore, agency theory provides useful insight into buyer and supplier 
goal and risk assumption conflicts arising during and after contract award.  Using the 
best-in-class suppliers as well as fewer suppliers and contracts should reduce the 
principle-agent problem.  As a result, agency theory can enhance a manager’s awareness 
when he or she is selecting the most effective contract to incentivize the agent.          
3. Institutional Theory 
Institutions are created for a common purpose.  For example, whether to protect 
nations or to promote humane treatment of animals, institutions set out on a clear path 
toward their goals. Along the way, institutions receive pressure from both internal and 
external forces that guide the direction they take.  Many scholars study institutions to 
gain greater insight into how forces shape organizations.  A prominent theory that 
provides understanding of the institution is institutional theory.  Institutional theory 
“suggests that the firm managers look to industry norms, firm traditions, management 




Furthermore, “institutional theory explains how an organization’s environment, through 
regulative, normative and cognitive mechanisms, institutionalizes and legitimizes 
strategies” (Shook et al., 2009, p. 1). 
Thus, understanding the behavioral patterns through the “institutionalization 
process” is critical for institutionalizing strategic sourcing strategy in the DoD.  Tolbert 
and Zucker (1996) provided a framework for the institutional process.  As shown in 
Figure 2, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) argued that the components of the 
institutionalization process include innovation, habitualization, objectification, and 
sedimentation.  Innovation is the driving force for change in an institution.  Innovation is 
what causes an institution to revisit its current policies and strategies.  The forces that 
push innovation within an institution are technological change, legislation, and market 
forces (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  For strategic sourcing, legislation and market forces are 
the main driving force pushing this innovation.  For example, the budget is decreasing 
due to decreased tax revenue (i.e., market forces).  In addition, previous legislation 
created a federal government whose costs are unsustainable (e.g., entitlements).  Before 
innovation can begin the institutionalization process, it must be put into a structure that 
can inhabit the institution. 
 
Figure 2.   Component Process of Institutionalization 
(From: Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 182) 
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Next, the innovation must be internalized and legitimized.  Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996) stated that habitualization “involves the generation of new structural arrangements 
in response to a specific organizational problem or set of problems, and the formalization 
of such arrangements in the policies and procedures” (p. 181).  In the habitualization 
stage, the innovation is compartmented and has not been fully adopted by the institution.  
Therefore, there is little interaction with the non-adopters within the institution.  It is not 
until the innovation has widespread consensus among decision-makers that it moves to 
permanent status within the institution. 
Objectification, as stated by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), “involves the 
development of some degree of social consensus among decision-makers concerning the 
value of a structure, and the increasing adoption by organizations on the basis of that 
consensus” (p. 182). During objectification, key stakeholders, influencers, and 
competitors provide inputs into the innovation’s adoptions.  Groups within and outside 
the organization will oppose or advocate the adoption of the innovation.  In addition, 
previous inventions are seen as more cost-effective options than the current innovation.  
However, the trajectory toward full institutionalization is well defined.  Strategic 
sourcing, while we argue that it still resides within the habitualization phase for the DoD 
as a whole, seemingly began the process of objectification within the contracting 
community.  The DoD is currently benchmarking and looking at past sourcing initiatives 
as ways to improve acquisition efficiency.  Although strategic sourcing continues a 
trajectory toward sedimentation within the DoD, it still might not be widely adopted. 
Sedimentation is the final stage in the institutionalization process.  Sedimentation 
of the innovation is essential for an innovative process to be retained long-term within an 
organization. The generations that come after an innovation has become fully 
institutionalized will continue to implement it.  However, even after sedimentation, if the 
innovation lacks results, its validity will erode (Tolbert &  Zucker, 1996, p. 184).  If 
strategic sourcing becomes institutionalized, it will be imperative that it produce savings 
that meet an organization’s expectations or else it will fade like other management and 
process fads (e.g., total quality management in the 1990s). 
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4. Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory (SET) emerged from the fields of sociology and social 
psychology to explain the rewards of social interactions.  The basic concept of social 
exchange originates as early as the 1920s (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).  However, it 
was not until the 1960s that concerted research focused on social exchange from both 
psychology and technical economic analysis viewpoints (Emerson, 1976).   Four 
individuals—George Homans, John Thibaut, Harold Kelly, and Peter Blau—were 
responsible for the emergence of SET (Emerson, 1976).  Emerson (1976) argued that 
relationships are created and maintained by performing cost-benefit analyses of 
alternative outcomes.  Furthermore, Emerson (1976) argued that SET provides “the 
conceptual tools needed … to deal with exactly those topics that economics theory has 
trouble with: market imperfection” (p. 359).  The main motivation for interaction 
between partners (individuals or firms) is to receive a reward or avoid punishment 
(Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006).     
SET attributes actions among participants to their perceived proportionality of the 
value (social or activity) exchange.  If one partner emits behavior that is not equally 
valued by the other participant, the other participant reduces his or her own value 
production to a perceived equilibrium.  In addition, if the originator values the exchange 
more than the other participant, the originator must supplement his or her value 
production to create a sense of proportionality between participants (Homans, 1958).   
SET suggests that relationships that evolve over time have “trust, loyalty, and 
commitment” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 875).  Relationships with mutual trust, 
loyalty, and commitment foster an open communication environment and increase the 
likelihood of proportional value exchange.  This is important for effective 
implementation of strategic sourcing initiatives.  A positive buyer–supplier relationship is 
critical for strategic sourcing initiatives to be effective.  As described in the previous 
section about TCE, reducing the frequency of transactions reduces costs.   
Therefore, SET can provide the insight needed to improve the long-term 
relationship exchange between the DoD and its contractors.  For the types of spend that 
are conducive to relational exchange (e.g., strategic), SET tells of the social norms that 
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should be nurtured:  trust, commitment, flexibility, goal congruence, harmonization of 
conflict, mutuality, cooperation, etc.  These social norms make the transaction more 
efficient.  If a supplier  can be trusted to do what it is supposed to do (or what it knows 
the buyer needs it to do), then the buyer does not have to spend hours crafting the perfect 
contract, and does not have to spend hours and dedicate excessive people to oversee 
performance (i.e., inspection).  This lowers transaction costs.  Historically, the 
government is not very good at relational exchange.  In fact, although the USAF strategic 
sourcing process in the AFFARS IG shows supplier relationship management, nowhere is 
this defined or explained.  Nobody knows how to do it, what to expect from doing it, or 
how to measure it.   
Interestingly, what you see is that TCE cannot fully explain transactions.  For 
example, what if firms do not use a contract?  What if the full set of expectations and 
obligations is consummated in a simple hand shake?  TCE theory does not account for 
such a phenomenon.  Thus, it is not a complete theory.  It addresses the transaction from 
an economic perspective, but omits the social aspects.  Thus, relational exchange fills the 
gap as an alternative form of governance (other than a contract).  This alternative can be 
more efficient since transaction costs can be lowered.   However, relationships take time 
and effort to build and maintain.  As a result, supplier optimization becomes key.  A 
buying organization cannot expect to have the resources to build a relationship with 
thousands of suppliers.  Therefore, a best practice that emerged in industry is to reduce 
the number of suppliers first (i.e., supplier rationalization).  Then, develop relational 
exchange with the remaining few (for “strategic” spend).   
5. Theory of Production Competence 
The theory of production competence (TPC) was first introduced by Cleveland, 
Schroeder, and Anderson (1989).  TPC is “a measure of the combined effects of a 
manufacturer’s strengths and weaknesses in certain key performance areas” (Cleveland et 
al., 1989, p. 657) that captures the firm’s ability to effectively carry out its business 
strategy.  The following nine areas were identified as key areas that mean the difference 
between business success and failure: adaptive manufacturing, cost-effectiveness of 
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labor, delivery performance, logistics, production economies of scale, process 
technology, quality performance, throughput and lead-time, and vertical integration 
(Cleveland et al., 1989).  The successful implementation of these nine areas is reliant on a 
successful procurement and supply strategy.  The importance of procurement to 
production is evident because more than half of the total production cost is related to 
procurement cost (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001).  Procurement and supply competence entails 
“acquiring and managing supply chain resources to achieve the highest quality of supply 
at the lowest cost of ownership possible” (Cox, 2001, p. 11).  Thus, to acquire inputs at a 
lower cost of ownership, production competence must include procurement competence 
to ensure suppliers meet both quality and timeliness objectives.  “Simply put, ‘poor’ 
purchasing decisions might lead to inferior corporate performance, and ‘good’ purchasing 
decisions might lead to superior corporate performance” (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 
1996, p. 21).    
Depending on business strategy, two firms with the same strengths and 
weaknesses may result in one being successful and the other failing.  Therefore, 
production competence is determined by both production process and business strategy 
(Cleveland et al., 1989).  Although TPC can explain production’s contribution to the 
overall performance, TPC does not consider the external competitive environment 
(Vickery, 1991).  However, it can be argued that the external environment is accounted 
for in the firm’s business strategy.  Vickery (1991) states, “It is anticipated that firms 
whose strategies are matched with their competitive environments and whose 
manufacturing units are strongly supportive of their business strategies will outperform 
firms that lack this combination of attributes (pp. 642–643).  Hence, it is imperative that 
the firm’s business strategy include a robust production, procurement, and supply 
strategy to ensure adequate cost and production efficiencies.  TPC provides a good 
framework to identify whether or not the Air Force has the internal ability to carry out 
strategic sourcing effectively. 
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C. STRATEGIC SOURCING 
Strategy is not a new concept.  From the earliest battles, effective battlefield 
strategy allowed armies to gain a competitive advantage over adversaries.  This concept 
is no different for a firm.  The marketplace is a constant battlefield where firms fight for 
finite resources (capital, talent, equipment, property, etc.) to achieve better outcomes 
(customers and profits).  Barney and Ketchen (2001) support this resource-based view of 
the firm.  The objective to gain a competitive advantage over adversaries (competitors) is 
central to a firm’s long-term sustainment in the marketplace (Porter, 1980).  Competition 
creates a willingness within a firm to seek out new sources of competitive advantage.  
The purchasing function recently evolved to become such a recognized source of 
competitive advantage for the firm.    
1. Purchasing’s Strategic Evolution 
For centuries, the purchasing function provided a transaction-based role for 
meeting a firm’s strategic objectives.  The purchasing function was not seen by a firm as 
a source of competitive advantage (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 1996).  Its function was 
solely to source goods and services necessary for operations.  “Throughout the 1970s, 
purchasing’s role in the company was viewed by many as much more administrative than 
strategic” (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 1996, p. 20). 
Over time, the fundamental idea that purchasing was simply an administrative 
function began to change.  According to Rajagopal and Bernard (1993), “purchasing 
strategy first achieved a general level of recognition and interest in the mid-1970s” (p. 
13).  This was in large part due to increased outsourcing.  “Today manufacturing focus 
means learning how not to make things—how not to make parts that divert a company 
from cultivating its skills, parts its suppliers could make more efficiently” (Venkatesan, 
1992, p. 98).  “Outsourcing is becoming so sophisticated that even core functions like 
engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can—and often should—be moved 
outside” (Gottfredson, Puryear, & Phillips, 2005, p. 1).   
In the mid-1980s, firms changed their focus on an asset’s effect on the balance 
sheet to “its ability to control and make the most of critical capabilities” (Gottfredson et 
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al., 2005, p. 132).   In 1991, Cammish and Keough reported that “most corporations 
spend between 50 and 80 percent of sales on outside goods and services” (p. 22).  
However, firms began to reevaluate the sources of competitive advantage.   According to 
Barney (1991), “a firm is said to have a competitive advantage when it is implementing a 
value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy” (p. 102).     
Competitive advantage is obtained either through low-cost leadership or 
differentiation (Porter, 1980).  Firms have long evaluated all parts of their production 
process to look for potential cost savings.  As previously identified, with such a large 
percentage of goods and services being outsourced, some firms have subsequently 
increased their bargaining power with suppliers.  These firms use this power to gain a 
competitive advantage over rival firms.  According to Porter (1980), the buyer’s power is 
enhanced “if the products purchased from the industry represent a significant fraction of 
total purchases” (p. 39).  Leveraging buying power has a direct impact on profit.  Unlike 
sales, every dollar saved through purchasing more efficiently is a dollar that goes directly 
to profit.   
Strategic sourcing also provides non-fiduciary value creation.  Long-term 
orientation, open lines of communication between firms and suppliers, and close 
relationships with a few suppliers result in the increased long-run effectiveness of the 
organization (Chen, Pauraj, & Lado, 2004).  The improvements go beyond the price 
discounts due to economies of scale (volume buying).  Improvements are also seen in 
customer wait time.  For example, the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) saw 
decreases in the number of days a commodity remained in the shop, reductions in 
administrative lead time (ALT), and reductions in production lead time (PLT) (U.S. DoD. 
2007).   
Ellram and Carr (1994) performed a systematic literature review of purchasing 
strategy articles spanning 30 years.  Ellram and Carr (1994) categorized the articles into 
three distinct concerns: (1) the key strategic issues and options that confront the 
purchasing function, (2) the integration of the purchasing function into corporate strategy, 
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and (3) the times when purchasing is considered strategic.  In addition, Ellram and Carr 
(1994) identified five areas as key strategic issues that confront the purchasing function.  
The five areas are “the make or buy decision, supplier technology, type of supplier 
relationship desired, external market forces, and how purchasing can support the firm’s 
competitive strategy” (Ellram & Carr, 1994, pp. 16–17).  In reviewing relevant literature 
in their article, Ellram and Carr revealed that the second concern, integration of the 
purchasing function into corporate strategy, is necessary in the current business 
environment.  Ellram and Carr (1994) stated,  
The movement toward global sourcing, rapid changes in technology, and 
increased competition requires purchasing to assume more responsibility 
in the planning and implementation of strategies to support corporate 
strategy.  Suppliers play a critical role in supporting a firm’s competitive 
strategy, whether it be cost leadership, differentiation, or mixed strategy.  
The contributions of suppliers cannot be realized unless purchasing, the 
key interface, is a full participant in corporate planning and strategy 
formation. (p. 17)  
Additionally, the purchasing functions of continuous supply forecasting, monitoring 
suppliers, and early involvement with suppliers during product development and the 
production process positively impact profitability (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  Finally, Ellram 
and Carr (1994) addressed the concern about when purchasing’s role transitions from an 
ancillary role to a strategic role.  According to Ellram and Carr (1994), purchasing takes a 
strategic role within corporate strategy “when [it is] included in strategic planning and 
implementation at the same level as other functional areas” (p. 17).  This only occurs 
when top management executives recognize, accept, and operationalize purchasing 
strategy (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  Organizations do not change in short periods of time.  
Change is a long, iterative process.  Ellram and Carr (1994) acknowledged that 
purchasing is no different when they stated that “changing the view of management has 
been a slow process in most organizations” (p. 17).  Slow adoption of a purchasing 
strategy directly affects an organization’s competitive advantage.  In the current 
marketplace, “continued attrition to competitive sourcing will remain necessary just to 
keep up” (Monczka, Blascovich, Markham, Parker, & Slaight, 2010, p. 7).  In today’s  
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austere environment, monetary savings alone will not be enough for a firm to thrive or 
even survive; additional value must be created in the buyer and supplier relationship 
(Monczka, Blascovich et al., 2010).        
2. Brief History of Strategic Sourcing 
After realizing the financial and nonfinancial performance benefits that the 
purchasing function can provide, strategic purchasing strategies began to gain popularity 
within firms.  Since the 1980s, strategic sourcing has been widely accepted as a positive 
contribution to a firm’s performance (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 1996, p. 21).  
According to Carr and Smeltzer (1997), strategic sourcing is “the process of planning, 
implementing, evaluating, and controlling strategies and operating purchasing decisions 
for directing all activities of the purchasing function toward opportunities consistent with 
the firm’s capabilities to achieve its long-term goals” (p. 201).  This is not the only 
definition of strategic sourcing.  Osborn and Schoonmaker (2007) provided eleven 
separate definitions from various publications (p. 9).  Osborn and Schoonmaker (2007) 
recognized that their list is not all-inclusive of all strategic sourcing definitions (p. 8).  To 
this end, we offer DPAP’s official definition of strategic sourcing.  “Strategic sourcing is 
the collaborative and structured process of critically analyzing an organization’s spending 
and using this information to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and 
services more effectively and efficiently” (DPAP, 2011).  Strategic sourcing creates value 
by improving quality, reducing cycle time, or by obtaining “cheaper pricing, more 
favorable warranties, better terms and conditions, and/or increased realization of socio-
economic goals” (Newhart, 2006, p. 26).       
Osborn and Schoonmaker (2007) also identified three strategic sourcing processes 
retrieved from published literature: two provided by the Institute of Management and 
Administration (IOMA) and one provided by Newhart (2006, p. 10).  The IOMA 
presented a 15-step strategic sourcing process in 2003 and an eight-step process in 2005.  
In 2006, Newhart presented a three-step process (pp. 27–28).  The following three 
strategic sourcing components were identified by Osborn and Schoonmaker (2007) as 
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common between the IOMA’s and Newhart’s three processes: spend analysis, market 
analysis, and procurement strategy development (p. 11). 
A robust spend analysis is vital to strategic sourcing.  “Spend analysis provides 
the necessary foundation for procurement organizations seeking to make better, more 
informed sourcing decisions” (Aberdeen Group, 2007, p. 4).  In 2004, a RAND 
Corporation report suggested that private firms place a high importance on spend 
analysis, viewing spend analysis as “very important” or “critical” to the success of their 
firm (Aberdeen Group, 2002, p. vii).  Spend analysis provides information such as the 
percentage of the total spend per commodity, the number of contracts, top suppliers, the 
number of suppliers broken down by commodity categories, and so forth.  The spend 
analysis data provides savings opportunities that otherwise go unnoticed.  The missed 
savings opportunities that were identified during spend analysis are between 14–24% of 
total organizational spend (Aberdeen Group, 2007, p. 4).   
Once a spend analysis identifies opportunities for savings, a market analysis must 
be performed.  Market analysis is a systematic review of the supply market that assesses 
the availability of goods and services in terms of quality and quantity and the strengths of 
each supplier (Kraljic, 1983, p. 112).  Kraljic (1983) identified six criteria to evaluate 
suppliers during market analysis: suppliers’ capacity utilization, suppliers’ break-even 
stability, uniqueness of the suppliers’ product, annual volume purchased and expected 
growth in demand, past variations in capacity utilization of main production units, and 
potential costs in the event of non-delivery or inadequate quality (pp. 112–113).  The 
information analysts gleaned from market analysis allows companies to develop the 
appropriate procurement strategy. 
Spend and market analyses provide the data needed to make an appropriate 
procurement strategy.  For decades, companies were making procurement strategy with 
minimal spending or market situation inputs.  This caused the strategy to have lackluster 
performance.   
The reason these efforts often fail to measure expectations, even purely in 
terms of cost savings, is that most companies continue to make sourcing 
decisions on a piece-meal basis.  They have not put hard numbers against 
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the potential value of capability sourcing, and they’ve been slow to 
develop a comprehensive sourcing strategy that will keep them 
competitive in the global economy. (Gottfredson, Puryear, & Phillips, 
2005, p. 2) 
To determine an appropriate procurement strategy, many firms—including the DoD—
have utilized Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio Approach with success.   
3. Kraljic’s Purchasing Portfolio Approach 
In 1983, Kraljic introduced a fundamental way to identify and implement 
purchasing strategies in a firm (p. 110).  Kraljic (1983) stated the following: 
A company’s supply strategy depends on two factors: (1) the strategic 
importance of purchasing in terms of the value added by product line, the 
percentage of raw materials in total costs and their impact on profitability, 
and so on; and (2) the complexity of the supply market gauged by supply 
scarcity, pace of technology and/or materials substitution, entry barriers, 
logistics cost or complexity, and monopoly or oligopoly conditions. (p. 
110)   
Using Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio Approach, shown in Figure 3, “top 
management and senior purchasing executives can determine the type of supply strategy” 
(p. 110).  The strategy the company uses depends on its strategy to either exploit the 
firm’s purchasing power with key suppliers or to minimize the firm’s purchasing risks.  
Kraljic’s (1983) portfolio approach allows companies to discover new purchasing options 
or to recognize supply vulnerabilities.  The procurement focus identified in each 




Figure 3.   Purchasing Portfolio Approach 
(From: Kraljic, 1983, p. 111) 
 
Each one of the procurement focus categories—noncritical, leverage, bottleneck, 
and strategic—requires a unique approach for acquisition.  For instance, “bottleneck 
items may require specific market analysis and decision models … while vendor and 
value analysis, price forecasting models, and decision models may come into play on 
issues affecting leverage materials” (Kraljic, 1983, p. 112).  After performing spend and 
market analyses, companies can decide on an appropriate procurement strategy using 
Kraljic’s approach. 
Strategic sourcing is more than just purchasing from suppliers.  It requires an 
investment of time and resources while conducting spend and market analyses to discover 
potential savings.  Additionally, models such as Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio 
Approach should be used to help identify the appropriate procurement strategies for each 
commodity category.  A good strategic sourcing strategy can pay dividends in both 
private and public organizations.  For instance, between 1996 and 2006, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb saved $1.6 billion of its $10 billion total spend, and the state of Pennsylvania 
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saved $140 million in 2004 utilizing strategic sourcing (Newhart, 2006, p. 26).  The vast 
cumulative evidence strongly suggests that the DoD could achieve savings because it 
spends over $400 billion per year on the procurement of goods and services. 
4. Available Sourcing Strategies 
There is not one supply strategy that leads to successful strategic sourcing.  
Rather, firms need many strategies to successfully implement strategic purchasing.  
According to a study by Monczka and Peterson in 2008, there are eight supply strategies 
that must be implemented and that are critical to reaching strategic sourcing success.  
These strategies include the following:   
• commodity and supply strategy processes; 
• strategic cost management; 
• total cost of ownership; 
• world-class supplier quality; 
• global sourcing and supply; 
• strategic insourcing and outsourcing;      
• supplier assessment, measurement and communications; and 
• structuring and maintaining the supply base. 
The commodity strategy is a strategic sourcing strategy that focuses individually on 
specific product or service groups.  “The success of commodity strategies is based on 
maximizing the cost reduction advantages of leveraging combined buying power, … 
using market experts, … and forming strong relationships with suppliers” (Rendon, 2005, 
p. 9).  Commodity councils are designed to use aggregation of spend as leverage to 
achieve economies of scale.  The aggregation of spend by the firm allows the supplier 
base to be dramatically reduced, thus saving on transaction costs.  However, this is not 
the only strategy leading to success.  Commodity councils exist to apply the appropriate 
strategy to the spend category.  Leveraging volume might be appropriate or strategic cost 
management may be appropriate (e.g., value analysis).  The appropriate strategy depends 
on where the spend falls within Kraljic’s Purchasing Portfolio Approach. 
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D. DOD ACQUISITION POLICIES AND DIRECTIVES 
On May 20, 2005, the U.S. government officially directed all government 
agencies to identify three areas of spend that were candidates for strategic sourcing.  By 
January 2006, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) directed agencies to 
report results of strategic sourcing efforts (Johnson, 2005).  This memorandum was the 
first policy letter directing agencies to strategically source goods and services.  In this 
section, we highlight a few of the acquisition policies and directives that apply to 
strategic sourcing. 
One policy that was a result of the OMB’s 2005 memo was the Federal Strategic 
Sourcing Initiative (FSSI).  The FFSI is the U.S. government’s strategic sourcing solution 
to the growing cost of goods and services.  “FSSI encourages cross-government 
collaboration and adoption of industry best practices” (General Services Administration 
[GSA], 2011).  The primary goals of FSSI are as follows: 
• strategically source across federal agencies; 
• establish mechanisms to increase total cost savings, value, and 
socioeconomic participation; 
• collaborate with industry to develop optimal solutions; 
• share best practices; and 
• create a strategic sourcing community of practice. 
 
The FSSI was created through a partnership between the General Services Administration 
(GSA) and the Department of Treasury and currently strategically sources three spend 
categories: wireless telecommunications services, office supplies, and express and ground 
domestic delivery services (GSA, 2011). The FSSI is significant in that over 20 federal 
agencies utilize FSSI/GSA contracts. 
 In addition to the FSSI, the Air Force wrote its own informational guidance (IG) 
specific to strategic sourcing referred to as AF Strategic Sourcing and Commodity 
Council Guide.  The guide is incorporated into the Air Force Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (AFFARS).  The guide provides Air Force buyers with instruction on how to 
perform strategic sourcing (USAF, 2010). 
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 The DPAP created a DoD-wide strategic sourcing framework, which we show in 
Figure 4.  The framework standardized the strategic sourcing process across the DoD.   
 
Figure 4.   Strategic Sourcing Framework 
(From: Office of Strategic Sourcing, 2011) 
 
E. ORGANIZING FOR STRATEGIC SOURCING 
The organizational structure is a key ingredient in the successful implementation 
of strategic sourcing.  “The central purpose of structure is to coordinate the work divided 
in a variety of ways; how that coordination is achieved—by whom and with what—
dictates what the organization will look like” (Mintzberg, 1981).  In this section, we 
discuss the organizational structure needed for strategic sourcing. 
1. Centralized, Decentralized, and Hybrid Organizational Structures 
An organization can be structured in a centralized, decentralized, or hybrid 
structure.  An organization is centralized when the majority of decisions are made from 
the top level and pushed down to the lower levels.  On the other hand, a decentralized 
organization allows lower levels of the organization to provide input and make key 
organizational decisions without top-level approval.  An organization can never be fully 
centralized or decentralized, but it may have characteristics that lead the organization to 
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be more centralized or decentralized (Robbins & Coulter, 2007).  A hybrid organization 
is simply an organization that is both centralized and decentralized in its structure.  
Rudzki et al., summarized the characteristics of a decentralized, centralized, and hybrid 
structure in Figure 5. 
In the case of strategic sourcing, an organization must decide on a centralized, 
decentralized, or hybrid (center-led) structure.  Centralization allows an organization to 
fully utilize its buying power, but also it creates a more inflexible purchasing 
environment (Kraljic, 1983). “To find the right balance, companies must carefully 
consider trade-offs between clout and flexibility” (Kraljic, 1983).  In addition, where 
purchasing falls in the corporate structure will guide an organization to be structured as 
centralized, decentralized, or a hybrid.  Kraljic stated, “The purchasing department’s 
structure should reflect supply-product market affinities and permit staff with specialized 
competence to take the lead in working out strategies for specific items” (Kraljic, 1983).   
Research suggests that there is a negative correlation between business 
performance and decentralized decisions.  (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 1996).  As a 
result, decentralized purchasing structures require centralized corporate oversight for the 
structure to support the strategy (Carter, J. R., & Narasimhan, 1996).  In a study of factors 
that influence purchasing activities, “centralized purchasing organizations reported 
consistently higher involvement in major corporate activities (i.e., corporate strategic 
planning, outsourcing and financial/cash flow planning) compared to those with 
decentralized structures” (Johnson & Leenders, 1998, p. 14).    According to the study, 
88% of service and manufacturing firms used a centralized or hybrid structure and only 







Figure 5.   Characteristics of the Three Most Common Organizational Approaches 
(From: Rudzki et al., 2006, p. 51) 
 
  
Traditional USAF purchasing is decentralized.  Due to the USAF’s global reach, 
centralized purchasing is impossible.  Therefore, the USAF has implemented purchasing 
via a hybrid (center-led) organizational structure.  The commodity council contracts are 
created at a central location, but a decentralized structure is used for executing buys 
across the USAF.  The use of a hybrid organizational structure is supported through 
research.  Trent illustrated the gradual shift toward centrally coordinated or centrally led 
purchasing organizational designs (2004).    Rudzki et al. devote an entire chapter to a 
corporate structure led from the center.  Rudzki et al. states, “Hybrid: often called 




avoid serious disruption of corporate culture” (2005, p. 50).  Furthermore, Monczka and 
Peterson (2008) found that center-led organizations are correlated with unit price 
reductions.       
Some contend that both decentralized and centralized organizational designs can 
be effective.  “What’s important is your commitment, strategy, approach, and your entire 
company’s alignment around a few key objectives.  Organizations can be an enabler – but 
there is no definite right or wrong” (Rudzki, Smock, Katzorke, & Stewart, 2006, p. 52).   
Carter and Narasimhan (1996) suggested that the structure does not seem to matter in the 
end: “Organizational structure is only important in the degree to which it fosters 
purchasing strategy formulation, integration, and implementation” (p. 25).  This is also 
supported by Galbraith (2011), who stated that “most design efforts invest far too much 
time drawing the organizational chart and far too little on processes and rewards” (p. 4).  
In the end, each organization must decide which structure is best suited to its business 
environment.  No matter which organizational structure is used, the most important factor 
is that purchasing is linked with corporate strategy.  If purchasing is linked with corporate 
strategy, then the organization can concentrate more on the purchasing strategy, 
integration, and implementation and less on the purchasing organizational structure. 
In 2008, the economic downturn caused procurement leaders in industry to cut 
costs in an effort to manage against revenue shortfalls (Limberakis, 2011).  Budgetary 
pressures also forced DoD procurement leaders to cut costs in an effort to manage 
anticipated congressional appropriation reductions (USD[AT&L], 2010). To be 
successful at linking corporate strategy with purchasing strategy, executive level center-
led direction is needed from a senior acquisition official such as a Chief Procurement 
Officer (CPO) (Limberakis, 2011).  In addition, the CPO provides the catalyst for 
procurement change within an organization (Limberakis, 2011).   
There are three main benefits the CPOs brings to an organization: promoting 
short-term and long-term cost savings, improving acquisition processes, and increasing 
acquisition expertise (Ardent Partners, 2011).  Additionally, the CPO acts as a change 
agent within the organization.  
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When CPOs collaborate with other senior managers to champion goals 
that cross organizational and product line boundaries, the savings potential 
not only is greater but also creates an opportunity for purchasers to 
establish credibility with other business unit. (Hardt, Reinecke, & Spiller, 
2007, p. 123)  
This is important because an organization’s reluctance to follow or adopt recommended 
processes improvements creates a barrier to promoting the strategic relevance of 
procurement (Ardent Partners, 2011).         
 In an effort to fill the CPO void, the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 
(SARA) mandated the appointment of a Chief Acquisition Officers (CAO) and Service 
Procurement Executives (SPE) (2003, § 414).  However, SARA exempted the DoD from 
establishing a CAO or SPE (2003, § 414).  Within the Air Force, SAF and CSAF act as 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, respectively.  If leadership 
views the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and 
Management (SAF/AQ) as the CPO, then the two entities are too far disconnected from 
the MAJCOMS in the organizational structure to efficiently and effectively implement 
strategic sourcing.   
 To increased procurement efficiency and effectiveness initiatives (i.e., strategic 
sourcing), Fryman and Haile (2011) provide their Center-Led Air Force Procurement 
Organizational Structure for the addition of a CPO to the current Air Force 
organizational structure.  As shown in Figure 6, Fryman and Haile recommend the CPO 
be placed above the MAJCOM level directly under the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) 
(2011).  According to Fryman and Haile (2011), 
The purchasing center would be accountable for generating the savings 
required by the Air Force [.…] The purchasing units would essentially 
have two bosses. They would be responsible to the MAJCOMs for 
acquiring the required goods and services and would also be responsible to 
the purchasing center for meeting savings targets as depicted by the 
dashed line. The purchasing center would work with the functional 
directors as equals to ensure the broader organization’s savings goals are 
met. The purchasing center would also have to work with SAF/AQ to 
make sure the policy guidance matched the organization’s savings goals.  
Out of the relationship with SAF/AQ, the purchasing center would have a 
special link to the contracting program office and the program executive 
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offices where they would be held accountable like the purchasing units for 
meeting the organizations’ savings goals. (p. 107)   
While Fryman and Haile’s Center-Led Air Force Procurement Organizational Structure 
is currently only a recommendation, the addition of the CPO to the Air Force 
organizational structure fills the procurement leadership position needed to manage and 
promote acquisition efficiency initiatives throughout the Air Force organization. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Center-Led Air Force Procurement Organizational Structure 
(From: Fryman and Haile, 2011, p. 111) 
2. Brief History of Commodity Councils 
The commodity council concept is an industry best practice in the purchasing and 
supply chain management arena.  “In developing its strategy, the goal of a council is to 
help maximize the firm’s competitive advantage by extracting the maximum value for the 
commodity from its suppliers” (Ausink, Baldwin, & Paul, 2004).  According to the 
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Secretary of the Air Force (SAF), “the term commodity council … describes a cross-
functional group charged with formulating a centralized purchasing strategy and 
establishing centralized contracts for enterprise wide requirements” (Gillen, 2006, p. 34).  
As a result, strategic purchasing contracts align with strategic objectives.  From there, 
decentralized business units can execute purchases from the centralized contracts.  In 
essence, the commodity council transforms purchasing from a tactical process to a 
strategic process (Reese & Pohlman, 2005). 
The cross-functional group used by a commodity council differs from a traditional 
purchasing organization.  The cross-functional team is an innovative idea used in 
strategic purchasing.  The commodity council consists of not only purchasing 
professionals but also full-time subject-matter experts and experts in other business areas 
such as finance and small business representatives.  “Preferably, the council should 
contain commodity expertise, as well as knowledge in maintenance, engineering, 
procurement, technology, market analysis, project management, business processes, and 
acquisition strategy and analysis” (Gillen, 2006).  Traditional purchasing teams consist 
only of purchasing professionals.  The new cross-functional structure allows the 
commodity council to conduct a stakeholder analysis as well as receive stakeholder buy-
in.      
The commodity council concept emerged in 1994 when purchasing expert Gene 
Richter was hired by IBM to revamp its purchasing department.  Prior to Richter’s hiring, 
IBM’s purchasing was decentralized.  Each department purchased needed supplies.  
There was no formal coordination among the department’s buyers.  As a result, Richter 
consolidated buying across all departments into commodity councils.  This created formal 
purchasing coordination across all departments.  The results were impressive.  IBM was 
able to cut cost as a percentage of spend by over half.  In addition, IBM reduced its 
supplier base by 38% and spent 80% of spend with the top 6% of suppliers (Carbone, 
1997). 
The commodity council adds value in two ways.  First, the commodity council 
achieves savings through the consolidation of purchases across the entire enterprise.  
Thus, the commodity council allows an organization to use economies of scale to receive 
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lower contract prices.  Second, the commodity council members become the purchasing 
experts for a specific area of spend (Reese & Pohlman, 2005).  “This is accomplished by 
team members closely watching industry trends, monitoring supplier performance, and 
tracking requirements” (Reese & Pohlman, 2005).   This allows commodity councils to 
align spend with strategic objectives and to understand the market forces, the cost drivers, 
and the suppliers.  The commodity council members create value for an organization 
through their expert market and spend knowledge. 
3. Commodity Council Processes 
There are four essential activities that the commodity council must conduct.  This 
includes spend analysis, market research, standardization of goods and services, and 
procurement strategy development.  This section discusses these four processes in more 
detail.   
a. Spend Analysis 
Strategic sourcing is as much a strategy as it is a process.  One of the 
components leading to a strategic sourcing strategy is a spend analysis.  The spend 
analysis is the first step in the Air Force’s Strategic Sourcing Model.   
A first step toward which purchasing and supply management practices to 
use in any particular purchasing situation is to conduct a spend analysis, or 
an analysis of expenditures along a number of dimensions, such as type of 
commodity and supplier, number of contracts and amount of expenditures, 
and other variables showing how a firm currently spends its money on 
goods and services. (Moore, Cook, Grammich, & Lindenblatt, 2004, p. 
vii) 
This enables an organization to see how much money it spends on which products and 
services and from whom they purchase.  The results of spend analysis allow the user to 
see whether the spend is fragmented on the buyer side or supplier side—or both.  For 
example, the spend analysis allows the user to discover whether there are too many 
contracts per supplier, too many suppliers per commodity, too many buying activities per 
supplier, and too many suppliers.  In addition, spend analysis allows the organization to 
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determine who buys what and who its top suppliers are by spend.  This information is 
very powerful and is needed to know which sourcing strategy to utilize. 
The commodity council conducts a spend analysis twice during the 
strategic sourcing process.  They conduct the first spend analysis as part of the Air 
Force’s opportunity assessment of goods and services.  Under this phase, the commodity 
council collects Air Force spend data from various sources.  After data collection, they 
separate spend data based on percentage of total Air Force spend.  The commodity 
council then breaks the data out by purchases and suppliers (Moore et al., 2004).  From 
there, the council separates data based on market structure, North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), Product Service Code (PSC), Federal Supply Code 
(FSC), user/buyer, or any other characteristics that allow the spend data to be separated 
into pools of similar goods and services (USAF, 2010).  The results of the first spend 
analysis enable the Air Force to determine which commodities to group together to be 
managed by commodity councils.  The second spend analysis occurs after SAF/AQC 
charters the commodity council.  The commodity council conducts a spend analysis of 
the assigned spend falling under its purview in order to develop an appropriate sourcing 
strategy to gain efficiencies, thus allowing the Air Force to consolidate highly fragmented 
purchasing activities and suppliers.  
Spend analysis has achieved significant cost savings for many companies 
by reducing fragmented supplier bases.  In this section, we highlight a few of the results 
achieved by various companies that have used spend analyses.  Teradyne Semiconductor 
Test Division cut its $500 million annual spend by about 10% per year (Carbone, 2005).  
Honeywell reduced its supply base by 40–50% using an automated data collection 
system.  Lucent historically spent 80% of its spend with 20% of its suppliers.  The 
company was able to reduce the supplier base to 3.5%.  Rockwell’s spend analysis 
resulted in 5% annual cost savings.  Microsoft saved $1 billion in FY05 through the use 
of spend analysis (Carbone, 1997).  These examples highlight the importance of spend 
analysis in today’s budget environments.   
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b. Standardization of Requirements 
Standardization, as defined by the National Committee on Value Analysis 
(NCVA, 1961), is “the process of establishing agreement [the standard] upon definite 
quality, design, sizes, procedures, etc.” (p. 2).  There are two broad categories of 
standardization.  The first standardization category is “things.”  The standardization of 
these items can include the color, shape, size, construction, and performance 
characteristics.  These standards are industrial standards.  The other standardization 
category is “processes.”  Examples of the standardization of processes include accounting 
practices, operating rules, and maintenance procedures.  These standards are managerial 
standards (NCVA, 1961, p. 2).   
For centuries, standardization has been recognized for its ability to drive 
efficiencies throughout the useful life of the product or service.  In 1801, Eli Whitney, 
after growing frustrated with the musket production process, made huge contributions to 
the production process by designing musket parts that were interchangeable and by 
standardizing machines and tool dies to replicate those parts.  This allowed him to 
produce 10,000 muskets in the same amount of time a traditional gunsmith could produce 
only a few comparable muskets.  Thus, by using standardization, Whitney was able to 
transfer a complex production process into one that could be produced by machines and 
less-skilled labor (Burt & Dobler, 1996, p. 179). 
Henry Ford took Eli Whitney’s standardized production process one step 
further and created an assembly-line process in which he standardized parts in the 
automobile manufacturing process.  Ford’s mass production process took “many diverse 
products, assembled from standardized parts which themselves ha[d] been mass-
produced” (Burt & Dobler, 1996, p. 180).  Industry’s recognition of the benefits of parts 
standardization led to the formation of such organizations as the American National 
Standards Institute, International Organization for Standards, American Society for 
Testing and Materials, American Society for Quality Control, and the Society of 
Automotive Engineers.  As identified by Burt and Dobler (1996), “the use of standards 
permits a firm to purchase fewer items, in larger quantities, and at lower cost” (p. 181). 
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Therefore, the standardization of items saves money by lowering purchase prices, 
reducing process costs, reducing inventory carrying costs, and reducing quality issues 
(Burt & Dobler, 1996, p. 181).   
Organizations recognize the benefits of standardization and its direct 
impact on profitability.  A dollar saved from a standardization initiative during 
procurement is a dollar that goes directly to profit—that cannot be said from increasing 
market share through sales.  An increase in sales volume does not have the same effect on 
profitability because of the incremental cost associated with the sale.  However, if 
standardized sales procedures reduce process time, those savings would go directly to 
profit.  But it is the standardization of procedures, not sales, that has a direct effect on 
profit.  It should also be noted that standardization can improve performance (Clavel, 
Hemsworth, Martinez-Lorente, & Sanchez-Rodriguez, 2006).   
c. Market Research 
After the spend analysis is complete and a commodity council has been 
created, the commodity council members must analyze the industry for the specific 
commodity.  The commodity council conducts this analysis through a process known as 
market research (Nicosia & Moore, 2006).  “Market research is the process for gathering 
and analyzing data on industries, markets, and supplies for the purpose of aligning the 
needs of an enterprise with the right suppliers on key factors such as quality, delivery, 
cost, and other key performance indicators” (Nicosia & Moore, 2006, p. 2). The textbook 
definition of market research, as provided by the Air Force Logistics Management 
Agency (AFLMA), is a “process used to collect, organize, maintain, analyze, and present 
data for the purpose of maximizing the capabilities, technology, and competitive force of 
the marketplace to meet an organization’s need for supplies or services” (1997, p. 15).  
This definition was further advanced by practioners’ acknowledgement that market 
research is a continuously evolving process of achieving best-value solutions to reach a 
desired state (DoD, 2011).   
The market research process consists of four steps: analyze the industry, 
identify potential suppliers, evaluate potential suppliers, and manage potential suppliers 
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(Nicosia & Moore, 2006).  The first step is the industry analysis.  In this step, a firm 
analyzes the competitiveness of the industry (using Porter’s Five Forces Model), industry 
standards and norms (using industry benchmarks), and total cost of ownership (TCO) 
(Nicosia & Moore, 2006).  In the second step, the firm identifies potential suppliers via 
various internal and external sources of industry information.  In the third step, the firm 
evaluates the potential suppliers.  This step includes a preliminary analysis; a financial 
analysis; an analysis of performance, costs, and capabilities; and an evaluation 
conference between the buyer and supplier.  The final step is to manage the supply base.  
In this step the firm monitors and tracks supplier performance and developing potential 
suppliers (Nicosia & Moore, 2006).   
To make an informed acquisition strategy, a firm needs to include 
information on “key suppliers, available capacity, technology trends, price and cost data 
trends, technical requirements, environmental and regulatory issues, and any other data 
that is available” in its market research (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, & Patterson, 
2009, p. 205).  Additionally, Monczka, Handfield et al. (2009) stated that “the whole 
point of market research is to understand the prevailing market conditions and the ability 
of current or potential new suppliers to effectively deliver the product or service” (p. 
205).  This requires the collection of data from multiple information sources, including 
databases, websites, reports, trade journals, interviews, and so forth to get the most 
accurate picture of the market environment. 
Market research can be classified as either market surveillance or market 
investigation (AFLMA, 1997).  Market surveillance is an ongoing process in which the 
firm’s office of interest continually monitors the marketplace for technology innovation, 
process improvements, trends, and new suppliers (AFLMA, 1997).  The difference 
between market surveillance and market investigation is that market investigation is 
driven by a need.  Market investigation is used to “determine, with a high degree of 
confidence, what technology or products can satisfy user requirements” (AFLMA, 1997, 
p. 28).  Market investigation requires information provided from market surveillance 
along with current supplier information, requests for information, and so forth to develop 
an effective procurement strategy for the firm.    
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d. Procurement Strategy Development 
Once the members of the commodity council have educated themselves 
about the market conditions, the total category spend, and the potential solutions to the 
user’s requirement, they must develop a procurement strategy.  The results of the market 
research feed into the procurement strategy development or the sourcing strategy.  How 
well an organization implements supply strategies directly correlates to achieving a 
successful supply transformation (Monczka & Peterson, 2008).    
To increase value for both the end user and the firm, the firm must employ 
multiple supply (purchasing) strategies.  In 2008, the Global Research Center For 
Strategic Supply Management (formerly known as CAPS Research) issued a detailed 
report from data collected from 110 firms utilizing 23 supply strategies across 24 
industries. This research was designed to help firms as they move toward fully integrated 
purchasing and supply as part of the corporate strategy.  In the report, CAPS researchers 
Monczka and Petersen (2008) found that firms used “price-focused strategies such as 
strategic sourcing, low-cost country sourcing, e-reverse auctions, and supplier 
consolidation to gain scale advantage” (pp. 10–11).  However, as a firm continues its 
multi-year supply transformation, it needs to move away from short-term improvement 
objectives to long-term, more complex, value-driven objectives (Monczka & Petersen, 
2008).  These long-term supply strategies require integration and collaboration across 
functional areas.  To help with this transformation, critical supply strategies need to be 
identified, their respective importance to the firm and implementation phases identified, 
and a desired goal (end-state) defined by the firm (Monczka & Petersen, 2008).  The 
result of the study found that “the implementation of supply strategies is far lower than 
their corresponding importance” (Monczka & Petersen, 2008, p. 16).  The 
implementation lag is most likely a result of firms just beginning supply strategy 
transformation and not having progressed very high up the maturity model.  In addition, 
initial strategies might take more resources and longer time for completion.   
The top six supply strategies in order of importance are as follows: (1) 
human resources development; (2) vision, mission, and the strategic plan; (3) engagement 
by corporate executives and business unit leaders; (4) commodity and supplier strategy 
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process; (5) strategic cost management; and (6) measurement and evaluation.  Monczka 
and Petersen (2008) stated, “The top six rated strategies all focus on the initial building 
blocks of an effective supply function (enablers) and/or are critical to achieving cost 
improvement” (p. 18).  In addition, human resource development’s top ranking of 
importance supports the idea “that acquiring, developing, and retraining the best people 
will be extremely critical to supply success in a turbulent world” (Monczka & Petersen, 
2008, p. 18).   
As for the firm’s top implementation strategies, the top three supply 
strategies by importance were the same except for their order: (1) vision, mission, and the 
strategic plan; (2) engagement by corporate executives and business unit leaders; and (3) 
human resources development.  Again, the least implemented strategies required long-
term strategy, vision, and collaboration across business units (Monczka & Petersen, 
2008).  The CAPS researchers’ observation of the participants in the study was that “the 
least implemented strategies require the longest view and generally require integration 
across functions and cross-functional collaboration” (Monczka & Petersen, 2008, p. 20).  
However, the least implemented strategies may offer the greatest contribution to long-
term value creation.  These include innovation and accelerated change management; e-
sourcing and supply; supplier assessment, measurement, and communication; 
standardization of systems, components and processes versus creation of unique designs 
and specifications; and global sourcing and supply (Monczka & Petersen, 2008).   
For a firm to integrate purchasing (supply management) strategies into its 
overall strategy, the firm must establish purchasing strategies that have the greatest 
impact on its financial and market performance (Monczka, Blascovich et al., 2010).  
CAPS researchers (Monczka, Blascovich et al., 2010) provided a two-stage screening 
approach to delineate the purchasing strategies with the greatest impact on an 
organization’s objectives from all other purchasing strategies.  In the first stage, the firm 
identifies those strategies that “impact product sales, return on investment, profitability 
and/or significant problem resolution” (Monczka, Blascovich et al., 2010, p. 31).  The 
second stage is more granular than the first.  Here, the firm looks at not only which 
purchasing strategies have the largest impact on the phase 1 criteria, but also the 
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likelihood of implementation.  As discussed earlier, this changes as the firm progresses 
through the maturity model.  A purchasing strategy today might not be as effective as a 
purchasing strategy a month from now and vice versa.  Overall, purchasing strategy must 
have a holistic approach to improving the corporate strategy and be supported by top-
level executives (Monczka, Blascovich et al., 2010) 
In addition, Nicosia and Moore (2006) identify “four basic elements of a 
sourcing strategy: the buying policy, the number of sources, the type of source, and the 
supplier relationship” (p. 11).  These four factors directly contribute to Kraljic’s (1983) 
purchasing model to determine the optimal procurement strategy, which is based on the 
value of the commodity classified as the strategic and critical importance to the mission 
and the complexity of the supply market and risk.     
As we discussed previously, Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio 
Approach allows a firm to distinguish what type of strategy it should utilize for a 
respective product or service.  If the firm categorized the solution as routine (non-
critical), the procurement strategy should focus on the efficiency of the transaction (e.g., 
automation) and on price.  However, if the item falls into the critical (strategic) or 
bottleneck categories, the procurement strategy should focus on supplier integration to 
maximize overall supplier effectiveness.  “By effectively classifying the goods and 
services being purchased into one of these categories, those responsible for proposing a 
strategy are able to comprehend the strategic importance of the item to the business” 
(Monczka, Handfield et al., 2009, p. 212).  After the portfolio analysis is finished, an 
evaluation of suppliers must take place to ensure that they can support the procurement 
strategy and that there will be adequate competition.  However, barriers to certain 
procurement strategies exist that may create additional obstacles for the firm. 
F. BARRIERS TO STRATEGIC SOURCING 
1. DoD Socioeconomic Goals 
Supply base rationalization is a key aspect of strategic sourcing implementation.  
Supply base rationalization involves obtaining the appropriate amount of suppliers to 
achieve lower prices through leveraged volume, standardized service, and lower 
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transaction management costs (Duffy, 2005).  However, supply base rationalization is in 
direct conflict with the U.S. government’s socioeconomic policies.  The U.S. government 
strives to maximize social responsibility in the economic environment.  To maximize 
social responsibility, FAR subpart 19.201 states,  
It is the policy of the Government to provide maximum practicable 
opportunities in its acquisitions to small business, veteran-owned small 
business, service-disabled veteran-owned small business, HUBZone small 
business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned small business 
concerns. Such concerns must also have the maximum practicable 
opportunity to participate as subcontractors in the contracts awarded by 
any executive agency, consistent with efficient contract performance. 
(2011)  
In addition, the FAR attempts to balance acquisition efficiency (fair and reasonable price) 
with socioeconomic policy.  FAR subpart 1.102(2)(d) states, “the System must support 
the attainment of public policy goals adopted by the Congress and the President. In 
attaining these goals, and in its overall operations, the process shall ensure the efficient 
use of public resources” (2011).  This provides a difficult challenge for government 
organizations.  Socioeconomic considerations provide a level of complexity to DoD 
strategic sourcing initiatives that is unlike the level found in private-sector sourcing.  
Because the government is concerned with the opportunities for small businesses, 
sourcing strategies must include small business considerations.  However, socioeconomic 
policies can create long-term relationship problems (i.e., a small business outgrows its 
respective small business designation, a HUBZone has to relocate to a different region, or 
an 8a supplier graduates from the program).  
Consolidation and bundling are also issues when implementing strategic sourcing 
within government.  Bundling of requirements can provide substantial benefits to the 
government.  However, due to the increase in scope and volume of the requirement, there 
is a potential that the bundled requirement will adversely impact small businesses’ ability 
to compete.  This is primarily due to small businesses’ inability to provide a competitive 
bid because the amount of resources needed to perform is substantially larger than a small 
business’ capacity to perform.  FAR 7.107(b) states that bundling is considered to 
provide a substantial benefit if it saves either 10% of the estimate contract or order value 
 48 
(including options) if the value is $94 million or less or 5% of the estimated contract or 
order value (including options) of $9.4 million, whichever is greater, if the value exceeds 
$94 million.  In addition, FAR 7.104(d)(1) states that “if the strategy involves substantial 
bundling, the small business specialist shall assist in identifying alternative strategies that 
would reduce or minimize the scope of the bundling” (2011).  The government’s effort to 
find a balance between acquisition efficiency and socioeconomic policy requires the 
organization to think of innovative ways to implement strategic sourcing initiatives while 
promoting socioeconomic policies.  This will require a shift in organizational culture. 
2. Organizational Culture 
An organization’s culture has been taught and validated over time.  Edgar Schein 
(1984) stated that organizational culture is 
the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, 
discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, and that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 3) 
Through the passage of time, an organization molds a complex set of values, beliefs, 
assumptions, and symbols for the premise on which the organization conducts business 
both internally and externally (Barney, 1986).  Accordingly, the attributes of a culture 
shape strategy because they “are direct manifestations of cultural assumptions about what 
business a firm is in and how it conducts that business” (Barney, 1986, p. 657).     
Schein (1984) stated that there are three fundamental levels in which a group 
manifests itself: observable artifacts, values, and basic assumptions.  An organization’s 
artifacts can be seen and felt.  These include things such as physical layout, social 
interactions, dress code, annual reports, products, and mission statements.  However, 
while artifacts are easy to detect, they can be hard to decipher.  To the external 
individual, the artifact’s physical presence does not provide any indication of how the 
internal culture will react to such artifacts (Barney, 1991).  Therefore, the external 
individual concludes incorrect inferences about the organization. 
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To further understand the culture of an organization, one can study the values that 
govern behavior.  Values can be thought of as “internalized normative beliefs that can 
guide behavior” (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991, p. 7).  Values are hard to observe 
directly.  The interested party infers values by interviewing key members of the 
organization or by analyzing the content of artifacts (Schein, 1984).  However, to really 
understand the culture, one must “delve into the underlying assumptions, which are 
typically unconscious but which actually determine how group members perceive, think, 
and feel” (Schein, 1984, p. 3).  By delving deeper to understand the assumptions of the 
organization, one can better understand how cultures can seem to be ambiguous or even 
self-contradictory.  Assumptions are a powerful source for understanding culture because 
they are less debatable (Schein, 1984).  They provide a second-nature response within the 
organization, and to go against that response is unthinkable.    
Researchers agree that organizational culture is a key factor in determining how 
well an individual fits into the organization (O’Reilly et al., 1991).  The organizational 
culture attracts and retains individuals who share its values.  In addition, the new entrants 
are further indoctrinated with artifacts and symbols; those who do not fit leave the 
organization (O’Reilly et al., 1991).  The culture creates generations of groupthink within 
the organization.  Therefore, an organization that is complacent stays complacent and an 
organization that is innovative continues to innovate.  Schein (1990) offered three distinct 
stages in an organization’s cultural maturity: the young-founder stage, midlife stage, and 
maturity stage.  The young-founder stage uses culture as a source of identity and as a way 
to hold the organization together.  Culture changes during this stage of development 
involve clarification, articulation, and elaboration (Schein, 1990).  During the midlife 
stage, culture still can be managed and changed.  During this stage, functional, 
geographic, or other groups may create their own respective culture within the 
organization.  Conflicts may arise because each group’s culture is blended into one 
homogeneous organizational culture.  Finally, organizations establish a mature culture 
that defines the essence of who they are as a firm.  This is the current state of the DoD.  
Schein (1984) provided a synopsis of this stage when he stated the following: 
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Organizations that have reached a stage of maturity or decline resulting 
from mature markets and products or from excessive internal stability and 
products or from excessive internal stability and comfort that prevents 
innovation may need to change parts of their culture, provided they can 
obtain the necessary self-insight.  Such managed change will always be a 
painful process and will elicit strong resistance.  Moreover, change may 
not even be possible without replacing the large numbers of people who 
wish to hold on to all of the original culture. (p. 14) 
To make effective purchasing strategy changes within the DoD, Schein (1990) suggested 
that a wide variety of tactics from outright coercion at one end of the spectrum to subtle 
seduction through the introduction of new technologies at the opposing end of the 
spectrum.  What is certain is that a mature organizational culture creates a strong barrier 
to change. 
3. Conflicting Government Objectives 
To promote savings in the public sector, managers must be motivated to reduce 
their budgets.  At the disdain of the taxpayer, not-for-profit managers (NPMs) promote 
budget enlargement to increase their respective power and control.  Budget maximization 
theory and the bureau-shaping model provide competing explanations of NPMs’ 
opportunistic behavior (Hawkins, Gravier, & Powley, 2011).     
a. Budget Maximization Theory 
Budget maximization theory is an effort to understand bureaucracies’ 
tendencies to be inefficient.  Budget maximization theory, following the utility 
maximization model, suggests that self-interested bureaus seek to have their total budget 
increased to gain greater power, higher salaries, and increased stature (Hawkins et al., 
2011).  The argument is that bureaus act like monopolies in that they can capitalize on 
consumer surplus.  The difference is that monopolies reap the consumer surplus as profits 
while a bureau retards efficiency to maximize its respective budget allocation.  William 
Niskanen (1968) illustrated this tendency in his budget maximization model. Niskanen 
(1968) defined his model as having two characteristics: 
(1) Bureaucrats maximize the total budget of their bureau, given demand 
and cost conditions, subject to the constraint that the budget must be equal 
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to or greater than the minimum total costs at the equilibrium output. (2)  
Bureaus exchange a specific output (or combination of outputs) for a 
specific budget. (p. 293) 
For the DoD, the second characteristic of the model is important to conceptualize.  
Instead of an itemized budget, the bureaus appropriate their budgets as a whole.  Brenton 
and Wintrobe (1975) asserted that the “bilateral monopoly framework therefore can 
easily obscure the fact that the bargaining power of a bureau depends on its ability to 
distort or conceal information from the sponsor” (p. 199).  For the DoD, this point is 
evident in its inability to provide its sponsor (Congress) a certified financial report.   
However, budget maximization theory has some points of contention.  
One point of contention is whether budget-maximizing officials have enough power to 
convince a majority Congress of their legitimacy.  Patrick Dunleavy (1986) addressed 
this issue by stating that “in the U.S. Congress, legislators on committees come from 
opposing parties, their party ties are … of low salience, [therefore] co-coordinating 
institutions form budget-setting within Congress are still relatively weak” (p. 17).  In 
simple terms, what is important for one bureau’s sponsor is not necessarily important for 
another bureau’s sponsor.  Thus, budget-maximizing officials seek the path of least 
resistance, free-riding on larger legislation (Dunleavy, 1986, p. 19).  DoD departments 
received substantial funding increases in recent years due to overseas contingency 
operations (Belasco, 2011).  These appropriation increases created an avenue for free-
riding.  Once appropriated, the bureau can shield its budget from scrutiny, as described 
earlier.  
b. Bureau-Shaping Model 
As discussed previously, budget-maximization theory suggests that self-
interested bureaus seek to have their total budget increased to gain greater power, higher 
salaries, and increased stature.  An alternative approach to understanding bureaucratic 
institutions is the bureau-shaping model.  The bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy 
describes how “self-interested officials are primarily concerned to maximize their 
agencies’ core budgets, equivalent to running cost” (Dunleavy, 1989, p. 249).  Thus, the 
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bureau-shaping model description of the self-interested official is linked to agency 
theory.  Additionally, Hawkins et al. (2011) stated,  
bureau-shaping predicts other managerially desired outcomes such as 
reducing personal risk and increasing access to centers of power in ways 
that do not unduly increase the scope of the problems under their 
responsibility. (p. 4)  
NPMs internalize a sense of ownership in their bureau (or their perceived 
kingdom) and enjoy professional enhancement in controlling change (Barberis, 1998). 
Using this approach, bureaus are more focused on maximizing core budgets so that they 
can maximize utility. Marsh, Smith, and Richards (2000) stated that “utility maximization 
is best pursued through bureau-shaping rather than budget maximization” (p. 462).  
Therefore, organizational change requires the implementation of successful business 
process reengineering and change management initiatives.    
G. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING AND CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
The concept of business process reengineering (BPR) was first introduced by 
Thomas Davenport and James Short (1990) and Michael Hammer (1990) when touting 
the benefits of new information technology in business. Hammer (1990) stated that BPR, 
strives to break away from the old rules about how we organize and 
conduct business.  It involves recognizing and rejecting some of them and 
then finding imaginative new ways to accomplish work. … Only then can 
we hope to achieve quantum leaps in performance. (pp. 104–105) 
Michael Hammer and James Champy (1993) further elaborated that BPR fundamentally 
rethinks and redesigns the business process to achieve improvements in cost, quality, 
service, and speed.  BPR is a “powerful change approach that can bring about radical 
improvements in business processes” (Davenport & Stoddard, 1994, p. 121).  To make 
BPR successful, the organization must recognize and break away from outdated rules and 
assumptions that underscore the old process (Hammer, 1990).   
Hammer and Champy (1993) identified four key elements that a firm must have 
to reengineer.  First, they must focus on the fundamentals.  This requires the firm to 
disregard the “what is” state and focus on the “what should be” state (Hammer & 
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Champy, 1993).  Next, the firm must have a radical redesign element.  This ensures that 
changes are not superficial or minor changes to traditional business processes.  Third, 
there must be potential for dramatic results.  By reengineering a business process, the 
firm should see dramatic leaps in performance—not incremental improvements (Hammer 
& Champy, 1993).  Finally, a firm must have business process orientation.  
Reengineering should revolve around a business process that creates value for the firm.   
To succeed at reengineering, Hammer and Champy (1993) stated that a firm 
should (a) start with the customer and work backwards, (b) move quickly, (c) tolerate 
risk, (d) accept imperfections along the way, and (e) not stop too soon.  Starting with the 
customer is a firm’s first priority since the business processes exist to satisfy the 
customer’s requirement.  Next, to thwart internal resistance, a firm must quickly and 
decisively implement BPR.  With quick implementation, there is inherent risk to the firm.  
However, taking calculated risk provides an environment in which change is not only 
tolerated but expected.  Finally, a firm should not expect perfection at first.  Waiting for 
the 100% solution wastes time and money.  Firms should get the BPR into action and 
adjust the process along the way.         
To effectively implement BPR within a firm, it is critical that leaders understand 
the importance of change management. Grover, Seung, Kettinger, and Teng’s (1995) 
study found that change management is both central and critical to BPR’s success (p. 
139).  Furthermore, Grover et al. (1995) made the following statement: 
Change management is a complex, multifaceted process. … Given the 
criticality of change management in reengineering revealed by our results, 
application of … change theories and intervention techniques … should be 
top priority. (p. 139)   
Julien Phillips (1983) outlined three components that are required for organizational 
change: (1) new strategic vision, (2) new organizational skills, and (3) political support 
(p. 188).  Phillips (1983) further stated that while a new vision is easily obtained, new 
skills and political support are gained over time.  In essence, change does not happen 
overnight and without the skills and support, change will not be implemented.  It is 
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imperative that leaders understand that quick victories are important to building the 
momentum needed to sustain long-term change. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided a brief review of topics relevant to strategic sourcing.  
We began by summarizing relevant theories underpinning strategic sourcing. These 
theories provided the framework for understanding the behavior of the purchasing 
function in relation to the organization.  Next, we explained that purchasing’s strategic 
evolution, including Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio Approach and current sourcing 
strategies, provides a framework for strategic sourcing’s implementation into the DoD.  
Then we discussed DoD acquisition policies and directives¸ organizing for strategic 
sourcing, and barriers to strategic sourcing.  Finally, we concluded the chapter by 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the method we utilized during this study 
to investigate the research questions.  Specifically, we used a case study methodology 
because it best addresses questions of why and how (Yin, 2003) and because the number 
of available commodity council cases in the Air Force is too small to study using 
stochastic modeling.  In this chapter we also discuss how reliability and validity were 
maintained during the qualitative research process.   
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The DoD continues to implement strategic sourcing initiatives to promote 
acquisition efficiencies.  The DoD utilizes commodity councils to implement strategic 
sourcing.  Commodity council development and implementation is not new to industry.  
However, the use of commodity councils in the DoD is relatively new.  Therefore, in this 
study, we seek to understand the factors that contributed to the successful development 
and implementation of the Air Force Furnishings Commodity Council (AFFCC) and its 
sourcing strategies.  The following list identifies the five specific objectives we seek to 
understand in this study: 
1. Understand the factors that contributed to the successful development and 
implementation of the AFFCC acquisition strategies.   
2. Document and analyze the challenges and successes during the AFFCC strategy 
development and implementation process.  Specifically, explore the challenges 
associated with supporting small business goals while not sacrificing strategic 
outcomes (i.e., increased savings, reduced transaction costs, and improved 
supplier performance).   
3. Explore the difficulties of creating a commodity council whose spend has no 
functional ownership or centralized fund allocation—issues not uncommon to 
indirect spend.  Here, the organization processes and organizational structure are 
examined for lessons learned, best practices, and barriers to efficiency. 
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4. Document and analyze how the AFFCC computes cost savings in order to 
determine efficiency.  Specifically, explore the challenges associated with 
establishing accurate, consistent, objective, and verifiable cost savings 
performance and validation methodology and accountability for the associated 
savings. 
5. Explore the difficulties of controlling utilization of the AFFCC.  Here, we 
examine the accountability process for lessons learned and best practices to 
maximize AFFCC effectiveness and mitigate “maverick” furnishings spending by 
organizations.     
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Yin (2003) stated that “‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and 
likely to lead to the use of case studies” (p. 6).  In addition, Yin (2003) defined the 
technical definition of case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13).  Therefore, because we 
seek to answer the “how” and “why” in the development and implementation of the 
AFFCC sourcing strategies, we used case study methodology in this research.   
A case study methodology remains one of the most challenging research designs 
(Yin, 2003).  Currently, the case study method is not easily understood in general, 
especially by purchasing and logistics managers (Ellram, 1996, p. 93).  However, the case 
study methodology can contribute to the knowledge of an individual, group, 
organizational, social, political, and other phenomena that cannot be documented through 
other research methodologies (Yin, 2003, p. 1).  “It makes sense to choose cases such as 
extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is ‘transparently 
observable’” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 537).  In addition, a case study helps in 
understanding the dynamics present within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 534).  
This makes the AFFCC ideal for employing a case study methodology.    
We limit the scope of the study to the objectives identified in the previous section.  
Without defining those five specific objectives, “an investigator might be tempted to 
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cover ‘everything,’ which is impossible to do” (Yin, 2003, p. 23).  To ensure that 
research remained focused to those specific objectives, we only conducted interviews 
with current and prior AFFCC members, reviewed specific AFFCC-provided and 
publically available documents, reviewed current DoD and Air Force policy, and directly 
observed the AFFCC.  We focused the case study only on the AFFCC; thus, we did not 
include other DoD or Air Force commodity councils.   
D. DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS 
Use of an individual source of evidence for conducting a case study lends itself to 
perception bias (Yin, 2003, p. 97).  Therefore, to get a comprehensive collection of 
evidence about the successful development and implementation of the AFFCC, we used 
the triangulation method to gather data.  The triangulation method allows researchers to 
gather data by using multiple collection methods (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 538).  According 
to Yin (2003), 
the use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an 
investigator to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and 
behavioral issues.  However, the most important advantage presented by 
using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines 
of inquiry, a process of triangulation. (p. 98) 
Thus, triangulation provides a stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 538).  Triangulation of data for this study included a review of 
relevant published literature, theories, government policies, government directives, 
government guides, communications, memorandums, contracts, transcriptions of personal 
interviews with AFFCC team members, and other source documents. 
 We then drafted the interview questions using relevant published literature, 
theories, government policies, government directives, and government guides.  After we 
drafted the interview questions, we provided the questions to two academicians and one 
practitioner to validate their accuracy and relevance.  Additionally, the Institutional 
Review Board reviewed the questions and approved them for use.  Furthermore, we 
distributed the interview questions, along with an abstract containing the objectives of the 
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study, to the participants prior to the interview.  This ensured that any vague questions 
were identified and clarified prior to the interview.  Interview questions are presented in 
Appendix A.   
 Interviews are essential sources when gathering evidence for a case study (Yin, 
2003, p. 89).  We conducted interviews on an individual basis and designed the questions 
to be open-ended in nature.  This allowed respondents a friendly and nonthreatening 
environment to provide insight into the development and implementation of the AFFCC.  
We selected each interviewee based solely on their direct involvement with the 
development and implementation of the AFFCC.  Table 2 provides the demographics for 
each informant.  In addition, we chose individual interviews to control the dominance of 
one respondent during the interview process.  We conducted eight interviews at Scott Air 
Force Base, Illinois, and each interview lasted approximately one hour.  We digitally 
recorded the interviews and transcribed them later.  After transcription, we erased all 
digital recordings.  The transcripts from the eight interviews became the primary source 
of data for analysis. 
 
Table 2.   AFFCC Informant Demographics 
 
 
Qualitative analysis provides a depth and richness aimed at answering the “how” 
and “why” questions and constructing idiographic knowledge (Ellram, 1996).  Because 
the “how” and “why” are common to case studies and qualitative analysis, we used 
qualitative analysis for this case study.  In this analysis we included the relevant 
Informant Functional Area Acquisition Exp. (Yrs) Strategic Sourcing Exp. (Yrs) Formal Strategic Sourcing Edu.
   A*1 Contracting 5-10 0 Yes
 B Small Business not applicable not applicable No
C Contracting 15-20 0 No
  D* Contracting <5 0 No
  E* Contracting <5 0 No
F Contracting 20+ 0 No
   G*2 Contracting <5 0 No
   H*1 Contracting 5-10 0 Yes
*Core Team Member, 1Deployed Six Months, 2Transferred from Civil Engineering. 
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published literature, theories, government policies, government directives, government 
guides, and transcriptions of personal interviews.  The two researchers analyzed the data 
separately.  We then discussed and resolved all discrepancies, and we present the 
resolved analysis in the Results section of this report. 
E. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Many individuals question the reliability and validity of qualitative studies due to 
perceived subjectivity.  If researchers do not inject reliability and validity into qualitative 
analysis, those concerns would be warranted.  “Whether quantitative or qualitative, good 
research design requires external validity, reliability, construct validity, and internal 
validity” (Ellram, 1996, p. 104).   
External validity, as defined by Yin (2003), requires “establishing the domain to 
which a study’s findings can be generalized” (p. 34).  Research establishes external 
validity during research design.  To ensure that this study has external validity, we used 
accepted strategic sourcing theories and government directives, policies, and guides.  
This provided a generally accepted basis for analysis.   
The reliability of a case study is determined by whether replication is possible 
with the same results (Ellram, 1996, p. 104).  In addition, Yin described reliability as 
“demonstrating that the operations of study—such as the data collection procedure—can 
be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 2003, p. 34).  Thus, Ellram and Yin agree that a 
study’s process must be repeatable with the same results.  Ellram (1996) provided two 
keys to case-study reliability: use of case-study protocol and the development of a case-
study database (p. 104).  A case-study protocol for this study was the interview question 
guide located in Appendix A.  As previously stated, the questions were reviewed for 
accuracy and relevance.  The question guide created a consistent roadmap across 
respondents during the interviews. 
Construct validity must be maintained during the data collection phase of 
research.  Yin (2003) stated that construct validity is obtained by “establishing correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied” (p. 34).  Ellram (1996) stated that “a 
primary element of construct validity in research is triangulation” (p. 105).  Triangulation 
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of data allows researchers to reduce informative bias (Ellram, 1996, p. 105).  In the 
previous section, we introduced triangulation as our study’s collection method.  In 
addition, to improve construct validity, we used multiple researchers.  This is important 
to diffuse the premise that research use “subjective” judgments to collect data (Yin, 2003, 
p. 35).  To ensure diffusion of subjective judgment, the research applies textual data 
analysis.  Textual data analysis includes identifying how well the author presents an 
argument by examining techniques employed to achieve the author’s intended purpose 
(Bullock & Goggin, p. 50).  Additionally, textual analysis of the data includes how 
effective the author was at reaching the target audience (Bullock & Goggin, p. 50).  For 
the AFFCC, this applies to all internal and external source documents.   
Finally, researchers achieve internal validity during the data analysis phase (Yin, 
2003, p. 34).  Yin (2003) described internal validity as “establishing a causal relationship, 
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships” (p. 34).  Researchers prefer explanatory cases for doing causal 
studies (Yin, 2003).  The AFFCC seeks to establish casual relationships by measuring 
success against factors such as cost savings, total cost of ownership, and transaction cost 
reductions.    
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we described our research objectives and the design, collection, 
and analysis methods we used in this study.  We described the explanatory case study 
methodology we used to create an interview question guide, to collect evidence, and to 
ensure reliability and validity.  In the next chapter, we provide consolidated responses to 
the interview questions we used for analysis during our research. 
 61 
IV. RESULTS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we summarize our findings during our investigation of the 
AFFCC.  After presenting a background of the AFFCC, we provide results from 
interview questions and documentation related to AFFCC development and 
implementation process.      
B. THE CASE 
In 2006, the Air Force hired Censeo Consulting Group to analyze the Air Force’s 
furniture spend for strategic sourcing opportunities (Williams, 2006).  Censeo presented 
its research findings to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Contracting; SAF/AQC).  
In turn, on March 23, 2006, SAF/AQC briefed Censeo’s furniture opportunity analysis to 
Air Force acquisition leaders.  The report identified that Air Force furniture spend was 
highly fragmented and lacked formal standards and policies.   In addition, Censeo 
identified that the supply market conditions were favorable for strategic sourcing 
(Williams, 2006).  Censeo estimated that improved management of furniture spend could 
result in a potential savings between $6.5 million and $10 million per year (Williams, 
2006).  Censeo proposed that the Air Force could start achieving the $6.5 million to $10 
million potential savings in a short period of time: less than one year (Williams, 2006).     
In 2007, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) began developing the furnishing 
commodity council (FCC) to meet its command’s requirements (Informant F, 2011).  The 
FCC implementation was a response to SAF/AQC’s request that each major command 
implement a strategic sourcing initiative (Informant F, 2011).  According to Informant F, 
SAF/ACQ requested each command “make something happen in the strategic sourcing 
world as we start moving down the road about Installation Acquisition Transformation” 
(May 25, 2011).     
During the development of the AMC FCC, the Air Force altered the Installation 
Acquisition Transformation (IAT) structure—a substantial organizational redesign 
intended to migrate from 71 individual contracting units to 5 regional units.  Instead, in 
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2010, the Air Force established the Enterprise Sourcing Group (ESG), headquartered at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to oversee all Air Force strategic sourcing 
initiatives (Informant F, 2011).  All Air Force strategic sourcing oversight transferred to 
the ESG.  However, AMC contracting leadership proceeded with the development and 
implementation of the AFFCC before transferring responsibility to the ESG (Informant 
D, 2011; Informant F, 2011; Informant H, 2011).  Subsequently, the AMC FCC increased 
its scope to include all Air Force furnishing requirements, which resulted in the AMC 
FCC’s re-designation as the AFFCC.  
In March 2009, SAF/ACQ signed the Air Force Furnishings Commodity Council 
Charter.  The following personnel agreed to the establishment of the AFFCC charter: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Contracting), Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force (Acquisition), Headquarters Air Mobility Command Deputy Director of 
Installation & Mission Support, Director Air Force Center for Engineering and the 
Environment, and Headquarters Air Mobility Command Contracting Division Chief, and 
Director of Installations & Mission Support (USAF, 2009b).  According the charter, the 
purpose of the AFFCC is to: 
establish a framework by which the Parties will collaboratively establish 
the AFFCC process at Scott AFB [St. Louis].  The AFFCC will provide an 
acquisition strategy for centralized procurement of furnishings 
requirements executed at centralized and decentralized levels.  The 
AFFCC will shape buying behavior that satisfies AF [Air Force] 
furnishings needs by: minimizing duplication of effort, standardizing 
procurement policy, and providing purchasing flexibility and leveraged 
purchasing power, resulting in a cost-effective procurement strategy that 
focuses on life-cycle cost. (USAF, 2009b, p. 1) 
Furthermore, the charter explained that the Air Force currently uses a tactical approach to 
furniture acquisition.  The tactical acquisition approach involves recognizing the need, 
defining the requirement, and awarding a contract for each separate customer regardless 
of requirement similarities.  Applied to the 71 continental U.S. active-duty Air Force 
installations, the tactical approach creates constant procurement repetition that leads to an 
increase overall cost that “results in unresponsive and inefficient processes” (USAF, 
2009b, p. 2).  The AFFCC’s charter states that “bringing together a group of commodity 
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experts to establish the AF’s furnishings acquisition strategy will ensure the best overall 
value for corporate agency” (USAF, 2009b, p. 2).   
After SAF/AQC approved the charter, AMC established and briefed the 
Commodity Acquisition Management Plan (CAMP).  The CAMP provided the Air Force 
furnishings acquisition background, AFFCC governance, and the AFFCC overarching 
strategy.  To build the objectives outlined in the AFFCC charter, the CAMP’s Statement 
of Need provides that “the AFFCC intends to reshape AF furnishings acquisition 
management to reduce total cost of ownership, generate savings from more efficient 
business processes [and] leverage spend” (AMC, 2009a, slide 4).  Since the CAMP 
provides the framework for the AFFCC, the AFFCC core members used it to guide them 
throughout the development and implementation process. 
The AFFCC established a specific acquisition strategy for each commodity, 
identified as a spiral.  A spiral provides the technical data, business strategy, management 
process, and other pertinent considerations pertaining to a commodity.  The overarching 
spiral development process includes determining the commodity profile, market analysis, 
demand plan, cost estimate, spend forecast, future strategy, and implementation plan.  
The AFFCC developed and implemented the Spiral 1, seating, followed by Spiral 1A, 
dormitory furnishings.  Each spiral experienced its own unique successes and challenges 
during the development and implementation process but both resulted in successful 
contract award. 
The AFFCC awarded Spiral 1, seating, BPAs to eight suppliers in June 2011 
(AFMC, 2011a).  In addition, the AFFCC awarded Spiral 1A, dormitory furnishings, 
BPAs to seven suppliers in May 2011 (AFMC, 2011).  Both Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A 
consist of a base year and four option years (AFMC, 2011; AFMC 2011a).  By awarding 
BPAs to eight suppliers for Spiral 1 and seven suppliers for Spiral 2, the Air Force 
rationalized their supplier base from 1,031 to 15 (Williams, 2006; AFMC, 2011; AFMC, 
2011a).  Furthermore, the AFFCC estimates the savings achieved through requirement 
consolidation and supplier optimization to be 12% for Spiral 1 and 8% for Spiral 1A 
(Informant H, 2011).  Overall, the AFFCC approximates a 20% cost savings excluding 
the administrative savings from awarding and managing fewer contracts and contractors.    
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C. INTERVIEWS 
As stated earlier, our research team collected data primarily through personal 
interviews and miscellaneous AFFCC source documents.  We collected, analyzed, and 
categorized the data into the following four broad categories: resource allocation, 
training, development, and execution.  The following sections provide our results for 
each category.   
1. Resource Allocation 
a. Personnel 
The CAMP identified an AFFCC organization structure with nine core 
members, four advisors, and six stakeholder categories (AMC, 2009a).  Of the nine core 
members, AMC identified four personnel as full-time.  The four members’ positions 
include a program manager, commodity expert, and two contracting officers.  According 
to the AFFCC charter, those four core team members are “tasked with developing 
acquisition, buying, financial and implementation strategies in addition to providing 
program management, strategic purchasing, and technical expertise” (USAF, 2009b, p. 
1).  In addition, in Table 3 we provide the 14 specific areas the AFFCC charter identified 
as the core member’s responsibilities.   
Table 3.   AFFCC Core Team Responsibilities 
(From: USAF, 2009b, p. 4) 
 
 
All eight informants provided details about the inadequate number of 
personnel.  Informant E stated, “we were basically three people; one for seating spiral, 
one for the dorm spiral and we had a commodity expert who handled both of our seating 
and dorm questions from the functional side” (2011).  According to an informant, 
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manning issues resulted from the IAT.  The IAT was designed to split operational base 
acquisition support into five regions.  Each region would have an Installation Acquisition 
Group (IAG) responsible for all base acquisition in that region.  Every contracting 
squadron had to transfer a certain amount of manpower to their IAG.  IAT required that 
personnel whose position moved to an IAG relocate with that respective position.  
According to Informant F, the following ensued: 
people got nervous, people took jobs elsewhere, and we were losing 
people left and right.  We lost some really quality people because of the 
discussion about IAT. … [P]eople started leaving in droves. … [T]hey 
[SAF/AQC] finally said, “Time out!” But then they still had to try and 
figure out a way to get the cuts in money that they promised that they 
would do.  So, to do that they said “well, okay, let’s take 250 positions” … 
that’s 250 bodies that will now stand up this organization called the 
Enterprise Sourcing Group. … [T]hey took slots away … 35 of them. 
(May 25, 2011)                      
The AFFCC CAMP was structured with the resources available with no 
expectation of receiving additional personnel.  In 2010, the ESG offered to take over 
AFFCC development and implementation (Informant F, 2011).  AFFCC leadership 
decided that they would lose valuable time and resources to move it to the ESG 
(Informant E, 2011; Informant F, 2011; Informant H, 2011).  Therefore, allocated 
personnel would only come from within AFFCC.  As Informant F stated, “We basically 
had taken this out of hide” (May 25, 2011).  Informant E corroborated Informant F’s 
statement: “We took them out of hide. We had no personnel added once it became Air 
Force and it is my understanding any personnel that we had went to the ESG” (May 24, 
2011).          
b. Expertise 
According to the Commodity Council Implementation and Operations 
Guide, “the key to the commodity council approach is relying on market experts for the 
specific commodity being purchased to make well-informed, market-savvy sourcing 
decisions that fully meet all enterprise-wide requirements for a specific commodity” 
(USAF, 2006, p. 3).  As stated earlier, the AFFCC charter identifies 14 areas that the four 
core members are responsible for completing.  A review of the 14 responsibilities listed 
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in Table 3 suggests that core members possess commodity and strategic sourcing 
expertise.  However, none of the personnel initially assigned to the AFFCC had prior 
strategic sourcing experience or commodity expertise.  Furthermore, only the program 
manager, a commissioned Air Force officer, had a formal strategic sourcing education 
from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  Additionally, the program 
manager deployed for six months during the AFFCC development and implementation 
process.  According to multiple informants, this created a continuity issue. Specifically, 
Informant E stated, 
we had a program manager who was military who were—being in 
contracting—were deploying and although they were helpful when they 
were here, there was the changeover and the deployments in between.  So 
there wasn’t a lot of consistent help and constant help. … I mean they may 
help on one of the briefings but then they would be gone and then you are 
losing all the historical data that they worked on and the briefing they did 
then you have to get yourself spun up.  I mean it is important I think to 
keep the same team together if possible. (May 24, 2011) 
Three other informants also expressed issues with continuity because of deployments.  
Multiple informants stated that the program manager, if military, should be put in a non-
deployable status while working on the AFFCC (Informant A, 2011; Informant D, 2011; 
Informant E, 2011).       
Informants expressed concern over the availability of specific expertise.  
As Informant D stated, “[The AFFCC] really needed more resources than what we had, 
because we didn’t have the pricing analysts [or] the costing analysts” (May 24, 2011).  
Though the core team lacked the technical expertise, they still continued to perform their 
duties while requesting additional personnel.  According to CAMP meeting minutes, “the 
AFFCC reminded [leadership] … at a minimum, [to add] a second commodity expert and 
a cost analyst to the team” (AMC, 2009b, p.4).  However, the AFFCC never received a 
second commodity expert or cost analyst to assist in development and implementation.    
2. Training 
During the development and implementation of the AFFCC, the Commodity 
Council Implementation and Operations informational guide (USAF, 2006) provided the 
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guidance for commodity council training.  According to the Commodity Council 
Implementation and Operations Guide, the AFFCC shall “use the Commodity Council 
Implementation and Operation Guide as the primary training material to review the CC 
[commodity council] process steps” (USAF, 2006, p. 11).  However, the Commodity 
Council Implementation and Operations Guide provided little to no education about 
proceeding through the commodity council development and implementation process.  
As discussed earlier, the core team lacked experience in strategic sourcing.  Therefore, 
the core team found it difficult to translate the information in the Commodity Council 
Implementation and Operations Guide into action.  Informant D described the lack of 
training in the following account: 
It’s like I’d look at the next person and they’d look at me and we look at 
the third person and say, “what is it that we need to figure out? What do 
we need to be looking at? What do we need to be doing?”  We knew we 
needed to do something a little different than I guess than typical buying. 
(May 24, 2011)         
The lack of understanding resonated with multiple informants.  Informant H stated that 
“information is one thing; understanding is something different … you can have the 
information that you have to execute a spiral, but you don’t really understand what it 
takes to go from point A to point B” (October 11, 2011). To make up for this lack of 
understanding about the commodity council process execution, the core team sought 
additional training.  The training included courses with Defense Acquisition University 
and the University of Tennessee (UT).  However, according to all the informants, it was 
the University of Tennessee training that was instrumental in the AFFCC development 
and implementation.     
The Air Force contracted with UT to develop a training program for strategic 
sourcing. UT created a sequential training process to walk a commodity council through 
the development and implementation process.  For the AFFCC, the training was split into 
three one-week classroom modules.  UT coordinated with AFFCC to ensure team 
members received the module training at a specific point during the strategy development 
process.  Appendix B provides an example of the UT classroom Modules 1 through 3.  
The AFFCC only received the UT training for Spiral 1A because UT developed the 
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training after Spiral 1 initiation.  When asked whether the AFFCC could complete Spiral 
1A without the UT training, Informant H responded, “No … it helped us to go step by 
step and then to make course corrections as the course material dictates” (October 11, 
2011).  Informant E, when asked the same question, stated,  
I couldn’t have done it without that. … if I didn’t have the module training 
to get everybody in the room and not stepping us through what needed to 
be done and setting goals like the work breakdown structure … who were 
accountable for coming up with the answers to the questions from our 
training. I couldn’t have done it without that. (May 24, 2011) 
As presented earlier, all informants stated that the UT training was instrumental to Spiral 
1A’s success.  In contrast, Spiral 1, seating, which was not developed and implemented 
with the UT training process, experienced delays.  Spiral 1 members’ training was 
informal and self-driven (Informant D, 2011).  “You know, just because you had to do 
[strategic sourcing], so [you knew] you had to get smart on it.  You have to kind of be 
resourceful and tap into whatever resources you have at your disposal” (Informant D, 
May 24, 2011).  Informant D went on to discuss why Spiral 1 did not utilize the UT 
training, stating,  
We were so far down the road with seating that we never applied those 
modules to the seating effort. … After we went through the module 
training, I can kind of look back and say, “Man, if I’d known this then, 
that would have helped me so much more with working the seating 
effort,” but we were just too far down the road with seating. (May 22, 
2011) 
Though SAF/AQC signed the AFFCC charter in March 2009, Spiral 1, seating, began 
initial development in mid-year 2007 while Spiral 1A, dorm furnishings, began 
development approximately one year later (Informant D, 2011; Informant E, 2011).  
Since the AFFCC awarded Spiral 1, seating, in June 2011 and Spiral 1A in May 2011, the 
time needed for development and implementation of Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A after 
receiving the charter was approximately 48 months.  The delay of award resulted from 
barriers such as small business, absence of spend analysis and cost analysis expertise, 
inadequate strategic sourcing knowledge, and an inadequate number of personnel.  
Therefore, using the 48 month AFFCC’s strategic sourcing implementation rate and 
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assuming 200 strategic sourcing opportunities, we anticipate that it would take 
approximately 400 years for the Air Force to fully manage 100% of spend.  
3. Development Process 
a. Spend Analysis 
As discussed earlier, spend analysis is the first step in the Air Force’s 
Strategic Sourcing Model.  It enables an organization to see how much money it spends 
on products and services and to identify the respective suppliers.  As we previously 
identified, the Air Force hired Censeo to conduct a furniture business case assessment.  
As part of its assessment, Censeo compiled all Air Force furniture spend data from the 
2005 fiscal year.  After AMC decided to move forward with a FCC, AMC realized they 
needed current spend data but did not have the resources to perform a spend analysis.  
Informant A stated that they could not perform the spend analysis because they “had 
limited manpower [and] didn’t have the expertise” (May 23, 2011).  Subsequently, AMC 
contracted out their spend analysis to Censeo.     
Censeo obtained Air Force furniture spend analysis data from four 
sources: Contracting Business Intelligence Services (CBIS), Standard Procurement 
System (SPS), Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), and the General Services 
Administration (GSA). When we asked whether Censeo expressed concerns about 
consolidating the data from each system, Informant A stated,  
Yes … [but] they were familiar working with it.  It was—you know GSA 
does their reports and their analysis a little different than we do it in SPS 
so yes it was a little tough for them but since they had experience it was 
better that we had somebody experienced doing it versus myself. I would 
have been pulling my hair out trying to figure out why the data didn’t 
match between GSA and SPS. (May 23, 2011)  
However, even though the team hired Censeo to conduct the spend 
analysis, two team members verified Censeo’s estimates by conducting an internal spend 
analysis.  The two team members who performed the spend analysis obtained MBAs in 
Strategic Purchasing from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  As the 
previous statement by Informant A stated, the lack of data continuity between systems 
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hampered the team’s ability to retrieve the data necessary for the spend analysis (May 23, 
2011).  After the team completed a verification spend analysis, its results were “almost 
parallel with what [Censeo] did” (Informant A, May 23, 2011).   
After closer examination, the council members recognized that Federal 
Supply Code (FSC), Product Service Codes (PSC) and North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) codes skewed the numbers.  Two coding problems arose 
from FSC and NAICS codes.  First, operational bases lumped bulk furniture buys under 
one code regardless of appropriateness.  By aggregating everything together under one 
code, specific furniture identification was impossible.  The second issue was the 
“miscellaneous” FSC/PSC 9999 and general furniture NAICS (i.e., NAICS 337127: 
furniture, institutional, manufacturing).  For unidentified reasons, contracting personnel 
identified furniture as miscellaneous or generalized the description.  The AFFCC reported 
that between 10% and 30% of the data was inaccurate (Informant A, 2011; Informant H, 
2011).  However, even with inaccurate codes, the team members felt the spend analysis 
provided an accurate picture of furniture spend (Informant A, 2011; Informant H, 2011). 
b. Customer Involvement 
Since SAF/AQC requested that each Air Force Major Command 
(MAJCOM) pursue a strategic sourcing initiative, the requirement for an FCC did not 
come from an external customer; it was a contracting-centric initiative.  According to the 
AFFCC charter, MAJCOM stakeholders “will appoint appropriate members to the 
AFFCC” (USAF, 2009b, p. 4).  Thus, MAJCOM stakeholders must be identified prior to 
the AFFCC.  The AFFCC CAMP shows that functional representative to the MAJCOM 
is the Air Force Center for Engineer and the Environment/Technical Directorate Built 
Infrastructure (AFCEE/TDB; AMC, 2009a).  In addition, the CAMP identified housing 
managers, MAJCOM designers, AFCEE, continental United States Air Force bases 
including Alaska and Hawaii, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations 
Command as major stakeholders in the AFFCC.  
The lack of an internal customer made the requirement definition difficult.  
The Commodity Council Implementation and Operations Guide states that “a lesson 
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learned is to include a ‘major’ user representative on the commodity council” (USAF, 
2006, p. 20).  According to multiple informants, senior Air Force leadership priorities 
influenced the lack of commitment by MAJCOMs.  Informant F gave the following 
account when we asked about high-level cooperation in response to the request for more 
personnel: 
I took on furnishings—I told them I wanted to take on furnishings and said 
that I could do this, but I could use your help by finding a customer 
because nobody wanted to be the customer.  I ended up going to 
SAF/AQC and saying, “Hey, I could use your help in trying to get a 
customer through the HAF [Headquarters Air Force] level.  Would you 
please go talk to A7C [Air Force Civil Engineering], in particular?”  
That’s where most of the command design interiors work in the A7 arena 
… the civil engineering arena. … That’s kind of what we were looking for 
and I got zero response on that.  It was only to the point where I finally got 
proposals in and I needed somebody to look at it from a technical 
standpoint and I finally put my pleas out to the other MAJCOMS saying I 
needed some help in trying to find like a designer or person that works 
with dormitories or housing, in particular, that are used to dealing with 
furnishings that I finally get some help, but HAF didn’t help at all even 
after pleas.  That’s just it.  Everybody’s busy.  I got it.  But, again, they’re 
working KCX [airborne fuel tanker/cargo] and I’m working furnishings.  
Their importance was put on KCX, not furnishings. (May 25, 2011)   
All levels of the Air Force Enterprise must prioritize mission 
requirements.  However, without a customer to provide a requirement, the AFFCC had to 
“take pieces from users from past procurements to develop whatever our real requirement 
was” (Informant E, May 24, 2011).  To that end, the core team took the initiative to find a 
customer to evaluate the requirement.  Spiral 1 struggled because no one organization is 
designated to take care of chairs (Informant D, 2011).  The responsibility for ordering 
chairs was left to a building facility manager or a resource manager in a variety of 
functional units.  Therefore, the AFFCC defined Spiral 1’s requirement with the help of 
MAJCOM designers and suppliers’ inputs on industry chair specifications.   
Spiral 1A did not experience the same outcome as Spiral 1.  However, like 
Spiral 1, no one wanted to be the dorm furnishings customer.  Fortunately, an Air Combat 
Command (ACC) MAJCOM representative attending UT Module 2 training volunteered 
to be the lead user representative for all MAJCOMs.  As Informant E said, “An ACC 
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MAJCOM leader said, alright I will do it.  I will be in charge of all the MAJCOMS.  So 
any time I had a user question … he saw that all the MAJCOMS … get it back to me.  So 
until I had him I was drowning” (May 24, 2011).  The informant went on to explain that 
the networking at the UT training module training was the only reason they got customer 
involvement.  
c. Supplier Integration 
Long-term supplier integration is a major component of strategic sourcing 
initiatives.  Collaborating with suppliers promotes product and process innovation, cost 
reduction, and cost avoidance.  Government policies make long-term supplier integration 
difficult for government agencies (Bowman, et al., 2006).  For example, the Competition 
in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) requires competition in public procurement.  CICA 
promotes “full and open competition” for federal procurement, establishment of a 
“competition advocate” to ensure the integrity of the procurement process, and provide 
offerors increased ability to challenge departures from competition requirements by 
government acquisition professionals (Koviac, 1992). In addition, government 
contractual terms and conditions suggest the government inherently distrusts of 
contractors and are not interested in long-term relationships.  However, agencies still try 
to find ways to improve efficiency in the supply chain.  Commodity councils are an 
avenue to seek those efficiencies without degrading the effectiveness of the mission.    
Each commodity council takes a different approach to supplier integration.  
Using Kraljic’s Purchasing Portfolio Approach, commodity councils decide what supplier 
integration approach is necessary.  Based on Kraljic’s approach, the Air Force should 
categorize furniture spend as non-critical based on the low impact on the mission and low 
complexity of supply.  Thus, supplier integration provides substantially less value for 
furnishings than for a strategic item.  Leveraging suppliers and process efficiency provide 
substantial value for government furnishing procurement. However, supplier integration 
could fill an experience gap in the absence of government technical expertise.       
The AFFCC initially conducted market research to identify the availability 
of suppliers that could meet its requirement.  Most of its supplier interaction took place at 
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the yearly National Exposition of Contract Furnishings (NEOCON) Conference in 
Chicago, Illinois.  The AFFCC commodity expert attended the NEOCON Conference 
every year with additional AFFCC core members to aid in information gathering.  The 
AFFCC issued a questionnaire for potential suppliers to complete and mail back to the 
AFFCC.  This allowed the suppliers to stay actively engaged in the commodity council 
(Informant D, 2011; Informant E, 2011; Informant G, 2011).  Specifically, because the 
AFFCC did not have a customer for Spiral 1, the AFFCC would post a request for 
information (RFI) about the proposed seating specifications.  After posting the RFI, the 
AFFCC took suggestions from multiple suppliers on improvements to align with industry 
designs and production standards.    
In the long-term, the AFFCC envisions demand forecasting as an informal 
way to integrate suppliers.  After the AFFCC establishes a new spend baseline, suppliers 
will be able to forecast Air Force furniture demand within a couple years of 
implementation.  Informant H provided the following vision of supplier integration into 
the AFFCC acquisition process, 
If the customer or if the supplier knows that in September or—well, 
between August and September we purchase most of our products, then 
maybe seven to eight months prior to that they could negotiate with the 
second or third tier suppliers based on historical data … to get better 
savings on materials. … So those savings hopefully as we get better 
acquainted with their processes will then be passed on to the government. 
(October 11, 2011) 
Multiple informants stated that government laws, regulations, and policies hinder the 
government’s ability to integrate suppliers (Informant A, 2011; Informant D, 2011; 
Informant E; Informant H, 2011).  
d. Small Business Concerns 
The AFFCC made efforts to include small business in the acquisition 
process.  At the beginning of the acquisition process, the AMC small business 
representative vacated his position.  As a temporary solution, a small business 
representative located in Nebraska reviewed the acquisition strategy.  Locally, the AMC 
Small Business Director provided small business advice to the AFFCC.  The AFFCC 
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held telecommunication conferences with the off-site small business representative and 
AMC’s Small Business Director.  This ensured that all parties could communicate ideas 
and concerns for the inclusion of small business.  Both the small business representative 
and the AMC Small Business Director provided input on the AFFCC acquisition strategy. 
The intention of Spiral 1’s acquisition strategy was for it to be a small 
business set-aside.  After further analysis by the Air Force Small Business Solution 
Center (AFSBSC), only 23% of the suppliers of office furniture (excluding wood) were 
identified as being small business non-GSA manufactures (AFSBSC, 2009b).  However, 
the AFSBSC provided that “there are an ample number of [wood furniture] GSA SBs 
[small businesses] to reserve 4 GSA BPAs [blank purchase agreements] for SB” (2009b, 
p. 22). Thus, the AFFCC planned to set-aside only wood seating for small business.  
Therefore, only small business would compete for the approximately 19% of total Air 
Force yearly seating spend appropriated to wood seating.   
Spiral 1A, dorm furnishings, was also intended to be set aside for small 
business.  Analysis by the AFSBSC showed that the Air Force bought 80% of dorm 
furnishings from small businesses (AFSBSC, 2009a).  In addition, the AFSBSC noted a 
key piece of information that was previously missed by both the AFFCC and small 
business representative; mandatory preference programs of FAR part 19 do not apply per 
FAR 8.405–5 (AFSBSC, 2009a). 
Before realizing that the BPAs could not be set aside, the AFFCC and the 
small business advocate differed in opinion about consolidation and bundling of 
requirements.  Informant B stated, “we had a lot of discussion about whether or not this 
would be bundling and then that is when we used the legal office to make that 
determination whether it was bundling or not” (May 23, 2011).  The legal office made the 
decision that it was not bundling but rather consolidation, raising concern by the small 
business representative that small business would be shut out of competition (Informant 
B, 2011).  Informant B provided evidence that the AFFCC and the small business 
advocate still have differing opinions;  
I still do look at it as bundling but you know my decision—how my view 
was trumped by the lawyers. … I think they stepped through a long period 
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of time trying to convince me that it wasn’t bundling or consolidation and 
I was already convinced it was. (May 23, 2011) 
Multiple informants believed that small business discussions slowed the acquisition 
process approximately six months to one year (Informant A, 2011; Informant B, 2011; 
Informant D, 2011; Informant E, 2011; Informant G, 2011).  However, multiple 
informants suggested that it was a lack of education by both parties that led to the delay 
(Informant A, 2011; Informant B, 2011; Informant D, 2011; Informant E, 2011; 
Informant G, 2011).   
e. Sourcing Strategy 
Spend analysis identified that the Air Force purchased approximately 80% 
office furniture from the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS; AMC, 2010).  Additionally, a 
significant portion of spend depends on application of fallout funding at fiscal year-end 
(AMC, 2009a).  Therefore, demand is almost impossible to forecast.  The AFFCC 
identified three demand drivers for furniture acquisition: new construction or building 
renovations, add-on purchases, and furniture replacement (AMC, 2009a).  Because 
furniture is not mission-critical, funding drives furniture requirements.  Because fallout 
funding requires quick execution, the acquisition process must be short. 
 The AFFCC originally planned to use indefinite delivery indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) contracts to source furniture.  However, because furniture purchases are 
typically contingent on funding, sourcing via IDIQ contracts became challenging to 
implement.  IDIQ contracts entail a minimum funding guarantee to the contractor.  In 
addition, the use of trivial IDIQ minimum guarantees (i.e., $10) diminishes the 
motivation for contractors to submit competitive offers.  Because the AFFCC receives no 
fund allocation, BPAs provide the best available sourcing solution. 
According to Informant H, after the AFFCC compared current market 
prices for commodities with the GSA price, the GSA price was typically 40% to 50% less 
than the retail price (October 11, 2011).  The AFFCC found that GSA was the “most 
favored” customer price that suppliers gave to the government.  Additionally, AFFCC felt 
 76 
that competing the requirement outside, utilizing means other than the GSA BPA would 
result in zero net savings (Informant H, 2011).  
The AFFCC believes that standardizing requirements, rationalizing 
suppliers, and centralizing the contract vehicle will bring an additional discount off the 
GSA list price.  FAR 8.405–4 states that “ordering activities may request a price 
reduction at any time before an order, establishing a BPA, or in conjunction with an 
annual BPA review” (FAR, 2011).  Informant H suggested that AFFCC should get an 
additional unit price discount between 8% and 12% as a result of requirements 
consolidation and known demand (2011).  Additionally, transaction cost reductions 
provide substantial savings from supplier rationalization, fewer contracts, and various 
other administrative process efficiencies.  After lengthy discussions about adequate small 
business participation on GSA, the AFFCC issued solicitations for Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A 
using a lowest-price-technically-acceptable (LPTA) source selection approach (Informant 
D, 2011; Informant E, 2011; Informant H, 2011). 
4. Implementation 
Development of a strategy is worthless without effective execution.  The success 
of the AFFCC hinges on changes in buying behavior by organizations.  As stated earlier, 
the AFFCC receives no appropriations, and thus cannot control fund allocation.  Spend 
data collected by Censeo represented organizations’ propensities to highly fragment 
furniture spend across approximately 3,800 suppliers (USAF, 2006).  The AFFCC, along 
with its stakeholders, recognized that standardizing and consolidating furniture spend 
provides an opportunity for immediate cost savings.   
Controlling maverick spend is a concern for the AFFCC.  In May 2011, to ensure 
organizations utilize the BPAs established by the AFFCC, SAF/AQC established a policy 
requiring mandatory use of the AFFCC BPAs.  The policy letter also states that AFFCC 
is the approval authority for all waivers.  However, this alone will not stop organizations 
from buying from non-approved suppliers.  Informant F provided commentary on how 
the AFFCC will control maverick spending: 
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You control it realistically by the CONS [contracting squadron] don’t have 
the time to do it any other way.  They’re going to look and say this is the 
easiest way for me to get furnishings in the future and that’s the way I’m 
going to use it.  They don’t have time to waste on doing a full-up 
solicitation for themselves. (May 25, 2011) 
The AFFCC admits it will be a culture change.  It will take time for organizations to rely 
solely on the AFFCC BPAs for their furniture requirements.  However, the AFFCC 
believes the cost and efficiency savings will entice all organizations to use the AFFCC. 
 To provide accountability for cost savings, the commodity council must establish 
metrics.  Establishing metrics to account for savings provides a challenge for all 
commodity councils.  Savings can only be achieved when an organization spends money.  
Thus, the Air Force must spend money to save money.  By spending more money an 
organization is not truly reducing expenditures.  However, Informant F stated, “People 
will spend to the budget that they have.  There is no incentive to put it in a—there is no 
401K.  There is no savings account that you can reach into next FY” (May 25, 2011).        
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We began this chapter with a background of the AFFCC.  The purpose of the 
background was to provide an understanding of the AFFCC development process.  In the 
remainder of the chapter, we presented the results pertaining to the development and 
implementation of the AFFCC.  In the next chapter, we discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the AFFCC development and implementation process, answer our 
research questions, provide recommendations for future commodity councils, identify 
limitations of this research, and suggest areas for further research. 
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In this chapter, we analyze the results and findings we presented in the previous 
chapter.  In addition to answering our research questions, a deeper analysis of the 
personal interviews and miscellaneous AFFCC source documents led us to identify the 
successes and challenges the commodity council encountered during its development and 
implementation.  Based on our analysis, we provide recommendations to benefit future 
development, implementation, and sustainment of commodity councils throughout the 
Air Force and the DoD.  As a final note, we discuss the limitations of our research and 
provide recommendations for future research.   
 The Air Force utilizes commodity councils to develop and implement enterprise-
wide procurement.  Leveraging by the commodity councils has achieved savings that 
make its use advantageous for both industry and the DoD.  It is important that 
commodities continue to be analyzed by the DoD for these potential savings since 
commodity councils offer unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness.  However, with the 
increasing use of commodity councils within the Air Force, there are a number of issues 
that need to be addressed. 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Small business goals can directly compete with cost efficiency goals.  Yet, the 
U.S. government continues to steer contracts to small businesses and to increase the use 
of strategic sourcing.  However, there is a lack of research that determines whether 
supporting small business goals sacrifices strategic sourcing outcomes.  In addition, not 
everyone agrees that meeting small business goals and strategic sourcing are mutually 
exclusive.  Another issue with respect to the use of commodity councils is whether the 
commodity councils can achieve cost savings objectives if the council has no functional 
ownership of spend or centralized funds.   The lack of spend ownership makes it difficult 
for the commodity council to ensure compliance with procurement policy.  Additionally, 
the Air Force still has not identified whether commodity councils can establish accurate 
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cost savings metrics. The issue remains as to how to validly, accurately, and consistently 
measure cost savings and whether the identified cost savings metrics support the cost 
savings objectives.  Finally, commodity councils have not answered the questions of how 
they can maximize utilization of their respective contracts and control maverick spending 
by organizations.  Commodity councils have processes that deter maverick spending by 
giving customers flexibility, thus deterring the need to buy outside agency-wide 
contracts. 
The problems previously discussed within the AFFCC led to the need for this 
study.  Specifically, this study will seek to understand the factors that contributed to the 
successful development and implementation of the AFFCC and its sourcing strategies.  
The primary goals are to identify the key factors that led to the development and 
implementation of sourcing strategies, document and analyze challenges and successes of 
the AFFCC development and implementation, and provide a case study of the AFFCC to 
improve future implementation of effective commodity council.  We initially developed 
five specific research questions to guide us as we conducted our research.  Each research 
question (RQ) is independently identified and its respective results discussed below.     
 
RQ 1.  What factors contributed to the successful development and implementation of the 
AFFCC. 
 
Identifying the enablers that led to the successful development and 
implementation of the AFFCC gives future commodity councils a framework for 
continued success.  While there were many challenges faced by the AFFCC, we 
identified five factors that enabled them to fully develop and implement Spiral 1, seating, 
and Spiral 1A, dormitory furnishings: time, NPS education, UT training, market research, 
and experienced consultants.   
Time proved to be a huge asset to the AFFCC.  The Air Force provided the 
AFFCC an opportunity to develop and implement their commodity council with no time 
constraint.  This allowed an in-depth analysis of the furnishing market and extensive 
discussions with small business about participation after requirements consolidation.  The 
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process for developing and implementing Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A was approximately 48 
months.  With a time limit constraint, the successful development and implementation of 
the AFFCC may not have occurred.  In addition to time, the program managers’ formal 
strategic sourcing education provided insight needed during the development and 
implementation process. 
During the development and implementation of Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A, military 
deployments resulted in the assignment of two program managers.  However, both 
military members received formal strategic sourcing education from Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California.  This knowledge allowed them to understand the skills 
core members needed to effectively develop and implement a commodity council.  They 
identified a gap in training and personnel that resulted in hiring UT to conduct strategic 
sourcing training and Censeo to perform spend analysis.  Their ability to understand the 
strategic sourcing process enabled the AFFCC to overcome initial knowledge and 
expertise weaknesses.   
A knowledgeable, experienced spend analysis consultant enabled the AFFCC to 
obtain critical spend data.  Though the program managers received spend analysis 
education, the lack of additional personnel to assist negated their abilities.  Additionally, 
the consultant’s experience merging different data collection systems provided an 
essential capability.  In addition to critical spend data provided by the spend analysis 
consultant, extensive market research enabled the AFFCC to effectively develop and 
implement their commodity council. 
Market research provided vital information needed to bridge requirement gaps in 
the absence of a customer and to identify the ideal sourcing solution for the inclusion of 
small businesses.  As stated, the absence of a customer made the AFFCC’s requirements 
definition task difficult.  Market research identified key suppliers to garner pertinent 
information about specifications, materials, and capabilities in the current marketplace.  
Without the suppliers’ inputs gathered during market research, the AFFCC’s would not 
possess the capability to effectively define the requirement for solicitation.  Additionally, 
market research allowed the AFFCC to identify the types of furnishings that currently 
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had adequate small business manufactures.  This allowed the AFFCC to identify the 
sourcing strategy that created the best trade-off between cost savings and socio-economic 
concerns.  
Finally, the UT training filled the strategic sourcing knowledge gap.  As shown in 
Table 2, none of the AFFCC members had previous strategic sourcing experience.  The 
lack of strategic sourcing knowledge caused the initial execution of the commodity 
council to slowly progress.  Since the members of Spiral 1 already began development 
one year prior, they did not attend the UT training.  Subsequently, the UT training 
allowed the members of Spiral 1A to accelerate development.  The UT training enabled 
Spiral 1A to be implemented one month prior to Spiral 1. 
 
RQ 2. How can the commodity council achieve strategic sourcing objectives (e.g., 
increased savings, reduce transaction costs, and improve supplier performance) if the 
council has no functional ownership of spend or a centralized fund?     
 
Successful implementation of strategic sourcing objectives improves when the 
commodity council controls their organization’s commodity market segment spend.  
However, the DoD hierarchical design delegates fund allocation authority to each 
department who, in turn, disseminates the allocated funds downward for decentralized 
spend execution.  To increase the fiscal complexity in today’s austere and politically-
charged environment, Congressional DoD fund appropriations continue to lag for an 
extended period of time into each new fiscal year.  The instability of Congressional fund 
allocation provides second, third, and fourth-order effects throughout the DoD.  
Subsequently, within each DoD department, financial planning becomes challenging.  
Therefore, decentralized commands typically purchase furnishings with operations and 
maintenance (O&M) “fallout” funds, those O&M funds yet to be spent on other priorities 
prior to their fiscal year expiration date on 30 September.  The lack of direct fund 
allocation makes achieving strategic sourcing objectives difficult for any commodity 
council, including the AFFCC.  Managing furnishing spend proves difficult since 
procurement funds for furnishings come from all organizations; no single functional 
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organizations “owns” the furnishings requirement.   The lack of a single functional 
organization who “owns” a specific requirement has implications for other indirect, non-
critical spend such as office supplies.  This highlights the importance for the commodity 
council to develop methods to control spend allocation in the absence of functional 
ownership of the requirement or centralized funds.   
An adequately defined requirement is essential for customer participation in 
strategic sourcing initiatives.  However, defining the requirement becomes an arduous 
task when the commodity council does not have functional ownership of the requirement.  
To ensure that the commodity council adequately defines the requirement, a functional 
expert must be part of the commodity council’s core team.  A functional expert provides 
an understanding of the commodity or service that otherwise is nonexistent.  Since 
functional experts work with the commodity or service daily, they can coordinate 
internally to achieve consensus on a standardized requirement (i.e., a standard furniture 
configuration).  Additionally, functional experts have a greater understanding of the 
current marketplace, thus provide valuable insight about supplier participation and 
supplier abilities to fulfill customer requirements.  Therefore, a functional expert provides 
critical information to be used in determining contract type during the solicitation phase.  
Additionally, to manage requirement changes after award, the functional expert must 
become assigned as a permanent member of the commodity council.   
In addition to functional ownership of the requirement, control of fund allocation 
for the commodity or service improves the commodity council’s ability to achieve 
strategic sourcing objectives.  A centralized fund allocation provides the ideal situation 
for controlling maverick spend.  However, as stated, the current DoD organizational 
environment promoted decentralized execution of funds.  This necessitates the need for a 
CPO within the Air Force organizational structure.  IBM implemented a center-led 
procurement strategy to ensure their commodity councils achieve strategic sourcing 
objectives while still maintaining decentralized fund execution.  According to Weele and 
Rozemeijer (1996), 
IBM’s new procurement organization provides suppliers with 
consolidated, enterprise-wide requirements and a ‘virtual’ organization 
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with a single contact point (the commodity council) for ‘contracting’. 
However, in all cases the actual purchasing operations are decentralized. 
Production buying is organized around divisional global procurement 
executives. These managers report to the Chief Purchasing Officer (CPO), 
but also to their line manager. The business unit managers meet with the 
CPO on the corporate business councils, so there is direct contact between 
the CPO and them. Here common agreements are decided upon. The CPO 
works with each of these managers individually to make sure that the 
corporate-wide procurement strategy is consistent with what the division 
needs to have.  In this way IBM is able to benefit from its massive 
purchasing power, while at the same time pursuing maximum operational 
flexibility for its manufacturing plants. (p. 156) 
IBM’s center-led procurement organizational structure provides a model to meet strategic 
sourcing objectives with decentralized fund allocation.  The Air Force should adopt such 
a model to meet their strategic sourcing objectives.  Without a CPO to ensure compliance 
with the Air Force’s procurement strategy, the AFFCC established GSA BPA contracts to 
leverage pricing in the current decentralized organizational structure.  The AFFCC 
planned to use IDIQ contracts to source furniture.  However, because furniture purchases 
are typically contingent on funding and having a customer, an IDIQ sourcing strategy 
became challenging to implement.  Since GSA contracts are not subject to the set-aside 
requirements of FAR Part 19, GSA BPAs provide the best sourcing approach.   
To achieve strategic sourcing objectives, the AFFCC standardized requirements, 
rationalized suppliers, and centralized the contract vehicle bringing additional discount 
off the GSA list price.  As stated earlier, Informant H suggested that AFFCC should get 
an additional discount between 8% and 12% (2011) a year for the duration of the base 
year plus four option years.  After the AFFCC transitions to Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base, Ohio, a new team will continue management of Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A along with 
creating additional furnishing spirals.  The continuous management provides oversight of 
spend formally without ownership.  Therefore, the AFFCC’s use of GSA BPAs that 
utilize decentralized ordering enables them to meet strategic sourcing objectives.  The 
addition of a commodity expert in future commodity councils could improve the 
probability of gaining functional ownership of furnishings spend.  Commodity councils 
are designed for long-term cost savings to commodity and service acquisitions.  Only 
with support from senior leadership to permanently place adequate personnel and 
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expertise on commodity councils will the commodity council be able to implement 
strategic sourcing objectives without functional ownership of requirements or without the 
ownership of centralized funds. 
    
RQ 3. How can the commodity council support small business goals without sacrificing 
strategic sourcing objectives? 
Government agencies must balance acquisition efficiency with socioeconomic 
concerns, specifically small business participation in government procurement.  For 
industry, leveraging the supply base through requirements consolidation and bundling is 
critical to an organization’s strategic sourcing success (Bowman et al., 2006).  
Unfortunately, the use of consolidation and bundling competes directly with small 
business development goals (Bowman et al., 2006).  However, the AFFCC made efforts 
to include small business in the acquisition process.  At the beginning of the acquisition 
process, the AMC coordinated with the AMC Small Business Director and the designated 
small business representative.  All parties communicated ideas and concerns for the 
inclusion of small business.  Both the small business representative and the AMC Small 
Business Director provided input on the AFFCC acquisition strategy. 
The intent of both Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A’s acquisition strategy was for them to be 
small business set-aside contracts.  To enable the Air Force to meet its strategic sourcing 
objective, it required the consolidation of requirements.  The AFFCC and AMC Small 
Business Director differed in opinion on whether the AFFCC’s proposed strategy met the 
definition of consolidation or bundling.  The legal office made the decision that it was not 
bundling; subsequently, the AFFCC pressed forward with implementing the strategy.   
Through spend analysis, the AFSBSC identified that only 23% of the suppliers of 
office furniture were small business non-GSA manufactures (AFSBSC, 2009b).  
However, the AFSBSC provided that wood seating comprised of mostly niche small 
business manufactures (AFSBSC, 2009b).  In addition, for Spiral 1A, the Air Force 
bought 80% of dorm furnishings from small businesses (AFSBSC, 2009a).  Thus, it was 
determined even with consolidation, the AFFCC would receive adequate small business 
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competition for Spiral 1 (wood seating) and Spiral 1A (dorm furnishings).  However, the 
AFSBSC noted that mandatory preference programs (i.e., small business set-aside) in 
FAR part 19 do not apply per FAR 8.405–5 (AFSBSC, 2009a).  While the AFFCC still 
had the option to include small business as an evaluation factor, the AFFCC decided that 
a LPTA source selection methodology provided the best fit to meet both the strategic 
sourcing objectives and small business goals.  Though the AFFCC did not establish a 
small business set-aside, our research found potential opportunities to effectively support 
small business goals without sacrificing strategic sourcing objectives.   
When a commodity council performs a detailed spend analysis and market 
research, they become aware of small businesses’ participation in the commodity or 
service marketplace.  For instance, the AFFCC identified that while large businesses 
manufactured a majority of non-wood seating, small businesses manufactured majority of 
the wood seating (AFSBSC, 2009b).   Additionally, through market research, the AFFCC 
determined that adequate small business competition for wood seating existed (AFSBSC, 
2009b).  Therefore, wood seating provided an opportunity for a partial small business set-
aside.  Though wood seating would be a set-aside, the competitive marketplace drives 
prices down resulting in lower total cost of ownership while supporting small business 
objectives.  Additionally, if market research indicates that aggregating requirements 
substantially hinders the small business manufacturing base, a regional contract approach 
to reduce the contract scope could prove more effective at balancing strategic sourcing 
and small business objectives than a nation-wide acquisition strategy.      
GSA BPAs provide another avenue to support small business goals while 
maintaining strategic sourcing objectives. GSA BPAs offer the flexibility to include 
socioeconomic consideration since GSA BPAs adhere to requirements under FAR Part 8 
versus FAR Part 19.  For contracts adhering to FAR Part 8 requirements, FAR Part 19 
requirements to substantiate consolidation or bundling do not apply.  According to FAR 
subpart 8.405–5(a)(1)(ii), contracting officers, at their discretion, may set-aside BPAs for 
small business (2011).  If market research concludes that there is limited small business 
participation but available small businesses possess the capability to perform, the 
contracting officer may set aside a portion of the GSA BPA for small business.  
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However, if market research determines that adequate small business participation exists, 
the commodity council should achieve deeper discounts and an expanded competitive 
marketplace.  Therefore, the used of GSA BPAs allow both the agency and small 
business to achieve their objectives.    
Finally, it is imperative that a commodity council be assigned a small business 
representative as part of their core team to ensure a balance between small business goals 
and strategic sourcing objectives.  The small business representative provides the 
knowledge and expertise needed to ensure effective inclusion of small business goals in 
strategic sourcing strategies.  Additionally, as multiple AFFCC informants stated, small 
business concerns slowed the commodity council’s development and implementation 
process between six months and one year (Informant A, 2011; Informant B, 2011; 
Informant D, 2011; Informant E, 2011; Informant G, 2011).  While a small business 
representative advised the AFFCC, the lack of accountability to the AFFCC potentially 
decreased the representative’s active participation during the development and 
implementation process.  Therefore, assigning a small business representative as a core 
team member maintains the small business representative allegiance to the commodity 
council’s task of developing and implementing their strategic sourcing initiative.     
 
RQ 4. How did the AFFCC establish a verifiable cost savings methodology that is valid, 
accurate, consistent, and objective?   
The Air Force commodity councils have struggled with identifying and analyzing 
strategic sourcing metrics.  Specifically, the AFFCC struggled with the development of a 
cost savings methodology that is valid, accurate, consistent, and objective.  Metrics such 
as cost savings are required for the successful execution of strategic sourcing.  The efforts 
of strategic sourcing must be measured against goals, industry benchmarks, or other 
metrics in order to drive appropriate purchasing strategy (Duffy, 2008).  Commodity 
councils established before the AFFCC reported significant savings, but these cost 
savings proved difficult to verify (AFAA, 2010).  This brings into question the 
commodity council’s ability to establish accurate cost savings and validation metrics.  
 88 
Specifically, the AFAA found that the councils inconsistently computed savings and 
reported savings that could not be validated (AFAA, 2010).  For example, the Medical 
Services Council could not provide supporting documentation to verify labor costs.  In 
the following year, the Medical Services Council calculated savings using a different 
methodology.  The theme across all commodity councils was the lack of a standardized 
and consistent cost savings methodology (AFAA, 2010).  Therefore, the issue remains as 
to how to establish a cost savings estimation methodology that is valid, accurate, 
consistent, and objective.   
In the AFFCC’s efforts to develop a cost savings methodology, the council 
created three business cases that represent three areas of cost savings.  The first area 
includes furniture standardization, which has estimated cost savings between $14.3M-
$35.5M over a five year period.  The second area includes savings from the development 
of centralized contract vehicles.  This area is subdivided between savings from volume 
discounts and savings from improved purchasing efficiency.  Volume discounts as a 
result of consolidation are estimated to account for 3.2%–9.3% ($9.5M-$27.3M) of cost 
savings over a five year period.  Improved purchasing efficiency through administrative 
cost avoidance is estimated to account for 2.1% ($6.1M) of cost savings over the first five 
years.  As a result, the second area accounts for a combined estimated cost savings of 
$15.6-$33.4M over the first five years.  The third area consists of savings from 
comprehensive furniture management services (CFMS).  CFMS consists of seven areas 
of management services: project management, asset management, 
reconfiguration/relocation management, space planning and design, packaged furnishing, 
asset maintenance, site preparation and reconfiguration.  CFMS replaces support and 
technical expertise no longer supported by organic sources within the USAF.  The 
consolidation of the management services under a centralized contract results in 
additional savings.  Savings from this area are estimated between 2.9% and 3.5% 
($11.3M and $13.6M, respectively) over the first five years.  The total estimated savings, 
over the first five years, from all three business cases is 10.6%–21% ($41.2M–$81.8M 
respectively (AMC, 2009a).          
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To compute cost savings, the AFFCC utilized Censeo’s expertise to gather 
pertinent data to create a saving calculation methodology and baseline.  The AFFCC used 
a percentage of savings based on government and commercial savings benchmarks, 
historical spend analysis from FY00-FY07, and forecast information to compute savings 
estimates listed in the business case studies.  In addition, each business case includes hard 
savings, soft savings, or a combination of the two (AMC, 2009a).  The variation of hard 
and soft savings in the cost savings estimates shows a limitation in the savings estimates.  
The current savings methodology provides a benchmark in which actual savings can be 
compared with the estimated savings after the first five years.  However, the current 
savings methodology highlights the need for a standardized and centralized methodology 
to measure actual cost savings before the five year time period.   
To document the savings identified in the business case study, the AFFCC created 
a methodology to measure cost savings in three categories:  rate (cost savings from 
economies of scale based on historical spend data), demand management (both cost 
savings and cost avoidance from reduced consumption), and process improvement 
(savings from administrative costs avoidance).  The AFFCC’s three savings categories 
are based on commercial industry practices.  Figure 7 shows an example of NCR’s hard 
cost savings methodology, tracking, and validation process.  NCR is an industry leader in 
strategic sourcing.  In addition, Table 4 illustrates how NCR calculates soft savings or 




Figure 7.   NCR Cost Reduction Levers and Tracking and Validation Process 
(From: Ashenbaum, 2006, p. 12) 
 
Table 4.   NCR Procurement Savings Calculations 




The AFFCC measured success as achieving savings via a reduced GSA price 
based on volume discounts.  These savings are referred to as hard cost savings.  The 
AFFCC doesn’t appear to place a measure on soft savings (i.e., cost avoidance).  Cost 
savings and cost avoidance are both essential to the success of strategic sourcing and 
must be included in the savings methodology.  However, there is no standardized 
definition of cost savings and cost avoidance.  In 2006, a report by Ashenbaum (p. 2–3) 
defined both cost savings and cost avoidance.  Ashenbaum (2006, p. 2) defined cost 
savings, or hard savings, as: 
• Year-on-year saving over the constant volume of purchased 
product/service 
• Actions that can be traced directly to the profit and loss statement 
• A direct reduction of expense or a change in process/technology/policy 
that directly reduces expenses 
• Process improvements that result in real and measurable cost or asset 
reductions 
• The examination of existing products or services, contractual agreements, 
or processes to determine potential change(s) that reduce cost 
• Net reductions in prices paid for items procured when compared to prices 
in place for the prior 12 months, or a change to lower cost alternative, i.e.., 
[old price – new price] x volume 
• Must have prior baseline or standard cost for the purchased product or 
service to measure savings against prior purchases 
• Tangible bottom line reductions resulting in saved money that could be 
removed from budgets or reinvested back into the business 
 
Furthermore, Ashenbaum (2006, p. 3) defines cost avoidance as: 
 
• Avoidance is a cost reduction that does not lower the cost of 
products/services when compared against historical results, but rather 
minimized or avoids entirely the negative impact to the bottom line that a 
price increase would have caused 
• When there is an increase in output/capacity without increasing resource 
expenditure, in general, the cost avoidance savings are the amount that 
would have been spent to handle the increased volume/output 
• Avoidances include process improvements that do not immediately reduce 
cost or assets but provide benefits through improved process efficiency, 
employee productivity, improved customer satisfaction, improved 
competitiveness, etc. 
• Often becomes cost savings over time 
• Not tangible savings that can be pulled out or reinvested 
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The above discussion highlights a methodology for the measurement of costs 
savings.  However, the AFFCC lacks a measurement methodology to determine whether 
strategic sourcing strategies achieve success and to identify programs/activities used to 
enable strategic sourcing strategies.  The use of a balanced score card can fill this gap.  
The balanced score card consists of four perspectives:  financial (how do we look to 
shareholders?), customer (how do our customers see us?), internal business (at what 
business process must we excel at?), and learning and growth perspectives (What do we 
need to do to improve?) (Braun, Tietz, & Harrison, 2010).  Each perspective consists of 
four procurement related components:  objective, measure, target, and initiative (Duffy, 
2008).  The balanced scorecard approach will enable the AFFCC to link purchasing 
strategies with Air Force wide strategies (Carter, Monczka, Mosconi, & McKinsey & 
Company, 2005), Appendix G illustrates an example of Merck’s procurement scorecard 
(Duffy, 2008, p. 26).  Additionally, Duffy (2008) states,   
When it comes to reporting on the scorecard, the key is to link the 
measures to  analysis and recommendations – again the focus on action.  
To track performance, the question is:  how are the objective and its 
measure(s) performing?  The  analysis then becomes:  why is the measure 
performing as it is?  What activities support this objective?  The 
recommendation would come from the question: What actions or 
decisions are needed. (p. 25)          
The newly created savings allows the AFFCC and all AF commodity councils to 
utilize a standardized cost methodology based on three categories to report savings over 
time.  To be considered reliable, consistent, objective, and verifiable, the cost savings 
methodology depends on the establishment of an accurate baseline.  The AFFCC used 
GSA to obtain baseline commercial prices and GSA discounted prices.  The price of each 
task order will be compared with the additional volume discounts offered by the AFFCC 
BPA providers to determine the net purchase price, which also serves as a reliable and 
accurate Independent Government Estimate (IGE).  The AFFCC used the spreadsheets 
shown in Appendix H to document the IGE and to form an audit trail.  A similar template 
is used by the AFFCC when soliciting for contractor quotes.  The spreadsheets illustrated 
in Appendix H allow the AFFCC to compare GSA pricing with the net BPA discount 
price.      
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This standardized methodology will allow the AFFCC’s cost savings to be 
measured consistently and objectively.  However, the methodology appears to lack 
validation since the methodology relies on contractor pricing inputs not historical spend 
data.  Therefore, we recommend that the AFFCC utilize the practices identified in the 
AFAA’s 2007 evaluation (Audit Report F2007–0011-FB4000) of the implementation and 
management of the USAF’s Network Centric Solutions Contract (NETCENTS) to 
achieve cost savings validation.  The AFAA recommended that NETCENTS establish a 
baseline to evaluate cost savings.  Specifically, the AFAA identifies GSA prices as an 
adequate predetermined baseline that can be used to evaluate cost savings (AFAA, 2007).  
We recommend that the AFFCC utilize random sampling and analysis of furniture task 
orders to compare AFFCC contractor bids with other acquisition sources such as GSA 
and previous furniture buys at the unit level.  We also recommend that the cost savings 
results be posted in a location that allows customers to view the cost savings achieved 
through the use of the centralized BPAs.  This will further achieve customer buy-in and 
provide incentive for customers to utilize the mandatory BPAs and mitigate maverick 
spending.   
We also recommend that the AFFCC adapt the NETCENTS cost savings 
methodology. This will enable the AFFCC to compare actual cost savings against an 
established baseline.  
To test whether using the NETCENTS contract resulted in anticipated cost 
savings, at each location we selected all NETCENTS awards if less than 
research amount identified on the AF Form 9 to the actual award amount 
and determine the average cost savings.  We performed the same 
comparison for all mandatory non-NETCENTS contract awards and 
compared the cost savings from NETCENTS to non-NETCENTS contract 
awards. (AFAA, 2007, p. 13)     
Furthermore, the AFFCC must establish metrics to measure warranties, training, 
technical standards, and special terms and conditions; i.e., total cost of ownership.  The 
metrics enable the AFFCC to manage suppliers more effectively and maximize cost 
savings.  In addition, it shows the customer the benefits of using the centralized BPAs 
and that the lowest price was not necessarily the best value.  Therefore, AFFCC’s BPAs 
provide obvious incentives justifying their use to the customer.     
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 Based on the research findings, we have several recommendations for the AFFCC 
with respect to their cost savings methodology.  First, we recommend that the AFFCC 
create standardized definitions for cost savings and cost avoidance as well as clearly 
specify the data collection processes needed to calculate savings results (Carter, 
Monckza, Mosconi, & McKinsey & Company, 2005).  Second, we recommend that the 
AFFCC utilize NCR’s savings calculations for both cost savings and cost avoidance.    
This will enable the AFFCC to achieve savings metrics that are both objective and 
consistent.  We further recommend that the AFFCC incorporate the savings reporting 
methodology (Appendix F) illustrated in a 2009 CAPS report by Carter, Monczka, & 
Ragatz (p. 18).  In addition, the AFFCC should continue to use the spreadsheets in 
Appendix H to establish a baseline that can be used to document cost savings.  However, 
we recommend that the AFFCC incorporate estimated delivery times and actual delivery 
times in order to document cost avoidance through the use of the AFFCC BPAs.   
 Due to the volume of SKUs, we recommend that the AFFCC identify the top 10 
SKUs (Stock Keeping Units) by purchase volume and dollar amount.  The SKUs should 
be averaged to establish an average actual cost.  The average actual cost should be 
compared with the average discounted GSA prices (i.e., the baseline).  In addition, the 
AFFCC could use random sampling of SKUs to compare actual costs with discounted 
GSA prices to estimate a savings percentage. Further research is needed to determine a 
way to automate the cost savings process so that it can be accomplished in a timelier 
manner.  This will allow discrepancies, deficiencies, and weaknesses to be identified 
quicker, thus leading to improved efficiency and effectiveness. Next, we recommend that 
the AFFCC incorporate NCR’s tracking and validation process.  This will enable to the 
AFFCC to document and validate savings on a timely and consistent basis (i.e., 
quarterly).  Next, we recommend that the AFFCC utilize a third party to validate their 
savings methodology.  Specifically, we recommend that the AFFCC utilize the AFAA to 
validate their cost savings methodology on an annual basis.  In addition, we recommend 
that the AFFCC incorporate a financial analyst into the commodity council.  This 
individual would be responsible for owning the processes for calculating cost savings and 
performing audits of actual savings submitted by the AFFCC Director on a quarterly 
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basis (Carter, Monckza, Mosconi, & McKinsey & Company, 2005).  In addition, the 
financial analyst role should be expanded to provide expert cost savings support to all Air 
Force commodity councils.  This will improve the accuracy of the cost savings and cost 
avoidance and further validate the AFFCC’s savings methodology.  Next, we recommend 
that the AFFCC create a procurement balanced score card to link strategic objectives with 
purchasing execution across the entire USAF.  This will enhance the measurement of 
purchasing’s effectiveness (Duffy, 2008).  Next, we recommend that the AFFCC develop 
a rewards system to reinforce the established metrics and to drive appropriate purchasing 
behavior by management.  Finally, we recommend that the AFFCC review its 
communication plan to ensure that Air Force customers are aware of the standardized 
BPA ordering process available through AFAdvantage 
 
RQ 5. How does the commodity council maximize utilization of its respective contracts 
and control maverick spending by organizations? 
Maverick spend is defined as spend that is purchased outside of the mandatory 
purchasing process (i.e., outside of the intended in-place contract).  It is essential for the 
Air Force to use its centralized furniture BPAs to procure goods and services.  Without 
the use of strategic sourcing contracts, significant savings cannot be realized.  Maverick 
spending is mainly caused by customers who are unaware of the current supplier 
relationship or by customers who cannot get exactly what he wants from the corporate 
contracts (Eakin, 2002).  Therefore, the AFFCC must establish processes that deter 
maverick spending by giving customers flexibility, thus deterring the desire to go “off-
contract” (Reese & Pohlman, 2005).        
The AFFCC must have buy-in from its stakeholders to mitigate maverick spend.  
Specifically, the purchasing and buying activities, contracting units and customers 
respectively, must be aware of the AFFCC contracts and their mandatory use.  To achieve 
this, the AFFCC drafted a policy letter, to be signed by the Deputy Assistance Secretary 
(Contracting)/Assistant Secretary (Acquisition), mandating the use of the AFFCC 
centralized purchasing agreements.  The mandatory use policy letter provides and 
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awareness of the requirement to use the AFFCC purchasing agreements.  However, the 
centralized and standardized furniture procurement process is a major change from how 
furniture was purchased in the past.  To prevent maverick spend, the use of the AFFCC 
purchasing agreements will require a cultural change within the Air Force.  The 
mandatory use policy letter jump starts the cultural change.  However, other incentives 
are needed to bring about a cultural change. 
To bring about cultural change requires change by the contracting units and the 
customers.  The AFFCC does not foresee an issue with the cultural change among the 
contracting units.  Contracting personnel will appreciate the centralized contracts; the 
shortage of contracting personnel and the increased contracting workload will allow 
contracting personnel to concentrate on other key purchasing areas.  With respect to the 
contracting units, Informant F stated, “This is the easiest way for me [contracting officer] 
to get furnishings in the future.  They [contracting personnel] don’t have time to waste on 
doing a full-up solicitation themselves” (2011).  Customers, however, may not be as 
appreciative of the standardized furniture requirements.  In the past, customers chose 
furniture from a variety of sources.  As a result, organizations across the Air Force do not 
have standardized furniture.  As customers require additional and/or replacement 
furniture, they will want the furniture to match existing furniture.  The AFFCC 
purchasing agreements are setup to standardize an entire room.  Basically, the agreements 
purchase “rooms in a box.”  That is, the agreements are setup so that all furniture in a 
room will be from the same source.  When a customer needs only a replacement piece of 
furniture and not an entire room of furniture, the replacement piece will not exactly 
match the existing furniture.  This may lead customers to pursue other avenues to 
purchase similar furniture, which will result in maverick spend.  Informant F stated,   
“It’s not going to be the CONS that I’m worried about.  It’s going to be the customer 
that’s saying I want something different. They have to be shown the policy letter that says 
sorry, here are your choices when it comes to dorm furnishings; here are your choices 
when it comes to seating, this is the mandatory use contract” (2011).   
It is likely that the cultural change will follow the current life cycle of furniture.  
As furniture needs to be replaced, customers will become aware of the AFFCC contracts 
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in place.  In addition, the current and future budget constraints will force customers to 
purchase furniture within their budgets.  As budgets shrink, customers will look for lower 
furniture prices.  These lower prices will come from the AFFCC agreements.  
Furthermore, there is no incentive for organizations to save money.  They will spend until 
they deplete their budget.  This presents a problem in itself.  Other than purchasing 
furniture with less money, there is no incentive for customers to save money.  This is an 
area that requires further research as providing incentives to save money would provide a 
significant reason for customers to use the AFFCC agreements.  Thus, maverick spending 
would be mitigated if not eliminated. 
C. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
1. Resource Allocation Analysis 
For the U.S. government, having not only the capacity to perform requirements 
but also the capacity to manage outsourced requirements continues to be an issue 
(Schooner, S. L. & Greenspan, D. S., 2008).  The downsizing of the federal acquisition 
workforce during the 1990s dramatically reduced the level of acquisition expertise within 
the DoD (Schooner, S.L. & Greenspan, D. S., 2008).  Thus, DoD leaders continually face 
the challenge of allocating the adequate number of personnel with the correct level of 
expertise.   Without a CPO to ensure the appropriate allocation of talent and 
implementation of rigorous education and training, the DoD continues to struggle to 
obtain and retain the resources necessary to effectively implement industry best practices.  
The lack of adequate resources was not an exception for the AFFCC.  The 
AFFCC was initially tasked by SAF/AQC to create a commodity council in order to 
strategically purchase furniture.  AMC divided furniture into subcategories called spirals.  
The furniture commodity council was responsible for Spiral 1, which consisted of 
seating, and Spiral 1a, which consisted of dorm furnishings.  The commodity council 
consisted of four personnel, which included a project manager, two contracting 
specialists, and a commodity expert.  However, in 2006, the furniture business case 
analysis called for one full-time project manager, one part-time procurement analyst, one 
full-time contract manager, one full-time contract specialist, and 10 part-time extended 
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team members (Williams, 2006).  As stated earlier, the commodity council was 
responsible for purchasing furniture for AMC requirements.  Shortly thereafter, the 
requirement for furniture was expanded to include furniture purchases across the entire 
Air Force.  Following this drastic change in scope, leadership did not allocated additional 
personnel to the commodity council (Informant E, 2011).  Thus, the lack of additional 
personnel and inadequate strategic sourcing expertise overwhelmed the commodity 
council members. 
Next, AFFCC leaderships’ efforts to seek additional personnel failed to gain the 
priority at the SAF/ACQ level.  While Informant F understood that the AFFCC was low 
priority, the FCC recommendation came from SAF/ACQ.   The lack of focus at the 
enterprise level suggests that strategic sourcing is still in the habitualization phase.   In 
addition, the lack of resource allocation by senior leaders suggests that the Air Force’s 
organizational culture still does not fully embrace strategic sourcing initiatives.  As stated 
earlier, because leadership did not appoint an adequate number of personnel to the 
AFFCC, the AFFCC requirements overwhelmed the core team members. 
In addition to the lack of sufficient personnel, the AFFCC experienced challenges 
with expertise and continuity.  To assist the contract specialists, leadership assigned one 
commodity expert to the AFFCC.  Because leadership only assigned one commodity 
expert to the AFFCC, all technical information for Spiral 1 and Spiral 1A became her 
responsibility.  Although the commodity expert identified outside resources to help define 
the requirement, the process was inefficient.  In addition to only having one commodity 
expert, the AFFCC only had two personnel that had a formal strategic sourcing 
education.  Therefore, the lack of adequate expertise hampered the AFFCC’s ability to 
formulate an efficient development and implementation strategy.   
Personnel continuity also provided an obstacle for the AFFCC.  A military 
member filled the project manager position.  As a military member, the individual 
deployed multiple times while assigned to the FCC (Informant A, 2011).  During the 
project manager’s deployment, leadership assigned another military member to the 
project manager position (Informant E, 2011).  Subsequently, that project manager was 
deployed.  Because the military members received formal strategic sourcing education, 
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they provided the AFFCC strategic sourcing expertise.  In an effort to fill the project 
manager void, the civilian contract specialists assumed the project manager’s 
responsibilities for their respective commodity spirals (Informant E, 2011).  There was 
not a full-time contracting officer assigned to the FCC.  We also emphasize that the 
civilians were contract specialists, not contracting officers.  Each contract specialist was 
responsible for his respective spiral.  They assumed all required actions during the 
acquisition process from initial requirement definitions to contract award.  The specialists 
did not have any contract support personnel to assist them.  Though the contract 
specialists are salaried employees, the considerable amounts of overtime resulted in an 
overall total acquisition cost increase to the federal government (Informant E, 2011).    
Finally, the commodity council lacked key support personnel.  Specifically, the 
AFFCC did not include a business requirements analyst, a market intelligence analyst, a 
procurement analyst, a business process analyst, a financial analyst, or an economic 
analyst.  The Commodity Council Implementation and Operations Informational Guide 
specifically identifies and defines these positions as core team members (USAF, 2006).  
Either the contract specialists or the commodity subject matter expert accomplished the 
duties of the vacant positions.  For example, the commodity subject matter expert took on 
the role of requirements analyst (Informant G, 2011).  This forced already inexperienced 
personnel to gain additional training to perform complex tasks.   
The implications from this finding are widespread.  The DoD established that 
strategic sourcing initiative are imperative to achieving the cost efficiencies necessary to 
continue its mission.  The lack of capacity to perform strategic sourcing initiatives within 
the DoD should be a major concern for leaders.  It is imperative that steps to strengthen 
the current DoD acquisition workforce continue into the foreseeable future.  Without the 
capacity to adequately implement a strategic sourcing initiative, the DoD will find it 
difficult to achieve cost savings targets.    
2. Training Analysis 
Trained and educated teams are critical to the successful implementation of 
commodity strategies (Rendon, 2005).  Wolf (2005) provides that “Strategic purchasing 
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can only be effective if the purchasing department constantly expands and updates its 
technical knowledge…” (p. 19).  Strategic sourcing requires a thought process that goes 
against the traditional tactical view of purchasing.  It requires a deeper understanding of 
the forces surrounding the buyer-supplier relationship.  Because the AFFCC was AMC’s 
first strategic sourcing endeavor, we assumed that AFFCC personnel received extensive, 
ongoing strategic sourcing training.  Therefore, the revelation that AFFCC team members 
started the acquisition process with only a small number of computer-based training 
modules came unexpectedly.  Through interviews, AFFCC team members identified that 
they did not possess the requisite strategic sourcing background and training needed to 
efficiently and effectively create a new commodity council (Informant E, 2011).  As a 
result, the AFFCC member’s personally sought out the strategic sourcing guides available 
for development and implementation of a commodity council.   
The team initially relied on the Commodity Council Implementation and 
Operations Informational Guide for the AFFCC development and implementation 
(USAF, 2006).  However, the guide’s framework failed to provide the in-depth 
instructions needed to implement a successful commodity council.  As a result, the 
AFFCC sought additional classroom training to improve their strategic sourcing 
knowledge.  The Air Force hired UT to design a commodity council implementation 
training course.  The UT training was instrumental in the successful development and 
implementation of the AFFCC (Informant E, 2011).   
The UT training provided a step-by-step module-based commodity council 
development and implementation process for the AFFCC.  The AFFCC attended three 
separate one-week training modules at UT (schedule shown in Appendix B).  Each 
module consisted of briefings, class work, and homework.  In addition, after each 
module, key participants received tasks to complete before the next session.  All 
informants commented that the training provided a detailed course of action and outlined 
the appropriate steps necessary to complete the AFFCC development and 
implementation.  Informant H stated that “information is one thing; understanding is 
something different … you can have the information that you have to execute a spiral, but 
you don’t really understand what it takes to go from point A to point B” (October 11, 
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2011).  Without the UT training, the AFFCC could not have successfully developed and 
implemented the AFFCC spirals (Informant H, 2011).    
The struggles that the AFFCC encountered provide important implications to the 
DoD about the adequacy of current training.  Current strategic sourcing curriculum 
available for government employees (i.e., DAU on-line continuous learning modules) 
provides a basic understanding of strategic sourcing.  However, as shown by the AFFCC, 
these courses do not develop the skills needed to effectively and efficiently develop and 
implement a commodity council.  It was not until the AFFCC attended the UT training 
that they possessed the skills necessary to develop and implement a commodity council.  
While the research only focused on one case, the lack of effective strategic sourcing 
training material proves problematic for the DoD as it promotes efficiency in acquisition.   
3. Development Process Analysis 
In 2006, SAF/AQC briefed a furnishings strategic sourcing business case.   The 
business case was developed by Censeo Consulting Group and highlighted benefits 
available through the strategic purchasing of furniture (Williams, 2006).   Although the 
AFFCC charter was signed in 2009, acquisition planning for the FCC began in 2007 at 
the direction of SAF/AQC to implement a strategic sourcing initiative.  When the AMC 
decided to create a FCC for their MAJCOM, they conducted further market analysis into 
the furniture commodity group.  AMC contracted Censeo to conduct another spend 
analysis.  The spend analysis provided the foundation for the development of the AFFCC.  
Since AMC did not have the expertise to complete the spend analysis, they appropriately 
contracted for that function.  Censeo analyzed the spend data from multiple government 
systems in an efficient and effective manner by using a staff of over 20 cost analysts 
(Informant A, 2011).  This would not have been possible for the AFFCC to accomplish in 
a timely manner given the limited personnel resources.  
Given the AFFCC’s limited personnel resources, the AFFCC collaborated with 
other agencies to gain insight on how to develop and implement the commodity council.  
The AFFCC collaborated with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the U.S. 
Navy, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), UT, and GSA to learn how best to 
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accomplish the furniture strategic sourcing objectives (Informant A, 2011).  In addition to 
collaborating with the agencies, the AFFCC also collaborated with furniture suppliers 
through industry conferences and information-gathering communications with vendors.  
The AFFCC attended the annual NEOCON in Chicago, Illinois, to speak with vendors to 
gain valuable insights into the furniture industry.  The AFFCC also sent out a request for 
information from vendors (Informant D, 2011).  This communication is critical in the 
early stages of the commodity council process.  Since collaboration with key stakeholders 
is an important part of strategic sourcing, we identified this as a success.  AFFCC gained 
insights from more established strategic sourcing programs and from industry.   
A stakeholder analysis is essential for a commodity council to meet its objectives 
and the needs of the end users.  Unfortunately, the AFFCC members did not conduct a 
stakeholder analysis for the seating and dorm furniture spirals in the initial stages of the 
strategic sourcing process.  The AFFCC was unaware of the need to conduct a 
stakeholder analysis until the UT training made them realize the value in a stakeholder 
analysis.  As a result, the AFFCC was unable to identify and define accurate furniture 
requirements. This resulted in furniture requirements that had to be rewritten once the 
stakeholders and end users were identified and engaged in collaboration with the 
commodity council.  During the UT training, a MAJCOM leader volunteered to act as the 
requirements liaison between the AFFCC and the end users.  This process expanded the 
AFFCC’s network and allowed the council to collect requirements from end users across 
the entire Air Force (Informant E, 2011).  By not conducting a stakeholder analysis, the 
commodity council failed to receive stakeholder buy-in. 
Stakeholder buy-in is very important to meet a commodity council’s objectives.  
A council cannot be successful without the support of the stakeholders.  The lack of 
stakeholder buy-in created friction points with the AFFCC’s end users whose options 
became limited after standardizing furniture options.  The end users did not view this as 
favorable because the AFFCC failed to gain their buy-in early in the process. The council 
needed stakeholder buy-in so that the end users would provide their furniture 
requirements to the council.  It was more difficult for the council to gain buy-in later in 
the process because the end users felt like they were forced to accept the strategic 
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purchasing of furniture, and that it was not in their best interest (Informant E, 2011).  Had 
the AFFCC received buy-in early in the process, the end users may have been more open 
to the idea of strategic purchasing and its benefits.  They also would have been able to 
provide more information on requirements earlier in the process.   
 One of our research questions asked whether small business goals sacrificed 
strategic sourcing outcomes.  In the case of the AFFCC—specifically Spirals 1 and 1A 
(seating and dorm furnishings, respectively)—our research indicated that the answer is 
that it depends on the situation.  It depends on the commodity being purchased, the 
market research, the acquisition strategy, and acquisition policies.  For example, Spiral 
1A, dorm furnishings, planned to award BPAs based on GSA schedules.  Initially, the 
AFFCC planned to use small business set-asides.  However, FAR part 8 indicates that 
small business set-asides established in FAR part 19 are not mandatory for GSA 
schedules (FAR, 2011, § 8.405–5).  Therefore, the council was unable to set aside the 
requirement for small businesses (Informant E, 2011).  This created a challenge for the 
AFFCC in that it needed to determine how to support small business goals without 
sacrificing strategic sourcing outcomes.  This situation is unique to this commodity 
council because of the use of the GSA schedules.   
The AFFCC relied on its market research and the AFSBSC business case analysis 
to create an acquisition strategy that would meet both strategic sourcing and small 
business goals.  For example, the AFFCC market research for Spiral 1, seating, showed 
that many small businesses manufacture wood seating.  However, large businesses 
account for approximately 50% of non-wood seating. The AFFCC originally planned to 
compete wood seating as a small business set-aside and the non-wood seating as full and 
open competition (AFSBSC, 2009b).  However, the use of GSA contracts did not allow 
the AFFCC to use this method.  The AFFCC had to find another approach. 
Even with the mandated use of GSA BPAs, the AFFCC was able to determine 
that there were enough wood seating small businesses that several small businesses 
would most likely submit a bid.  As a result, the council expects a 34% ($1.2 million) 
increase in small business dollars over current small business dollars (AMC, 2010).  This 
shows that strategic sourcing does not sacrifice small business goals even without using 
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small business set-asides.  Market research and acquisition strategy provided key small 
business participation determinants during the strategic sourcing process.  
Finally, we found the sourcing strategy to be a success up to the point of contract 
award.  Seating and dorm furnishings are classified as non-critical within Kraljic’s (1983) 
purchasing portfolio approach.  As such, the AFFCC focused on leveraging volume to 
gain savings.  The council achieved price savings by awarding BPAs against GSA 
schedules.   When compared with market prices, the GSA BPA schedules offer prices 
significantly lower than retail market price (Informant H, 2011).  Additionally, the BPAs 
incorporated volume discounts beyond the GSA pricing schedule.  This sourcing strategy 
focused on price analysis, which is the appropriate strategy given the non-critical nature 
of the spend.  The AFFCC rationalized the supply base by reducing the number of 
suppliers by 1,014.  This decreased supplier fragmentation and allowed the Air Force to 
use its bargaining power to achieve additional volume discounts.  The actual costs 
savings will need to be measured at a future date to determine the extent to which the 
council realized expected savings.   
By standardizing furniture across the Air Force, rationalizing the supply base, 
leveraging the Air Force’s buying power, and evaluating offers on a LPTA sourcing 
strategy, the council achieved additional discounts beyond what individual purchasing 
activities could achieve.  Even though the council has no functional ownership or 
centralized funding, it works with stakeholders to provide a standardized solution to 
achieve cost savings.  This will require future research to compare actual spend with 
baseline data.      
4. Implementation Analysis 
As Informant F stated, “People will spend to the budget that they have.  There is 
no incentive to put it in a—there is no 401K.  There is no savings account that you can 
reach into next FY” (May 25, 2011).  Budget-maximization theory addresses leaders’ and 
managers’ propensities to spend all allocated funds.  The culture change necessary to 
maximize the utilization of the AFFCC and to control maverick spending will continue to 
be a challenge for acquisition professionals.  However, the U.S. government’s current 
 105 
fiscal challenges make implementing strategic sourcing initiatives that achieve cost 
savings and reduce TCO a less arduous task. 
Limiting maverick spend will be the major implementation challenge.  With the 
creation of the AFFCC and standardized furniture purchases, end users are limited in 
their furniture choices.  As a result, end users might intentionally not use the established 
furniture BPAs.  On the other hand, maverick spending may occur if end users are not 
aware of the BPAs.  This may result in unintentional avoidance of the established BPAs.  
To avoid this, the AFFCC must create and implement a marketing plan to educate the Air 
Force on new strategic sourcing initiatives.  We surmised that acceptance of strategic 
sourcing across the Air Force and DoD provides greater efficiency savings as a result of 
customer buy-in, ease of implementation, and consistency of use by customers .      
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this section, we make our recommendations for improving commodity council 
development and implementation based on our research findings. Our research indicates 
that acquisition professions within the Air Force lack adequate strategic sourcing 
knowledge.  Additionally, military acquisition personnel with strategic sourcing expertise 
deploy causing an issue with continuity and efficiency.  Finally, the Air Force delegated 
responsibility for developing strategic sourcing initiatives to the contracting function.  
While contracting personnel acquire the acquisition skills necessary to develop and 
implement strategic sourcing initiatives, customers drive requirements.  As experienced 
by the AFFCC, the likelihood of a commodity council meeting its savings objectives 
diminishes if customers do not have a stake in its success.  To address these five main 
issues identified during our research, we recommend implementing the following five 
suggestions to increase efficiency and effectiveness of commodity council strategic 
objectives. 
1. Strategic Sourcing Distance Learning Degree Program 
Since strategic sourcing is an ever-evolving acquisition initiative, acquisition 
professionals need a viable strategic sourcing training program to establish a knowledge 
base instrumental for strategic sourcing expertise development.  While DAU currently 
 106 
offers strategic sourcing computer-based training (CBT) modules, the AFFCC 
demonstrated that the CBTs lacked the rigor necessary to effectively develop and 
implement a commodity council.   
To build a cadre of acquisition professional with extensive strategic sourcing 
knowledge, we recommend the adaptation of the current, traditional delivery of the NPS 
strategic sourcing MBA program via distance learning. Informants offered on multiple 
occasions that their lack of strategic sourcing knowledge hindered efficient commodity 
council implementation.  To compensate for their lack of strategic sourcing knowledge, 
the USAF contracted with UT to provide commodity council development and 
implementation training.  While it was a huge success, a more robust academic strategic 
sourcing curriculum provides returns on the Air Force’s investment well into the future.    
With the availability of a distance learning MBA program with an emphasis in 
strategic sourcing, civilians who would normally do not have the opportunity to relocate 
to pursue academics could have the opportunity to advance their knowledge base.  As 
pointed out during the analysis of the AFFCC, military members’ deployments caused 
continuity and efficiency issues; thus, civilian personnel are the ideal target for this 
degree program.  Additionally, mid-career officers receiving their advanced academic 
degree from NPS are often not available for long to apply their strategic sourcing 
knowledge since their military promotions entice them to pursue other assignments (e.g., 
squadron command, executive officer, career broadening, etc.).  It is nonsensical to 
educate those who will not be available to do strategic sourcing for any appreciable 
length of time (i.e., military), while simultaneously denying the educational opportunity 
to those workforce members who will be around to – and will be expected to - do 
strategic sourcing (i.e., civil servants).  The degree program could equip Air Force 
civilian personnel with knowledge necessary to achieve acquisition efficiencies sought by 
the DoD.   
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2. Obtain Program Management, Spend Analysis, Market Analysis, and 
Cost Analysis Expertise 
The AFFCC experienced issues with resource allocation causing delays in Spiral 
1 and Spiral 1A implementation.  For a commodity council to be effective, they must 
understand what needs to be done and have the personnel to execute the acquisition plan.  
Unfortunately, the AFFCC had neither the knowledge nor the personnel.  Leadership 
must understand that doing more with less comes with higher costs.  For instance, the 
combined lack of adequate personnel and expertise delayed AFFCC implementation for 
at least one year (Informant C, 2011; Informant D, 2011; Informant E; 2011).  The 
AFFCC attributed military deployments as a reason for the lack of personnel and 
expertise.   
The project manager role is essential for the success of the commodity council.  
The project manager must ensure oversight and continuity of the commodity acquisition.  
Since a military member served as the project manager, the project manager position 
promises to be vacant for at least six months.  Unfortunately, the AFFCC experienced 
this twice during development and implementation.  As a result, the AFFCC lost 
manpower, continuity, and strategic sourcing expertise.  Therefore, we recommend that 
future project manager position be filled by a full-time civilian. 
Second, the value of the commodity council lies in the cross-functional expertise 
assigned to the team.  The cross-functional group used by the AFFCC differentiates the 
commodity council from a traditional purchasing organization.  “Preferably, the Council 
should contain commodity expertise, as well as knowledge in maintenance, engineering, 
procurement, technology, market analysis, project management, business processes, and 
acquisition strategy and analysis” (Gillen, 2006).  Leaders must ensure that commodity 
councils consist of the correct mix of cross-functional expertise.  The AFFCC struggled 
since it did not have the proper mix of personnel (i.e., cost-analyst, market analyst).  If 
the Air Force does not have the ability to fill these positions internally, it is essential that 
the Air Force contract for the required expertise.  The knowledge gained from cost, 
market, and spend analyst increases the key data needed to quickly implement strategic 
sourcing initiatives.  Though the AFFCC identified the lack of certain personnel, 
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leadership provided no additional personnel to the team; a result of not having a CPO 
ensuring adequate resource allocation.  We recommend that future commodity councils 
contain the right mix of expertise to increase efficiency in the development and 
implementation process.    
3. Hire a Chief Procurement Officer from Industry 
 An organization’s reluctance to follow or adopt recommended processes 
improvements creates a barrier to promoting the strategic relevance of procurement 
(Ardent Partners, 2011).  The lack of both leadership and customer involvement during 
the AFFCC development and implementation process suggests a reluctance to follow or 
adopt recommended process improvements in the Air Force.   Fryman and Haile (2011) 
provide their Center-Led Air Force Procurement Organizational Structure, shown in 
Figure 6, for the addition of a CPO to the current Air Force organizational structure.  The 
addition of the CPO promotes short-term and long-term cost savings, improves 
acquisition processes, and increases acquisition expertise (Ardent Partners, 2011).  
Additionally, the CPO allocates resources necessary to obtain and retain the resources 
necessary to effectively implement industry best practices within the Air Force.   
To successfully create organizational change, the Air Force should hire an 
experienced CPO from industry.  Industry’s experience in realigning procurement within 
the organization allows the Air Force an opportunity to capture a seasoned CPO with the 
skills necessary to implement proven acquisition initiatives, influence key Air Force 
decision-makers, and drive transformation.  Fryman and Haile’s (2011) addition of the 
CPO to the Air Force organizational structure fills the procurement leadership position 
needed to manage and promote acquisition efficiency initiatives throughout the Air Force 
organization.  Obtaining a CPO from a corporation such as IBM, who, since the 1990’s, 
adopted the CPO to create a procurement position with executive standing could provide 
the Air Force procurement leadership necessary effectively and efficiently procure 
mission requirements in the current austere environment (Axelsson, Rozemeijer & 
Wynstra, 2005). 
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4. Establish Customer Driven Commodity Councils 
Customers prove instrumental to the commodity council successful outcome.  For 
most government acquisitions, the customer drives the requirement.  However, 
commodity councils provide a different acquisition approach.  To garner savings from the 
duplication of requirements, the commodity council proactively engages industry to 
reduce procurement costs.  Through spend analysis, commodity councils anticipate 
requirements and seek efficiencies through leverage.  However, the customer does not 
drive the formation of the commodity council.   
Leadership develops the formation of commodity councils.  Therefore, 
commodity councils’ top-down direction differs from regular acquisitions bottom-up 
requirement requests.  Though commodity council direction comes from leaders, not 
customers, the commodity council needs customers to define the requirements.  Without 
customers’ input, defining the requirement promises to be an arduous task.  Commodity 
councils seek efficiencies by leveraging anticipated customer requirements.  Therefore, 
without customer involvement, the likelihood that a customer maximizes the commodity 
council’s efficiencies reduces dramatically.  Therefore, we recommend that a customer 
representative be assigned full-time to the commodity council for the duration of the 
development and implementation process.    
5. Implement Negative Incentives to Mitigate Maverick Spend 
 The mitigation of maverick spend is essential to the AFFCC’s success.  Therefore, 
the AFFCC implemented mandatory use policy letters signed by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition.  The policy letter proves effective only if monitored and enforced.  
Therefore, the policy letter must be monitored and enforced as appropriate.  If the policy 
letter fails to provide the desired effect, then the policy letter must be strengthened.  
Specifically, the mandatory use policy letter can be made stronger through the inclusion 
of negative incentives in response to maverick spend.   
 The AFFCC should conduct routine spend analysis to identify maverick spend.  If 
maverick spend proves significant, then the effect of the mandatory use policy letter 
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should be evaluated.  Furthermore, the AFFCC should instill negative incentives to 
eliminate the maverick spend.  This should be followed by exception reporting to the 
buyer’s 2-letter at the SAF/HAF level and local MAJCOM/CC and Wing /CC – coupled 
with a requirement for a response as to how it is curtailed in the future.  Along those 
lines, SAF/AQC could make its mandatory use policy letter stronger by employing 
negative incentives.  For example, maverick spend could be determined not to be fair & 
reasonable because the prices obtained were not lower than those offered by the AFFCC 
BPA.  As a result, all such purchases would be considered unauthorized commitments 
and could not be ratified.  Civilian and military contracting members in violation of the 
mandatory use policy letter would lose their warrant.  This negative incentive must 
include GPC holders such that GPC holders would lose their GPC.   
6. Maximize GSA BPA Utilization 
Policy, socioeconomic, and political barriers make implementing strategic 
sourcing in the Government an arduous task.  The AFFCC spent approximately six 
months to a year trying to meet small business goals while still providing the cost 
efficiencies the Air Force requires to modernize the force.  However, with a slow 
implementation process, achieving complete management of all Air Force spend could 
take as long as 400 years at the current pace.  Procurement strategies that optimize quick 
development and implementation should be sought.  GSA BPAs provide such 
optimization. 
As discussed, the use of GSA BPAs by the AFFCC allowed for truncation of 
socioeconomic procurement planning.  Though the AFFCC performed extensive market 
research to determine the extent of small business participation, they concluded that an 
LPTA sourcing strategy provided the ideal trade-off between cost efficiency and 
socioeconomic concerns.  Since GSA BPAs do not require set-aside consideration, the 
likelihood of better pricing increases because of increase marketplace competition.   
As provided in research question three, GSA BPAs offer the flexibility to include 
socioeconomic consideration.  According to FAR subpart 8.405–5(a)(1)(ii), contracting 
officers, at their discretion, may set-aside BPAs for small business (2011).  If market 
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research concludes that there is limited small business participation but available small 
businesses possess the capability to perform, the contracting officer may set aside a 
portion of the GSA BPA for small business.  However, if market research determines that 
adequate small business participation exists, the commodity council should achieve 
deeper discounts and an expanded competitive marketplace.  Therefore, the use of GSA 
BPAs provides the balance between cost savings goals and socioeconomic goals the 
government needs to ensure weapons modernization in the future.    
E. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
Limitations constrain all research projects—especially time and funding.  Our 
research was no exception.  During this research, in addition to time and funding, 
limitations included interviewing all key informants, accessing source data, establishing 
external validity, and meeting submission deadline requirements. 
By interviewing all key informants, researchers improve the likelihood of 
identifying informant biases.  Unfortunately, due to personnel turnover and personal 
tragedy, three key informants were unavailable for interviews.  During the site visit to 
AFFCC, we inquired about the unavailable informants’ commodity council 
responsibilities to ensure we collected all pertinent data. 
In addition, our research had finite access to source data.  This was due to the 
limited amount of time available at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.  To make up for the 
time limitation, the AFFCC prepared a compact disk containing some source documents 
for the researchers.  However, the compact disk contained limited source documents.  
The AFFCC also assigned a liaison to assist us in retrieving any further data for analysis.  
The third limitation to our research was establishing external validity.  Replication 
of findings provides external validity to research (Yin, 2003).  Because we experienced a 
time constraint, we were unable to replicate the research with other commodity councils.  
To help control for external validity, we used a triangulation approach to data collection.     
Finally, our degree program requires that a research report be completed upon 
graduation.  This requirement placed a time constraint of approximately nine months for 
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data collection, analysis, and presentation.  In order to complete all necessary research 
functions, we truncated the scope of our research to only the AFFCC.  As discussed, this 
hindered our ability to establish external validity through research replication.                
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As strategic sourcing continues to gain popularity within government 
organizations, replication of this case study research will garner deeper insight into 
resource allocation, training, development and implementation.  Future recommendations 
for commodity council case study research includes studies to determines the impact of 
strategic sourcing on small businesses, compare historical spend data with cost savings 
estimates and actual commodity council spend data, identify the trends among all of the 
commodity council reports, and assess the Enterprise Sourcing Group based on measures 
of performance and measures of effectiveness.  Furthermore, comparative analysis of 
multiple commodity council case study results provides an opportunity to establish 
greater external validity, prompting a greater understanding of commodity council’s 
development and implementation successes and challenges.   
Another potential area for future research is the development of a defense-wide 
acquisition agency (DAA).  Currently, the DoD service departments utilize their own set 
of policies and procedures for acquisitions.  By having multiple agencies simultaneously 
letting multiple contracts with the same requirement, the DoD fails to achieve volume 
discounts from suppliers.  Additionally, the administrative savings could prove to 
outperform savings achieved by consolidation of requirements.   
Furthermore, our research of the AFFCC illustrated that at the current 
development and implementation rate for strategic sourcing initiatives it would take 
approximately 400 years to implement a potential 200 strategic sourcing opportunities.  
To improve implementation efficiency, we recommend a study to determine a way to 
truncate the schedule and reduce the time need for steps 1–5 of the strategic sourcing 
framework shown in Figure 5.   
Finally, further research is needed to compare data collection and analysis  
processes and electronic software used by the DoD to conduct spend analysis and 
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decision making with data collection and analysis processes and electronic software used 
by leading commercial industry firms.  Specifically, research is needed in the area of 
modeling to produce better forecast of Air Force wide requirements.  Today’s technology 
capabilities provide information overload.  Studies are needed to evaluate ways to 
effectively capture spend data, incorporate the data into a model, and use the model to 
forecast requirements.  This will lead to improved purchasing efficiency and 
effectiveness.  By comparing the DoD’s current approach with industry leaders, the 
USAF will be able to adapt commercial best practices in this area.           
G. SUMMARY 
A case study methodology enables research to answer “how” or “why” a specific 
event occurs.  Researching multiple cases related to a specific event provides a greater 
understanding.  This study sought to answer specific questions about the design and 
implementation of the AFFCC to provide insight for future commodity council 
development and implementation.  We explored qualitative analyses of peer-reviewed 
literature, theories, government policies, directives, and guides, and conducted interviews 
with past and present members of the AFFCC.   
Our analysis was concentrated to four specific areas: resource allocation, training, 
development process, and implementation.  A deeper analysis of the personal interviews 
and miscellaneous AFFCC source documents led to the identification of the successes 
and challenges the AFFCC encountered during the development and implementation of 
the AFFCC.  In addition, we explored the challenges associated with the research 
questions based on the results of the qualitative data.  Based on lessons learned, we 
provided recommendations to benefit future development, implementation, and 
sustainment of commodity councils throughout the Air Force and the DoD.   
Acquisition efficiency provides the DoD cost and efficiency savings it needs to 
meet downward budgetary pressures.  To accomplish acquisition efficiency, the DoD and 
other U.S. government agencies look to industry.  However, the private and public 
sector’s “clash of cultures” makes implementation of these best practices difficult.  
Continuous case study research identifying successes and challenges of implementing 
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industry best practices in government (i.e., strategic sourcing) improves successful 
development and implementation of future acquisition initiatives.  Thus, this study, along 
with past and future acquisition research, sets the framework for improving U.S. 
government acquisition efficiency and effectiveness.  
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APPENDIX A. AFFCC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Part One:  Furnishings Commodity Council Development and Implementation 
 
A.  Resources 
1. How many people were involved in the commodity council development?  Was it 
enough? 
2. What functional areas made up the team? 
3. How were members on the commodity council selected? 
4. Were the functional areas involved the correct mix?  If not, what area should have 
been included or not included?   
5. Did the composition of the team remain the same or change throughout the 
development process?  If no, did this hinder the commodity council development? 
6. What were the team dynamics?  Was each team member valuable or valued?  What 
authority, if any, did each member possess? 
7. Describe what the organization culture.  Was the assigned authority sufficient?  How 
did it add to or take away from the development process? 
 
B.  Training 
1. Did members of the team possess a solid understanding of the strategic sourcing 
initiatives and the Air Force vision to achieve these initiatives? 
2. Did individuals possess the correct skill sets for their role within the team?  If not, 
was additional training required? 
3. If additional training was required, how was it accomplished? 
4. Is formal training available and required? 
 
C.  Plan   
1. Did this commodity council have a documented Furnishing Commodity Council 
development and implementation plan outlining specific objectives? 
2. If a plan was in place: 
a. Was the plan designed by team members or instituted at a higher level? 
b. What considerations were taken into account when the plan was designed? 
c. How was the plan made available to all the team members, if at all? 
d. Was the plan followed?  In not, why? 
3. If a plan was not in place, why not? 
4. How did you organize your resources, activities, and milestones to fit your strategic 
direction? 
 
D.  Implementation 
1. How long did it take to stand up the commodity council?  Was it on time?  If 
implementation was late, then why? 
2. How long did it take to award the first spiral?  Was it on time?  If implementation was 
late, then why? 
3. What were the results of the first spiral source selection? 
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Part Two:  Furnishings Commodity Council Sourcing Strategy and Execution 
 
A.  Commodity Sourcing Strategy 
1. Was there an established process for each phase of the acquisition? 
2. Was the process followed?  If not, what was done differently? 
3. What impact, if any, did transactional cost have in the process? 
4. Were best practices from industry or other commodity councils incorporated in the 
process?  
a. If yes, explain how the best practices were identified and incorporated. 
b. If no, why? 
5. How did you transform the traditional decentralized purchasing function to a 
strategically sourced purchasing function? 
6. What were the successes in the process development? 
7. What were the issues faced during the process development? 
 
B.  Small Business Concerns 
1. How were small business goals integrated into the process without sacrificing 
strategic sourcing outcomes? 
2. What were the main concerns that the SBA had? 
3. How did you address these concerns? 
4. How was the relationship with the SBA during the commodity council development 
and implementation process?  Elaborate. 
 
C.  Spend Analysis 
1. Along which dimensions did you conduct a spend analysis? 
2. How did you collect the data for the spend analysis? 
3. How did you calculate the total cost of ownership when doing the spend analysis? 
 
D.  Cost and Performance Metrics 
1. How were the critical cost drivers and performance metrics identified? 
2. How did you evaluate/incorporate those cost drivers and performance metrics? 
3. What is the cost and performance objective?  What are the consequences if not 
obtained? 
4. What metrics were established to define the commodity council as a success or 
failure? 
5. How did the commodity council address funding issues (i.e. the lack of functional 
ownership over spend or fund allocation) since there is no single customer? 
6. How do established savings metrics account for the lack direct fund allocation to the 
commodity council? 
7. How do the established metrics entice organizations to use the commodity council 
who do have fund allocation? 
 
E.  Supplier Integration and Relationships 
1. Were suppliers integrated into the development process, if at all? 
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2. How did you meet the requirements of justifying “consolidation” as stated in the 
FAR? 
a. Describe the approval process both internally and with the SBA. 
b. What were the challenges? 
c. What documentation and analysis was required?  Can you provide copies? 
3. What areas within the buyer-supplier relationship were most important to the 
commodity council? 
a. How were these areas identified and measured during source selection, if at 
all? 
4. If suppliers were integrated, how did they contribute to the successful development? 
 
 
F.  Accountability Process 
1. What has been incorporated to enforce use of this commodity council? 
2. What mechanisms or policies are in place to reduce “maverick” spending? 
3. How are those mechanisms or policies enforced? 
4. What metrics were established to ensure savings are accurate, consistent, objective, 
and verifiable? 
a. How were these metrics identified? 
b. What process has been established to validate these metrics? 
c. Were these metrics approved by a higher authority?  If so, whom? 
5. To whom does the CC director report?  Is this the same person identified in the 
planning phase?  If not, why? 
 
G.  Overall Assessment 
1. What has the commodity council achieved? 
2. What did the first spiral achieve? 
3. Is the overall strategy of the commodity council still on track with initial expectations 
using the performance metrics established? 
4. What lessons learned should be captured and relayed to developers of future 
commodity councils? 
5. What political hurdles did you encounter?  How were they overcome? 
6. What are the significant barriers or threats to standing up a commodity council? 
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